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Balkans
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman dies
"He was a monster, but he was our monster"
By Justus Leicht and Peter Schwarz
16 December 1999
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"Tudjman almost certainly did not care that he was a monster
because, unlike Milosevic, he was our monster." These are
the words that the author Misha Glenny uses in his recent book
to sum up the relationship between the Western powers and Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman, who died in Zagreb on Saturday night.
Tudjman was a nationalist, a racist and anti-Semite. As president
and army commander-in-chief he was personally responsible for
driving 400,000 Serbs out of Croatia. The country, which originally
had a Serbian population of 12 percent, is today almost "Serb-free".
From the Krajina alone, the Croatian army expelled a quarter
million Serbs, who had lived there for centuries. Later, a UN
report noted: "New evidence for the atrocities continues
to emerge, on average, six corpses a day ... the corpses, some
fresh, others decayed, are predominantly old men. Many were shot
in the back of the head or had their throats cut, others were
mutilated.... The crimes were committed by the Croatian army,
the Croatian police and Croatian civilians. No efforts were observed
of them being ordered to stop, and everything points to a policy
of scorched earth."
In Tudjman's view, Catholic Croatia was the cultural demarcation
line separating the West from the Orthodox Christian and Muslim
Balkans. His racist opinions regarding Bosnian Muslims, Jews and
Roma were notorious.
As a historian, he had written in the 1960s thick tomes in
which he glorified the medieval roots of the Croatian nation and
trivialised the atrocities of the fascist Ustasha. During the
Second World War, under Hitler's sponsorship, the Ustasha had
established an independent Croatian state. In Jasenovac concentration
camp up to 800,000 Serbs, Jews, Roma and anti-fascists were cruelly
murdered. Tudjman reduced this number to 30,000 and ascribed quite
"positive achievements" to the Ustasha regime, which
were "the expression of the historical efforts of the Croatian
people".
Under his presidency, fascist symbols emerged once again. The
flag of the new Croatian state was modelled after that of the
Ustasha regime, just like the currency of the country. Public
squares and roads, named after figures from the Yugoslav guerrilla
war against the German armed forces and its collaborators, were
now given the names of "heroes" of Croatian nationalism.
Anti-fascist films disappeared.
Among Tudjman's avowed followers was Dinko Sakic, former commander
of the Jasenovac concentration camp, who had fled to Argentina
after the war, where he lived undisturbed for many decades. According
to reports, which Tudjman always denied, the Croatian president
is said to have maintained personal contact with Sakic up to 1994.
Only in 1999 was a trial against Sakic begun in Zagreb, and in
October the 77-year-old was condemned to 20 years imprisonment.
In Bosnia, Tudjman extended his protection to the notorious
HVO militia, which clung to fascist traditions even more openly
than their Croatian sponsor. The HVO was financed directly from
the Croatian treasury and was shielded by Tudjman against pursuit
by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. His co-operation with these
notorious war criminals was so obvious that rumours began to mount
that the Hague tribunal was preparing to act against Tudjman.
Tudjman possessed all the negative characteristicsand
a few morethat are usually ascribed to his opponent, Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic. But whereas Milosevic was demonised
as a "Hitler of the Balkans" and Yugoslavia was bombed
to destruction, the same characteristics made Tudjman an ideal
partner of the Western powersin particular Germany and the
United States.
Born in 1922, he originally was part of the leadership of the
Yugoslav army. Aged 19, he followed Tito's partisans and after
the war rose to the rank of general. In 1961 he left the military
to become director of a Communist Party historical institute in
Zagreb. It was at this time that he became a Croatian nationalist
and, as such, influenced the so-called "Croatian spring"
of 1971. At that time, his denial of the true numbers of Jasenovac
victims led to two short terms of imprisonment.
By then the German secret service had established close contact
with the Croatian nationalists, among whom Tudjman ranked as a
leading spokesman.
In 1989 he created the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and
the same year was elected president of the Yugoslavian Republic
of Croatia. He was now a frequent and welcome guest in Bonn. The
German government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister
Dietrich Genscher, against the initial hesitation of the US and
other European governments, pushed for the rapid recognition of
Croatia after Tudjman announced its independence in 1991 following
a referendum.
