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WSWS : News
& Analysis : Asia
: China
Beijing's WTO concessions signal a new stage in China's capitalist
restructuring
By James Conachy
28 June 2000
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A little-publicised aspect of China's recently-agreed entry
into the World Trade Organisation is the sweeping impact it will
have on the economic, political and social life of the most populous
country on earth. Chinese analysts predict that transnational
banks and corporations will, through mergers, acquisitions or
joint ventures, dominate the domestic economy within a decade.
Over the past 20 years the Beijing regime has wooed foreign
direct investment into export-orientated special economic zones.
It has used a complex array of regulations, tariffs and bureaucracy
to restrict the access of transnational companies to China's national
markets. These have largely remained monopolised by the state-owned
enterprisesmost of which are now part-owned by private shareholdersand
swelling numbers of privately-owned businesses.
The WTO agreements hammered out with the United States will
bring this stage to an end. By 2005, the bulk of restrictions
on foreign companies to produce and sell within the domestic economy
of China will have been phased out. Transnationals will be free
to establish their own distribution, warehousing, marketing, customer
support and maintenance networks.
From 2001 to 2006, China is to cut tariffs across the board,
from an average of 24.6 percent to 9.4 percent. Tariffs levied
on computers and high-tech products will be eliminated altogether.
Imports into China are predicted to rise exponentially.
China's highly-protected banking, insurance and securities
markets are to be opened up. Within five years the global financial
conglomerates will have full market access, enjoying the same
rights as China's domestic banks.
The Beijing government will reduce its stake in China's 1,000
large, politically-sponsored, share-traded corporations, many
of which are preparing to list on the New York and Hong Kong stock
exchanges. State ownership will fall from an average of 62 percent
to 51 percent, or less in certain cases. The telecommunication
sector, currently controlled by semi-privatised Chinese telecom
corporations, will be opened to up to 50 percent foreign ownership.
Global giants such as Motorola, Siemens, AT&T and MCI are
thought to be interested in major stakes in the telecom companies.
China's airlines are prime targets for foreign acquisitions. Rupert
Murdoch's News Limited is developing a major presence in Chinese
television. In the oil industry, BP Amoco recently took a 20 percent
stake in PetroChina, the internationally-listed subsidiary of
China National Petroleum Corporation. Shell is expected to emerge
as a major stakeholder in the Chinese oil company Sinopec when
it is listed on Wall Street later this year. Over 80 foreign banks
and securities houses are already conducting limited operations
in China.
Most of the Fortune 500 largest transnationals have
long established operations in China. In many sectors they are
already securing their position through joint ventures with Chinese
partners. By such arrangements, transnational companies are gaining
established production sites, branch and distribution networks,
personnel and the patronage of the Beijing regime. Long before
tariffs are reduced, they are entrenching market domination and
wiping out less efficient Chinese producers.
The auto industry is a prominent example. Volkswagen's joint
venture already has 50 percent of the Chinese consumer car market
and it intends to make a further investment of $US1.4 billion
to ward off competition. General Motor's $US1.5 billion joint
venture production plant in Shanghai, at present producing luxury
Buicks for China's political and business elite, will be re-tooled
for consumer car production. On May 29, Toyota announced a joint
venture with the Tianjin Automobile Xiali Group, a large Chinese
auto company. It is aiming for 30 percent of the market.
The lowering of auto tariffs will enable the China-based joint
ventures to make greater use of auto-parts manufactured internationally,
cut their costs and potentially begin to compete in world export
markets. Analysts predict that up to 500,000 Chinese auto jobs
will be eliminated. Most local parts manufacturers and assembly
companies without transnational partners are not competitive and
are likely to be bankrupted by the Chinese government.
A similar scenario is predicted across the financial, service
and industrial sectors, with a rush of mergers, acquisitions and
joint ventures by major world companies, followed by massive restructuring
and job shedding. The WTO concessions are expected to double capital
inflows into China by 2005, both in increased foreign direct investment
and a rapid growth in trading on Chinese stock markets.
Over $US80 billion per year is expected to flood in. The primary
origin of investment into China is expected to shift to corporations
from the US, Europe and Japan, with investors from Hong Kong and
Taiwan playing a reduced role. The focus of transnational investment
will be the centres of power like Shanghai and Beijing, where
new technology and business parks have been opened up.
China's commercial law is being subjected to hundreds of amendments
to protect the property rights of foreign corporations and private
businessmen. Beijing is also carrying out a purge of the Stalinist
state, whose multi-tier levels of bureaucracy and traditions of
nepotism are viewed as barriers to investment. Over 2.5 million
public servants have been laid-off in the last year and tens of
thousands arrested for crimes ranging from smuggling to bribery.
