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A comedy of errors or a planned attack?
CIA disciplines seven officers over NATO's bombing of Chinese
embassy
By Peter Symonds
12 April 2000
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this version to print
Eleven months after NATO's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has taken action
against seven of its officers. One middle level officer was sacked
and six others, including a senior manager, have received official
reprimandseither verbally or in writingaccording to
a statement released last Saturday by CIA spokesman Bill Harlow.
No names were released.
The punishments, said to have been carried out after two internal
investigations, amount to little more than a rap over the knuckles
for the CIA and those singled out. Moreover, the accompanying
explanation, which was meant to further substantiate the official
US claim that the embassy bombing was a tragic mistake
caused by human error, raises more questions than it answers.
As the World Socialist Web Site explained in an article
just days after the May 7 attack, the least credible explanation
was that it was a pure accident. It pointed out that NATO claims
that faulty maps were responsible for the embassy being mistaken
for the Yugoslav military supply headquarters simply could not
be squared with the facts.
The Chinese embassy was clearly marked on English-language
tourist maps, was well known to diplomats, journalists and other
visitors to Belgrade, and its address was listed in the Belgrade
telephone directory. As well as these publicly available, low-tech
items, the US military and the CIA had access to information from
the multi-billion dollar US spy satellite network and other hi-tech
surveillance systems.
Two articles in the British Observer newspaper on October
19 and November 28 provided further corroborative evidence that
the NATO targetting of the Chinese embassy had been deliberate.
The reports, based on information and interviews with NATO officers
including a senior official in NATO's Brussels headquarters, maintained
that the attack by the US B2 stealth bomber with highly accurate
JDAM precision munitions was carried out because the embassy was
being used to rebroadcast military intelligence for the Yugoslav
army or Serbian paramilitaries.
The latest CIA statement baldly reasserts that the embassy
had been incorrectly designated by a middle level officer [the
one who was sacked] working with inadequate maps. The officer
from the agency's clandestine branch had the correct address for
the Yugoslav Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement but
then had to guess the building's location because the map he was
using did not have numbers for the street in question. The map
produced in 1997 by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency showed
the Chinese embassy in central Belgrade from where it had moved
in 1996.
The CIA was forced to acknowledge that more than one individual
was involved. Numerous CIA officers at all levels of responsibility
failed to ensure that the intended targetthe Yugoslav Federal
Directorate of Supply and Procurement headquartershad been
properly identified and precisely located before the CIA passed
a target nomination package to the US military for action.
In fact, the target was discussed in at least three meetings
by CIA officers, before being turned over to the Pentagon for
further evaluation and finally to NATO headquarters in Europe.
Yet the CIA would have us believe that at none of these stages
was the location of the target ever checked. Moreover the target
also slipped past a computer cross-check against various data
bases listing sensitive sites, such as schools, hospitals and
embassies, purportedly because the data had not been recently
updated.
The CIA story strains the credibility of all but the most politically
naïve. If one swallows the explanation, one would have to
believe that it was just good fortune that the mistake
caused the guided missiles to hit the embassy of China, with whom
the US has had tense relations and which opposed the NATO onslaught,
rather than another friendlier embassy or a more sensitive target.
According to a NATO air controller cited in the November 28 Observer
article, however, NATO had accurately pinpointed the correct location
of the Chinese embassy and the information had been forwarded
to the joint intelligence operational centre in Mons, NATO's European
headquarters.
The bombing, which killed three embassy staff and wounded 20
others, justifiably produced an angry reaction by the Chinese
leadership and within China where a series of protests erupted
outside the US embassy in Beijing. Last week Chinese officials
were informed of the CIA's disciplinary action. But on Monday,
a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao rejected the
formal explanation offered by the US saying: The Chinese
embassy in Yugoslavia has unmistakable markings and is also clearly
indicated on US maps. The US claim that it did not know its exact
location does not hold water.
The explanation provided by the CIA raises a number of unresolved
issues.
Firstly, it was unusual that the CIA was involved in targeting
at all. According to the Los Angeles Times report on the
latest CIA statement, [T]he agency received a special request
to help meet the constant demand for new bombing targets during
NATO's 11-week bombardment of Yugoslavia. But it was certainly
not pressure of overwork that produced the mistake.
CIA director George Tenet pointed out last year that the bombing
raid on the Chinese embassy was the first and last time that the
CIA was involved in selecting targets during the NATO war. So
why was the CIA involved at all? And why the extraordinary co-incidence
that the CIA, renowned for its dirty operations internationally,
was involved in choosing the one target out of hundreds that proved
to be an error?
Secondly, there is the curious case of the almost hero. According
to the CIA statement, Tenet singled out one mid-level analyst
for going well beyond the call of duty to try to rescind
what he believedcorrectly in hindsightwere discrepancies
in the target's location. Based on his personal familiarity
with the building's location in Belgrade, he had questioned the
targetting both within the CIA and then in two separate phone
calls on May 4 and May 7 to the European Command's targetting
task force in Naples. The obvious question is why were the repeated
warnings of someone with local knowledge completely ignored?
Finally, the CIA story has its own inherent contradictions.
According to its statement, the agency simply lacked formal
procedures for preparing and forwarding target nomination packages
to the US military. Yet seven officers have been singled out for
punishment.
A lawyer representing one of the CIA officers, Roy Krieger,
put his finger on the logical difficulty when he said it was manifestly
unjust to blame individuals when the failure was systemic.
It's shameful that the CIA caved in to political pressure
to provide scapegoats. The agency has already publicly admitted
that the map provided to the officers contained errors, absent
which the Chinese Embassy would not have been mistakenly targetted.
These officers were asked to improvise and did their best with
the tools provided to them.
Taken together the story hinges on the supposition that the
CIA was completely incapable of carrying out the relatively straightforward
task of selecting and identifying targets. What resulted was a
tragi-comedy of errors from the initial choice through an elaborate
series of checks and crosschecks to the final bombing of the Chinese
embassy.
But this explanation is the least plausible. The alternative
is far more likely: that the target was deliberately chosen for
political purposes and that the CIA was involved for precisely
that reason. Far from being a bunch of incompetent buffoons the
agency was assigned the delicate task of choosing the target,
keeping it a secret from other NATO allies and providing the necessary
cover story once the bombing occurred.
As the WSWS noted at the time, the attack on the embassy
came at a crucial time for those in the US administration intent
on pursuing the war. It came just days after the G8 foreign
ministers summit had produced a draft agreement ostensibly aimed
at cutting short the war, and amid intensive activity by the German
and Russian administrations to fashion a deal that could be concluded
with the Milosevic government. Needless to say, amid the
outrage in Belgrade and Beijing, the embassy bombing promptly
ended any talk of a peace deal.
See Also:
Fresh evidence that
NATO's bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade was deliberate
[1 December 1999]
British newspaper
says NATO deliberately bombed Chinese embassy in Belgrade
[19 October 1999]
How could the bombing
of the Chinese embassy have been a mistake?
[10 May 1999]
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