There was no lack of warnings that this would lead to bloody
disputes all over Yugoslavia. Large national groupslike
the Serbs in Croatiasuddenly found themselves in a foreign
country which did not recognise their rights. In addition, it
was well known that Tudjman was seeking to establish a Croatian
state far larger than the Croatian Republic of Yugoslavia. Even
before the unilateral declaration of independence, in several
secret meetings Tudjman had agreed with Milosevic the division
of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia, whereby the largest population
groupthe Bosnian Muslimswould emerge empty handed.
Despite the perilous implications of Croatian secession from
the Yugoslav Federation, the Western powers recognised the independence
of Croatia because it served their own interests. After the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the US, Germany, Britain
and France lost interest in upholding the unity of Yugoslavia,
something they had previouslysince the split between Stalin
and Titovalued as a bulwark against a Soviet thrust into
the Mediterranean. With the demise of the USSR they quickly came
to regard Yugoslavia's old, centralised state structure as an
obstacle to the privatisation of state-owned industry and the
penetration of Western capital.
They considered Tudjman an ally in breaking open these structures
and limiting Belgrade's influence in the Balkans. Thus Milosevic
became the villain and Serbia was categorised as a "rogue
state", while Tudjman, despite his authoritarian behaviour
and racist opinions, was portrayed in the most favourable possible
light.
In all the crucial phases of the Bosnia conflict, Tudjman was
supported by Germany and the US. While the Croatian troops initially
acted brutally against the Muslim populationin 1992 they
massacred numerous civilians in the Mostar regionin 1994,
on initiative of the US, the Croatian and Muslim nationalists
formed an anti-Serbian alliance. With the military support of
NATO they conquered large sections of northwest Bosnia, and hundreds
of thousands of Serbs were driven out.
In 1995 the US and Germany gave the green light for the "lightning"
and "storm" offensives, and provided military support
against the predominantly Serbian-inhabited regions of West Slavonia
and the Krajina within Croatia. Knijn, the Serbian "capital"
of the Krajina, was ruthlessly bombarded and roughly a quarter
million Serbs driven out or murdered.
The victims of the Bosnian war were not the only ones who suffered
due to Western support for Tudjman. The Croatian population did
as well. After his 10-year rule the "father of the nation",
as he liked to be called, has left behind an economic and social
disaster.
Unemployment officially stands at 20 percent, wages are very
low and a large part of the population lives in bitter poverty.
Around the president a fabulously wealthy clique has gathered,
which mainly consists of his family and some of his favourites.
They have seized formerly state-owned property, in part by flagrantly
illegal means. Tudjman maintained a pompous personality cult,
recalling the final years of Tito.
Democratic rights in Croatia are trampled on, the press and
media kept on a tight leash, and critical journalists persecuted
and suppressed. Altogether, there are nine different secret services,
one under the direct control of Tudjman's son, Miroslav. These
protect the security of the ruling clique. Even parliamentary
President Vlatko Pavletic, who took over Tudjman's affairs of
office in the final stages of the president's illness, publicly
complained that his telephone was bugged.
In the aftermath of the Bosnian war, the great powers gradually
arrived at the conclusion that Tudjman had served his purpose.
The Croatian president and his right-wing extremist clique of
fascists, war criminals and Mafiosi were not only hated by their
own population, but their pervasive corruption and nepotism were
an obstacle to the penetration of international capital. The European
Union has so far refused to grant the desolate country candidate
status for EU membership, which most other Eastern European states
have now achieved.
Above all, Tudjman's greater-Croatian chauvinism increasingly
endangered the fragile structure of the NATO protectorate Bosnia
and, in the long run, the stability of the entire Balkans. Only
under massive Western pressure, and even then unwillingly, did
Tudjman recognise the "inviolability of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
border" in July this year. Nevertheless, he later called
for the "independence" of the Croatian enclave Herzeg-Bosna.
The telegrams of condolence from Western governments contained
the usual words of praise for the deceased. German Federal President
Johannes Rau called Tudjman "a great figure of political
leadership". Rau went on, shamelessly, to say the friendly
relations between the German and Croatian peoples which had been
deepened during Tudjman's presidency could now be developed further.
Reading between the lines, however, one can discern a certain
note of relief. Now the democratisation of the country
can go forward, is how Javier Solana, the head of the EU for foreign
and security policies, expressed it. The hope is that Tudjman's
successorunder consideration is Foreign Affairs Minister
Mate Granicwill be more amenable to Western requirements.
At the same time there are fears that Tudjman's party could break
apart after the death of the autocrat.
See Also:
The US and ethnic cleansingthe
case of Croatia
[15 April 1999]
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