Comprador capitalists
Chinese policy during the 1990s was to restructure the state-owned
sector of the economy into a range of corporations that were both
profitable and competitive on world markets. The state banks were
utilised to finance the restructuring, by extending billions of
dollars in loans to companies as they carried through mergers,
retooling and downsizing. Thousands of firms, deemed redundant,
have been systematically bankrupted or sold off to private buyers.
However the politically-backed corporations and grasping private
businessmen have not entered into a world market with ample room
for their expansion. Rather they have confronted a deflationary
economic environment of over-production, falling prices, intense
competitive pressures and low profit rates. Additions to inventory,
or stockpiling, averaged 5.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in China from 1990-1998, compared with 0.4 percent in the
US.
China's second largest steel company, Anshan Iron and Steel,
based in the north-eastern Liaoning province, is a microcosm of
the contradictions of Chinese capitalism. The company has reduced
its workforce from 380,000 in 1995 to 172,000, utilising loans
of over $US1 billion. Its exports of rolled steel have increased
12-fold and its revenue is over $US2 billion. Anshan profits,
however, are not expected to reach $US25 million until next year.
Though Anshan has dispensed with many non-core industries, only
50,000 of its workforce is involved in steel production and it
is still responsible for paying pensions to 120,000 retired employees.
The logic of the capitalist market dictates that companies
like Anshan must continue to restructure. To assist it and other
key steel producers, Beijing announced on April 24 the forced
closure of 103 small Chinese steel companies, with a combined
workforce of 129,000. The intention is to slash steel production
by 4.5 million tons and push up prices, but it will not be enough
to finance ongoing upgrading and downsizing.
China's new capitalist elite has had to turn to international
capital. China's banking system is struggling with non-performing
loans to state-owned enterprises of over $US200 billion, over
20 percent of total lending. Foreign lenders have raised interest
rates or curtailed foreign currency loans in response.
Beijing has also been compelled to pour billions of dollars
into public works programs to stave off depression in whole areas
of the country. It is establishing minimal social welfare provisions
in an attempt to head off a social explosion. Yet government revenue
has fallen to just 13 percent of GDP, compared with over 25 percent
in 1985. The result is rapidly growing public debt.
At the same time, the government has been forced to take $US120
billion of debt from the banks and transfer it to four asset management
companies. Current predictions are that Beijing will recover no
more than 15-20 percent by selling off the assets of indebted
state-owned firms.
Nicholas Lardy, an economist for the Brookings Institute, has
postulated that on current trends and including liability for
the state banks, government debt in China would soar from 19 percent
of GDP to an untenable 100 percent of GDP, or $US1.4 trillion,
by 2008. The entire national budget could not even pay the interest.
The WTO concessions are the result. The transnational banks
and companies will direct the next decade of restructuring in
the China. Assisting them will be the burgeoning social layer
of stock market investors and private entrepreneurs spawned by
the last two decades of free market measures.
This new Chinese capitalist class is being driven toward the
status of its pre-1949 predecessorsa junior partner or the
comprador in the exploitation of China's working class and resources.
In that way it hopes to cling to the property and privileges it
has built up, against the opposition of the masses.
Social polarisation
Most of the wealthy have intimate connections with the Stalinist
Communist Party. Some three million private businessmen, with
1.5 million enterprises and assets of $US120 billion, employ about
18 million workers. There are reportedly 47 million individual
investment accounts in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets,
with a collective market capitalisation of $US440 billion. One
percent of the population, about 12 million people, earn incomes
over $US24,00090 times the average rural per capita income
of $US268.
The victims of Beijing's capitalist restructuring have been
the Chinese workers and peasants. In the last three years alone,
at least 30 million jobs have been shed by state-owned enterprises.
Some 10 million more state sector jobs are likely to be axed this
year. A large proportion of the job shedding has been in non-core
parts of companiessuch as hospitals, clinics, schools, farms,
bakeries and shopsonce owned by industrial firms to provide
low cost services to their employees. Many non-core businesses
have been sold to well-connected private buyers, such as managers,
who operate them as profit-making concerns.
State-owned enterprises now employ less than 40 percent of
the urban workforce, compared with 78 percent in 1978. In recent
years, most have begun to show profitsat an immense social
cost. By reliable estimates, urban unemployment and underemployment
is as high as 50 million, or over 25 percent, concentrated in
the north eastern and central provinces where state-owned heavy
industry was centred.
In rural China, ignored by policy makers, agricultural incomes
are stagnating or falling in cases where government subsidies
are being cut. Recent surveys indicate that over 20 percent of
peasant households depend upon one or more family member having
other work. Rural underemployment is estimated at 150 million
and can only grow as greater mechanisation is introduced. Migration
to the cities is continuous, with landless peasants supplying
low-cost labour for industry.
Among Chinese workers, the WTO concessions can only further
undermine the myth of Mao Zedong and his successors that there
was some separate national Chinese road for development. Like
workers around the world, their future is inseparable from developing
a unified movement of the international working class against
globally-organised capital.
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