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WSWS : News
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: Indonesia
Freeport obtains Indonesian approval to expand world's largest
gold mine
By Mike Head
20 February 1999
After a year-long saga, the Habibie government in Indonesia
has given the US mining company Freeport McMoRan approval to almost
double production at the Grassberg copper, silver and copper operation
in West Papua (Irian Jaya). With reserves valued at $40 billion,
the Freeport project is the largest single gold deposit in the
world and the third largest open-cut copper mine.
Mines and Energy Minister Kuntoro Mangkusubroto announced the
decision, which is retrospective to the start of the year, on
Monday. Some four weeks earlier, Freeport's chief executive James
Moffett held a private meeting with President B. J. Habibie to
discuss his difficulties in getting the expansion approved since
ex-president Suharto personally endorsed it last year.
Both the announcement and the tense manoeuvres that preceded
it provide an insight into the uneasy relations between the Habibie
regime and the Western powers and multinationals, in the wake
of Suharto's fall. Freeport is a classic Suharto-period development.
The Louisiana-based company operates the mine in partnership with
the British and Australian mining conglomerate Rio Tinto, which
holds a 12 percent stake, and the Jakarta regime itself, which
has 20 percent.
Freeport had a special place under the Suharto dictatorship.
In April 1967 it became the first foreign company granted an operating
permit following the 1965-66 US-backed coup that installed General
Suharto. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is credited
with having arranged Moffett's introduction to Suharto. Today
Kissinger sits on Freeport's board, earning $500,000 a year, and
Freeport also retains his law firm, Kissinger and Associates,
for a reputed $200,000 a year.
Under the Contract of Work signed in 1967, Freeport was given
rights over 100,000 hectares on the traditional land of the Amaungme
and Komoro people in the southern part of West Papua. Despite
strong protests, the rights of the local people were denied and
their interests were trampled on. Since then, some 2,000 villagers
have been forcibly removed to concentration camps to make way
for mining, waste dumping and the construction of townships, roads,
airfields and military posts.
In return for giving the Suharto family and its associates
a share in the considerable profits generated by the mine--$208
million in 1997--Freeport obtained generous tax concessions and
virtual free reign over the tracts of land it mined, occupied
and polluted. Special units of the Indonesian military have guarded
its operations.
When the mine first began in 1973, its output was limited.
By 1978 it was 7,500 tonnes of ore a day. The latest decision
will allow the company to lift production to 300,000 tonnes of
ore a day from 160,000 tonnes, with further devastating consequences
for the local people and the region's environment.
Suharto reportedly approved the expansion with a handwritten
note on a letter during a private audience with Moffett in 1997.
The company subsequently obtained all the necessary formal approvals
but after Suharto's resignation had difficulty in getting a final
sign-off from the key minister, Kuntoro, who faced objections
within the Indonesian ruling elite over the corrupt concessions
given to Freeport and the benefits afforded to Suharto and his
associates.
Last September a report was presented to the Indonesian national
assembly (DPR) by a Commission VIII, consisting of members of
the government-controlled parliament. They urged approval of the
expansion, while warning that an "explosive" situation
existed in the mining area because of the poverty of the local
people and the damage done by the mine to their hunting and farming
lands. They admitted that the local peoples' welfare had not improved,
despite the earmarking of 1 percent of Freeport's revenues (about
$2 billion in 1997) to a government fund for community and regional
development, starting from 1996.
The report recommended even greater military security for the
expanded mine and concluded: "Any disturbances and barriers
experienced by PTFI (PT Freeport Indonesia) can be interpreted
by the world that investment in the region is unsafe, preventing
foreigners from investing in the region. This will not benefit
the interests of both the nation nor the region. As such, the
existence of the PFTI must be maintained and secured, and its
benefits made use of to support the Regional Government in developing
the region."
Still no go-ahead came from Kuntoro. Moffett tried to break
through the seeming impasse last month by going back to his old
style of dealings with Jakarta. He sought, and obtained, a meeting
with Habibie, who was apparently willing to oblige. Habibie signed
a letter the very same day telling his ministers to help Freeport.
The Indonesian President was not able to deliver the deal without
further complication, however. Kuntoro observed sarcastically
later that everybody could meet the President but "we of
course have procedure and clear rules".
In the Freeport affair and other controversial cases, such
as Caltex's bid to keep pumping oil from central Sumatra, Kuntoro
has been attempting to balance between conflicting interests.
First, he has endeavoured to appease international investors.
