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WSWS : News
& Analysis : Europe
: The
Balkan Crisis
Kosovo "freedom fighters" financed by organised
crime
By Michel Chossudovsky
10 April 1999
Michel Chossudovsky is a Professor of Economics at the University
of Ottawa and author of The Globalization of Poverty, Impacts
of IMF and World Bank Reforms, Third World Network, Penang
and Zed Books, London, 1997. He has submitted this article to
the World Socialist Web Site and we are presenting it for
the information of our readers.
Also in
Serbo-Croatian
Heralded by the global media as a humanitarian peace-keeping
mission, NATO's ruthless bombing of Belgrade and Pristina goes
far beyond the breach of international law. While Slobodan Milosevic
is demonised, portrayed as a remorseless dictator, the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) is upheld as a self-respecting nationalist
movement struggling for the rights of ethnic Albanians. The truth
of the matter is that the KLA is sustained by organised crime
with the tacit approval of the United States and its allies.
Following a pattern set during the War in Bosnia, public opinion
has been carefully misled. The multibillion dollar Balkans narcotics
trade has played a crucial role in "financing the conflict"
in Kosovo in accordance with Western economic, strategic and military
objectives. Amply documented by European police files, acknowledged
by numerous studies, the links of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
to criminal syndicates in Albania, Turkey and the European Union
have been known to Western governments and intelligence agencies
since the mid-1990s.
" ... The financing of the Kosovo guerrilla war poses
critical questions and it sorely tests claims of an "ethical"
foreign policy. Should the West back a guerrilla army that appears
to partly financed by organised crime."[1]
While KLA leaders were shaking hands with US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright at Rambouillet, Europol (the European Police
Organization based in The Hague) was "preparing a report
for European interior and justice ministers on a connection between
the KLA and Albanian drug gangs."[2] In the meantime, the
rebel army has been skilfully heralded by the global media (in
the months preceding the NATO bombings) as broadly representative
of the interests of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
With KLA leader Hashim Thaci (a 29 year "freedom fighter")
appointed as chief negotiator at Rambouillet, the KLA has become
the de facto helmsman of the peace process on behalf of the ethnic
Albanian majority and this despite its links to the drug trade.
The West was relying on its KLA puppets to rubber-stamp an agreement
which would have transformed Kosovo into an occupied territory
under Western Administration.
Ironically Robert Gelbard, America's special envoy to Bosnia,
had described the KLA last year as "terrorists". Christopher
Hill, America's chief negotiator and architect of the Rambouillet
agreement, "has also been a strong critic of the KLA for
its alleged dealings in drugs."[3] Moreover, barely a few
two months before Rambouillet, the US State Department had acknowledged
(based on reports from the US Observer Mission) the role of the
KLA in terrorising and uprooting ethnic Albanians:
" ... the KLA harass or kidnap anyone who comes to the
police, ... KLA representatives had threatened to kill villagers
and burn their homes if they did not join the KLA [a process which
has continued since the NATO bombings]... [T]he KLA harassment
has reached such intensity that residents of six villages in the
Stimlje region are "ready to flee."[4]
While backing a "freedom movement" with links to
the drug trade, the West seems also intent in bypassing the civilian
Kosovo Democratic League and its leader Ibrahim Rugova who has
called for an end to the bombings and expressed his desire to
negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Yugoslav authorities.[5]
It is worth recalling that a few days before his March 31 Press
Conference, Rugova had been reported by the KLA (alongside three
other leaders including Fehmi Agani) to have been killed by the
Serbs.
Covert financing of "freedom fighters"
Remember Oliver North and the Contras? The pattern in Kosovo
is similar to other CIA covert operations in Central America,
Haiti and Afghanistan where "freedom fighters" were
financed through the laundering of drug money. Since the onslaught
of the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies have developed
a complex relationship to the illegal narcotics trade. In case
after case, drug money laundered in the international banking
system has financed covert operations.
According to author Alfred McCoy, the pattern of covert financing
was established in the Indochina war. In the 1960s, the Meo army
in Laos was funded by the narcotics trade as part of Washington's
military strategy against the combined forces of the neutralist
government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao.[6]
The pattern of drug politics set in Indochina has since been
replicated in Central America and the Caribbean. "The rising
curve of cocaine imports to the US", wrote journalist John
Dinges "followed almost exactly the flow of US arms and military
advisers to Central America".[7]
The military in Guatemala and Haiti, to which the CIA provided
covert support, were known to be involved in the trade of narcotics
into Southern Florida. And as revealed in the Iran-Contra and
Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) scandals, there
was strong evidence that covert operations were funded through
the laundering of drug money. "Dirty money" recycled
through the banking system--often through an anonymous shell company--
became "covert money," used to finance various rebel
groups and guerrilla movements including the Nicaraguan Contras
and the Afghan Mujahadeen. According to a 1991 Time magazine
report:
"Because the US wanted to supply the mujehadeen rebels
in Afghanistan with stinger missiles and other military hardware
it needed the full cooperation of Pakistan. By the mid-1980s,
the CIA operation in Islamabad was one of the largest US intelligence
stations in the World. 'If BCCI is such an embarrassment to the
US that forthright investigations are not being pursued it has
a lot to do with the blind eye the US turned to the heroin trafficking
in Pakistan', said a US intelligence officer.[8]
America and Germany join hands
Since the early 1990s, Bonn and Washington have joined hands
in establishing their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans.
