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: Germany
The Kosovo war, German "national interests" and
the rightward turn of the SPD
By Peter Schwarz
21 September 1999
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The following article was written as the editorial of the
September/October issue of Gleichheit, the magazine published
by the Partei für Soziale Gleichheit (Socialist Equality
Party), German section of the International Committee of the Fourth
International.
History records the passage of time, but its rhythm does not
correspond to the regular change of the weeks, months and years.
After the rather settled period of the Kohl era (with the exception
of the eventful year of German unification 1989-90), events are
now coming thick and fast since the change in government last
November, when the Social Democratic Party (SPD) entered office
with the Greens. Even most members of the red-green
coalition would have been astonished if they had known then where
they would be nine months later: The confidence of the voters
completely frittered away, hopes for a reduction in unemployment
and an improvement in social conditions vanished. Instead, an
all-consuming drive to implement cuts at the expense of the weakest;
in place of environmental protection, infinite subservience to
the large employers' associations; instead of a peace-promoting
foreign policy, a war that has transformed the Balkans into a
political and physical ruin.
The reason for the speed of these changes can only partially
be attributed to a government that entered office sworn to modernity.
It did not determine events, but was driven by them. Political
farsightedness and an awareness of social processes are not among
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's strengths, and are certainly
foreign to his Green party coalition partners. The tectonic shifts
beneath the superstructure of society, which now make themselves
felt on the surface, creating one shock after another, developed
over many years. The Kosovo war marks a turning point, but it
has only made visible something that began a long time before.
Since unification and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the
Soviet Union, Germany's position in the world has fundamentally
changed, and this has also had a dramatic impact on domestic affairs.
From its earlier location at the edge of the Western sphere of
influence, the Federal Republic has moved into the centre of Europe.
Far more so than in the past, it has become the outstanding power
to the west of Russia. Despite its long duration of over four
decades, the post-war period proves, under these circumstances,
to have been a historical exception.
During this interval, two closely connected political illusions
prevailed, which also shaped the conceptions of the SPD. First
was that armed conflicts between imperialist great powers, as
had been unleashed in the two bloody world wars, finally belonged
to the past. The undisputed hegemony of the United States and
the confrontation with the Soviet Union lent a stability which
seemed to exclude any future breakdown in the Atlantic alliance.
The process of European integration proceeded slowly but inevitably,
without this being felt as a threat on the other side of the Atlantic.
Germany did not need an independent foreign policy under these
circumstancesunless one regards the effort to secure good
business relations with every regime in the world as such. In
the wake of the US, it once again developed into an economic great
power, without having to devote any special force to insuring
its national interests.
With the end of the Soviet Union all this changed. The necessity
to close ranks against the eastern superpower does not exist any
more. NATO lost its raison d'être. In foreign policy circles,
the view has become generally accepted that Germany must pursue
its national interests more aggressively and, if necessary, lend
them military force. This is dubbed a return to normality.
Foreign policy journals are repeating the language of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Foreign policy is again expressed
in terms like strategic targets and vital interests.
A typical contribution was that made by Christian Hacke, professor
at the Bundeswehrhochschule (Federal Armed Forces University)
in Hamburg, for the weekly paper Das Parlament. He provocatively
asks the question, if the re-nationalisation tendencies
in Europe and the world, and the obvious lack and crises of a
jointly oriented foreign policy in the face of the war on the
Balkans means that a united Germany can still maintain
the demonisation of a policy of national interest and the idealisation
of a common interest. He arrives at the conclusion that
a new perception of Germany's national interests is
urgently required.
Questions which have been discussed among experts for a long
time have suddenly been brought into the political consciousness
by the Kosovo war. Behind the demonstrative façade of unity,
the smouldering clash of interests between Germany and the US
has become clear. This is one of the most important reasons for
the abrupt break of the SPD and the Greens with their earlier
pacifist standpoints. If the national interest is disturbed, they
will not leave the fatherland in need, as their political
forerunners declared in 1914.