They want secure super-profits without having to make deals with
Jakarta cronies, yet also oppose the cancellation of previous
Suharto-period contracts because of the precedents that might
be set for the abrogation of contracts in the future.
At the same time, Kuntoro faces pressure from nationalist business
elements who were excluded from the old crony relations, as well
demands from regional and local power brokers in the resource-rich
provinces for a greater share of the proceeds from mining operations.
If these regional interests are not accommodated, the Indonesian
capitalists fear the emergence of secessionist groups in resource-rich
areas, like those in East Timor and Aceh, possibly seeking their
own deals with transnationals.
In the end, Kuntoro declared that the Freeport expansion can
proceed, but on two conditions. The first is a doubling of the
royalties paid to the government. For copper, the new rate will
be 3 - 7 percent, compared with the existing 1.5 - 3 percent,
depending on the price. For gold and silver, the increase is slightly
greater--to 3 - 9 percent from 1 - 3 percent. This forms part
of a plan to allocate more royalty revenue--perhaps 80 percent--to
provincial and local governments in mining areas.
The second condition is that Freeport meet certain environmental
standards. This has nothing to do with any genuine bid to halt
the company's pollution, which has ravaged the local land and
rivers for 30 years. Throughout that period, the environmental
requirements have been non-existent or token. Any new rules will
remain a formality, except if they can be used as a pretext for
future demands for changes to the financial carve-up of Freeport's
profits.
It is obvious that Freeport's expansion will magnify the mine's
environmental impact. Nearly all the 300,000 tonnes of ore to
be crushed and processed each day will be dumped as waste tailings
in the Ajkwa River. Of the ore mined at Grassberg only about 1
percent is removed as copper metal and 0.42 parts per million
as gold. Over the past three decades, the waste residues have
already choked the river, causing it to breach its banks and flood
as much as 50 square kilometres of productive land. By Freeport's
estimates, the future flooding will extend over 130 square kilometres.
The tailings have also rendered the river's water unfit to
drink or use. Exposed to the weather, the tailings leach sulphuric
acid, copper, mercury and arsenic into the river system.
In addition, the overburden from the expanded mine, the earth
lying above the mineral-bearing ore, is to be dumped into two
neighbouring valleys. The ratio of overburden to ore at Grassberg
is about 3 to 1. Over the next 40 years an estimated 3 billion
tonnes will be blasted or bulldozed off Grassberg mountain, to
form two giant, crumbling rockpiles, prone to a range of risks,
from leaching acid to subsidence and landslides.
Even greater are the social and health problems created by
the mine. It has led to an influx of people to work in and service
the project, alongside 11,000 transmigrants from Java and Bali,
resettled by the government in nearby areas. Combined with the
forcible removal of mountain villagers to coastal areas, this
has led to high rates of malaria, cholera, tetanus and sexually-transmitted
diseases.
Despite the riches being extracted by Freeport, the infant
mortality rate in West Papua is as high as 200 per 1,000; the
maternal mortality rate is 4.5 per 1,000 in rural districts; over
20 percent of the people in the central highlands suffer malnutrition;
and women have an average life expectancy of 50.3 years. Health
Department records show that West Papua's central highlands, with
a population of 400,000, has only one hospital with 70 beds, and
15 health centres with a doctor.
Of Freeport's workforce of 17,300, only about 100 are from
the immediate vicinity, all unskilled. Their average wage is about
70 cents ($A) an hour. The Amaungme and Komoro people have no
access to the mine town of Tembagapura for shopping or medical
care. Freeport has built wire fences around the town, segregating
the local Papuans.
Resistance to the mine's operations, including protests and
hostage-taking organised by the Free West Papua (OPM) separatist
movement, have been met with mass arrests, torture, killings,
and disappearances. More than 100 people were killed during 1994
and 1995. The military presence in the area includes an air force
base, a naval base and 1,000 KOPASUS Red Beret commandos.
West Papua was effectively incorporated into Indonesia in 1962,
when the Kennedy administration in the United States backed demands
by former Indonesian president Sukarno for the Netherlands to
quit its long-held colony. Indonesian rule was ratified by an
undemocratic, UN-orchestrated "Act of Free Choice" in
1969. Today, the Indonesian capitalist class is desperately clinging
to its control over the territory, with the Freeport mine its
central preoccupation.
See Also:
Eye-witness
account of West Papua massacre: Part 1
"People were shot, bleeding and lying on the ground"
[28 November 1998]
Eye-witness
account of West Papua massacre: Part 2
"We saw terrible slum-like conditions and a very strong army
presence"
[1 December 1998]
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