Their intelligence agencies have also collaborated. According
to intelligence analyst John Whitley, covert support to the Kosovo
rebel army was established as a joint endeavour between the CIA
and Germany's Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND) (which previously
played a key role in installing a right-wing nationalist government
under Franjo Tudjman in Croatia).[9] The task to create and finance
the KLA was initially given to Germany: "They used German
uniforms, East German weapons and were financed, in part, with
drug money".[10] According to Whitley, the CIA was subsequently
instrumental in training and equipping the KLA in Albania.[11]
The covert activities of Germany's BND were consistent with
Bonn's intent to expand its "Lebensraum" into the Balkans.
Prior to the onset of the civil war in Bosnia, Germany and its
Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had actively supported
secession; it had "forced the pace of international diplomacy"
and pressured its Western allies to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.
According to the Geopolitical Drug Watch, both Germany and the
US favoured (although not officially) the formation of a "Greater
Albania" encompassing Albania, Kosovo and parts of Macedonia.[12]
According to Sean Gervasi, Germany was seeking a free hand among
its allies "to pursue economic dominance in the whole of
Mitteleuropa."[13]
Islamic fundamentalism in support of the KLA
Bonn and Washington's "hidden agenda" consisted in
triggering nationalist liberation movements in Bosnia and Kosovo
with the ultimate purpose of destabilising Yugoslavia. The latter
objective was also carried out "by turning a blind eye"
to the influx of mercenaries and financial support from Islamic
fundamentalist organisations.[14]
Mercenaries financed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had been fighting
in Bosnia.[15] And the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo:
Mujahadeen mercenaries from various Islamic countries are reported
to be fighting alongside the KLA in Kosovo. German, Turkish and
Afghan instructors were reported to be training the KLA in guerrilla
and diversion tactics.[16]
According to a Deutsche Press-Agentur report, financial support
from Islamic countries to the KLA had been channelled through
the former Albanian chief of the National Information Service
(NIS), Bashkim Gazidede.[17] "Gazidede, reportedly a devout
Moslem who fled Albania in March of last year [1997], is presently
[1998] being investigated for his contacts with Islamic terrorist
organizations."[18]
The supply route for arming KLA "freedom fighters"
are the rugged mountainous borders of Albania with Kosovo and
Macedonia. Albania is also a key point of transit of the Balkans
drug route which supplies Western Europe with grade four heroin.
Seventy-five percent of the heroin entering Western Europe is
from Turkey. And a large part of drug shipments originating in
Turkey transits through the Balkans. According to the US Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), "it is estimated that 4-6
metric tons of heroin leave each month from Turkey having [through
the Balkans] as destination Western Europe."[19] A recent
intelligence report by Germany's Federal Criminal Agency suggests
that: "Ethnic Albanians are now the most prominent group
in the distribution of heroin in Western consumer countries."[20]
The laundering of dirty money
In order to thrive, the criminal syndicates involved in the
Balkans narcotics trade need friends in high places. Smuggling
rings with alleged links to the Turkish State are said to control
the trafficking of heroin through the Balkans "cooperating
closely with other groups with which they have political or religious
ties" including criminal groups in Albanian and Kosovo.[21]
In this new global financial environment, powerful undercover
political lobbies connected to organized crime cultivate links
to prominent political figures and officials of the military and
intelligence establishment.
The narcotics trade nonetheless uses respectable banks to launder
large amounts of dirty money. While comfortably removed from the
smuggling operations per se, powerful banking interests in Turkey
but mainly those in financial centres in Western Europe discretely
collect fat commissions in a multibillion dollar money laundering
operation. These interests have high stakes in ensuring a safe
passage of drug shipments into Western European markets.
The Albanian connection
Arms smuggling from Albania into Kosovo and Macedonia started
at the beginning of 1992, when the Democratic Party came to power,
headed by President Sali Berisha. An expansive underground economy
and cross border trade had unfolded. A triangular trade in oil,
arms and narcotics had developed largely as a result of the embargo
imposed by the international community on Serbia and Montenegro
and the blockade enforced by Greece against Macedonia.