The second illusion of the post-war period was that the class
contradictions in capitalist society could be subdued over the
long term. By means of the welfare state, policies of social equilibrium
and partnership, the rifts in society were bridged and cemented
together. In the language of the SPD, which did not live badly
on it, this was called social justice.
An end to peaceful foreign policy also means the end of peace
at home. To be able to act aggressively abroad means the domestic
situation must be brought to order. The welfare state and policies
of social balance thereby prove an unnecessary ballastas
disadvantages in promoting the national economy and as obstacles
to the necessary increase in defence expenditure.
It is no accident that Minister of Finance Hans Eichel's cuts
package was decided at the highpoint of the Kosovo war. Budget
consolidation suddenly became the outstanding necessity. Eichel
even went as far as to say this was socially fair,
because it was the only way the state could regain its capacity
to act. As if social expenditure would ever be increased again!
In the United States, where the budget is now in the black, cuts
continue; the wealthy enjoy tax cuts and military expenditure
rises astronomically.
The abrupt rightward turn of the SPD has unleashed loud calls
for social justice inside the party from a circle
of social reformers and trade union leadersthe specialists
in questions of social partnership. But that is only a reflex
from the past, a nostalgic look back at the 1960s and 1970s. The
realisation of social justice under conditions of globalisation
requires a quite different orientation than that of social democracy,
which is used to thinking in national categories and fears nothing
as much as open class warfare.
The opponents of the cuts package in the SPD quickly got cold
feet, when it turned out that their appeal to social justice found
some resonance. Their protest was quickly followed by a declaration
of bankruptcy. The opposition SPD parliamentary deputies explained
that they would subordinate themselves to party discipline and
vote in the Bundestag (parliament) for the cuts. Four days
after the SPD lost the state elections in the Saarland, Oskar
Lafontaine's friend Reinhard Klimmt took up a ministerial post
in the federal government, thus accepting cabinet discipline,
removing another potential source of opposition.
In the meantime, in the wake of the SPD, the PDS (Party of
Democratic Socialismsuccessor to the Stalinist SED in East
Germany) are eagerly striving to gather those who were lost overboard
in the SPD's abrupt about-turn. They are following the social
democrats, at a respectful distance, on their way to the right.
Blair and Schröder had hardly announced their program of
modern social democracy, than PDS leader Gregor Gysi
countered with talk of modern socialism. The content
of the inconspicuous little word modern is always
the same: the re-evaluation of all values and the departure from
everything that even distantly recalls social justice.
After the collapse of East Germany, the PDS had to say goodbye
to many aspects of Stalinism, but they preserved one: its national
orientation, which the Stalinist bureaucracy has shared with social
democracy for many decades. As long as war was being directed
against Belgrade and Milosevic, the PDS could act as pacifists.
If it comes to implementing German interests against the hegemony
of the USA, then Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping and Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer will be able to count on them. After
all, haven't the PDS's French comrades been competing for a long
time with the Gaullists in all things anti-American? Where the
PDS bears the responsibility of officeas in the state administrations
in Mecklenburg-Pomerania and Saxony-Anhaltthey have long
since accepted national responsibility and carried
through welfare cuts.
Above all, the absence of any serious opposition to the government's
course presently benefits the extreme-right-wing. Disorientation
and despair amongst the mass of voters is reflected in gains for
the DVU (German Peoples Union) and in the growth of right-wing
youth gangs. The great majority remains passive, as the high number
of abstentions shows. Rage and indignation against the cuts are
not lacking; what is missing is a political orientation.
In the age of globalisation such an orientation can only derive
from an international point of view. It must unite the mass of
working people over and beyond all national, ethnic and other
boundaries. Only in this way is it possible to oppose the powerful
financial and economic interests that control political life at
present. Such an orientation cannot be expected from the SPD,
which is organically bound with the national state and the national
interest.
See Also:
Germany
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