Industry and agriculture in Kosovo were spearheaded into bankruptcy
following the IMF's lethal "economic medicine" imposed
on Belgrade in 1990. The embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia. Ethnic
Albanians and Serbs were driven into abysmal poverty. Economic
collapse created an environment which fostered the progress of
illicit trade. In Kosovo, the rate of unemployment increased to
a staggering 70 percent (according to Western sources).
Poverty and economic collapse served to exacerbate simmering
ethnic tensions. Thousands of unemployed youths "barely out
of their teens" from an impoverished population, were drafted
into the ranks of the KLA ...[22]
In neighbouring Albania, the free market reforms adopted since
1992 had created conditions which favoured the criminalisation
of state institutions. Drug money was also laundered in the Albanian
pyramids (ponzi schemes) which mushroomed during the government
of former President Sali Berisha (1992-1997).[23] These shady
investment funds were an integral part of the economic reforms
inflicted by Western creditors on Albania.
Drug barons in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (with links to
the Italian Mafia) had become the new economic elites, often associated
with Western business interests. In turn the financial proceeds
of the trade in drugs and arms were recycled towards other illicit
activities (and vice versa) including a vast prostitution racket
between Albania and Italy. Albanian criminal groups operating
in Milan, "have become so powerful running prostitution rackets
that they have even taken over the Calabrians in strength and
influence."[24]
The application of "strong economic medicine" under
the guidance of the Washington based Bretton Woods institutions
had contributed to wrecking Albania's banking system and precipitating
the collapse of the Albanian economy. The resulting chaos enabled
American and European transnationals to carefully position themselves.
Several Western oil companies including Occidental, Shell and
British Petroleum had their eyes riveted on Albania's abundant
and unexplored oil-deposits. Western investors were also gawking
Albania's extensive reserves of chrome, copper, gold, nickel and
platinum.... The Adenauer Foundation had been lobbying in the
background on behalf of German mining interests.[25]
Berisha's Minister of Defence Safet Zoulali (alleged to have
been involved in the illegal oil and narcotics trade) was the
architect of the agreement with Germany's Preussag (handing over
control over Albania's chrome mines) against the competing bid
of the US led consortium of Macalloy Inc. in association with
Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZ).[26]
Large amounts of narco-dollars had also been recycled into
the privatisation programmes leading to the acquisition of state
assets by the mafias. In Albania, the privatisation programme
had led virtually overnight to the development of a property owning
class firmly committed to the "free market". In Northern
Albania, this class was associated with the Guegue "families"
linked to the Democratic Party.
Controlled by the Democratic Party under the presidency of
Sali Berisha (1992-97), Albania's largest financial "pyramid"
VEFA Holdings had been set up by the Guegue "families"
of Northern Albania with the support of Western banking interests.
VEFA was under investigation in Italy in 1997 for its ties to
the Mafia which allegedly used VEFA to launder large amounts of
dirty money.[27]
According to one press report (based on intelligence sources),
senior members of the Albanian government during the presidency
of Sali Berisha including cabinet members and members of the secret
police SHIK were alleged to be involved in drugs trafficking and
illegal arms trading into Kosovo:
(...) The allegations are very serious. Drugs, arms, contraband
cigarettes all are believed to have been handled by a company
run openly by Albania's ruling Democratic Party, Shqiponja (...).
In the course of 1996 Defence Minister, Safet Zhulali [was alleged]
to had used his office to facilitate the transport of arms, oil
and contraband cigarettes. (...) Drugs barons from Kosovo (...)
operate in Albania with impunity, and much of the transportation
of heroin and other drugs across Albania, from Macedonia and Greece
en route to Italy, is believed to be organised by Shik, the state
security police (...). Intelligence agents are convinced the chain
of command in the rackets goes all the way to the top and have
had no hesitation in naming ministers in their reports.[28]
The trade in narcotics and weapons was allowed to prosper despite
the presence since 1993 of a large contingent of American troops
at the Albanian-Macedonian border with a mandate to enforce the
embargo. The West had turned a blind eye. The revenues from oil
and narcotics were used to finance the purchase of arms (often
in terms of direct barter): "Deliveries of oil to Macedonia
(skirting the Greek embargo [in 1993-4] can be used to cover heroin,
as do deliveries of kalachnikov rifles to Albanian 'brothers'
in Kosovo".[29]
The Northern tribal clans or "fares" had also developed
links with Italy's crime syndicates.[30] In turn, the latter played
a key role in smuggling arms across the Adriatic into the Albanian
ports of Dures and Valona. At the outset in 1992, the weapons
channelled into Kosovo were largely small arms including Kalashnikov
AK-47 rifles, RPK and PPK machine-guns, 12.7 calibre heavy machine-guns,
etc.
The proceeds of the narcotics trade has enabled the KLA to
rapidly develop a force of some 30,000 men. More recently, the
KLA has acquired more sophisticated weaponry including anti-aircraft
and anti-armor rockets. According to Belgrade, some of the funds
have come directly from the CIA "funnelled through a so-called
'Government of Kosovo' based in Geneva, Switzerland. Its Washington
office employs the public-relations firm of Ruder Finn--notorious
for its slanders of the Belgrade government".[31]
The KLA has also acquired electronic surveillance equipment
which enables it to receive NATO satellite information concerning
the movement of the Yugoslav Army. The KLA training camp in Albania
is said to "concentrate on heavy weapons training--rocket
propelled grenades, medium caliber cannons, tanks and transporter
use, as well as on communications, and command and control".
(According to Yugoslav government sources).[32]
These extensive deliveries of weapons to the Kosovo rebel army
were consistent with Western geopolitical objectives. Not surprisingly,
there has been a "deafening silence" of the international
media regarding the Kosovo arms-drugs trade. In the words of a
1994 Report of the Geopolitical Drug Watch: "the trafficking
[of drugs and arms] is basically being judged on its geostrategic
implications (...) In Kosovo, drugs and weapons trafficking is
fuelling geopolitical hopes and fears"...[33]
The fate of Kosovo had already been carefully laid out prior
to the signing of the 1995 Dayton agreement. NATO had entered
an unwholesome "marriage of convenience" with the mafia.
"Freedom fighters" were put in place, the narcotics
trade enabled Washington and Bonn to "finance the Kosovo
conflict" with the ultimate objective of destabilising the
Belgrade government and fully recolonising the Balkans. The destruction
of an entire country is the outcome. Western governments which
participated in the NATO operation bear a heavy burden of responsibility
in the deaths of civilians, the impoverishment of both the ethnic
Albanian and Serbian populations and the plight of those who were
brutally uprooted from towns and villages in Kosovo as a result
of the bombings.
Notes:
1. Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, Drugs Money
Linked to the Kosovo Rebels, The Times, London, Monday, March
24, 1999.
2. Ibid.
3. Philip Smucker and Tim Butcher, "Shifting stance over
KLA has betrayed' Albanians", Daily Telegraph, London, 6
April 1999
4. KDOM Daily Report, released by the Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs, Office of South Central European Affairs, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, DC, December 21, 1998; Compiled by EUR/SCE
(202-647-4850) from daily reports of the US element of the Kosovo
Diplomatic Observer Mission, December 21, 1998.
5. "Rugova, sous protection serbe appelle a l'arret des raides",
Le Devoir, Montreal, 1 April 1999.
6. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,
Harper and Row, New York, 1972.
7. See John Dinges, Our Man in Panama, The Shrewd Rise and Brutal
Fall of Manuel Noriega, Times Books, New York, 1991.
8. "The Dirtiest Bank of All," Time, July 29, 1991,
p. 22.
9. Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999; see also Michel Collon,
Poker Menteur, editions EPO, Brussels, 1997.
10. Quoted in Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999).
11. Ibid.
12. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4
13. Sean Gervasi, "Germany, US and the Yugoslav Crisis",
Covert Action Quarterly, No. 43, Winter 1992-93).
14. See Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1993.
15. For further details see Michel Collon, Poker Menteur, editions
EPO, Brussels, 1997, p. 288.
16. Truth in Media, Kosovo in Crisis, Phoenix, 2 April 1999.
17. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 13, 1998.
18. Ibid.
19. Daily News, Ankara, 5 March 1997.
20. Quoted in Boyes and Wright, op cit.
21. ANA, Athens, 28 January 1997, see also Turkish Daily News,
29 January 1997.
22. Brian Murphy, KLA Volunteers Lack Experience, The Associated
Press, 5 April 1999.
23. See Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3, see also
Barry James, in Balkans, Arms for Drugs, The International Herald
Tribune, Paris, June 6, 1994.
24. The Guardian, 25 March 1997.
25. For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, La crisi albanese,
Edizioni Gruppo Abele, Torino, 1998.
26. Ibid.
27. Andrew Gumbel, The Gangster Regime We Fund, The Independent,
February 14, 1997, p. 15.
28. Ibid.
29. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3.
30. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 66, p. 4.
31. Quoted in Workers' World, May 7, 1998.
32. See Government of Yugoslavia at http://www.gov.yu/terrorism/terroristcamps.html.
33. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4.
Recent articles by Chossudovsky:
On Yugoslavia:
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/022.html
On the Brazilian financial crisis:
http://wwwdb.ix.de/tp/english/special/eco/6373/1.html
On global poverty and the financial crisis:
http://www.transnational.org/features/chossu_worldbank.html
http://www.transnational.org/features/g7solution.html
http://www.twnside.org.sg/souths/twn/title/scam-cn.htm
http://www.interlog.com/~cjazz/chossd.htm
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/eco/
http://heise.xlink.de/tp/english/special/eco/6099/1.html#anchor1
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