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WSWS : News
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: Sri
Lanka
Media lies and distortions exposed
WSWS investigates the Bindunewewa massacre in Sri Lanka
By our correspondents
13 November 2000
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On October 25, a Sinhala extremist mob invaded a government-run
detention camp at Bindunewewa in Sri Lanka and attacked the unarmed
Tamil youth who were inside. Twenty nine were killed27 died
on the spot after being shot or hacked to death, and two more
died later from their wounds. Another 12 were injured, some critically.
The response of the Peoples Alliance (PA) government and
the Colombo media to the massacre has been a mixture of lies and
deliberate distortions, aimed at appealing to anti-Tamil chauvinism.
The first press reports claimed that a crowd of local Sinhala
villagers, incensed at a protest by detainees, had spontaneously
invaded the centre and carried out the murders.
Further articles and editorials embellished the story with
claims that the hidden hand of the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was involved. Most of the detainees were
LTTE suspects who had been held for lengthy periods
without trial under the country's repressive Prevention of Terrorism
Act.
According to an editorial in the government-controlled Daily
News on October 30, a hardcore LTTE cadre inside the
camp incited the others to stage a mutiny to deliberately
provoke an attack. The purported motive: Since all the detainees
had voluntarily surrendered, the LTTE wanted to annihilate them
as an act of revenge for deserting the terrorist organisation.
No proof was offered for any of these conjectures. Local
villagers have denied being involved, pointing out that many of
the attackers arrived by vehicle.
The editorial's argument was a crude attempt to blame the
victims for their own deaths. It was based on the assumption that
the prisoners had no right to protest over being arbitrarily detained
or over poor conditions in the centre.
The issue has now been all but buried, both by the government
and the media. A much publicised top level inquiry
on the attack has dragged on without any results. Some 16 policemen,
including two inspectors, have been arrested and kept
at a police station in Colombo. Five civilians have also been
detained. But no one has been charged.
World Socialist Web Site correspondents working in Colombo,
Bindunewewa and the nearby town of Bandarawela have pieced together
the following account of what took place from witnesses, including
wounded detainees, local sources and information gathered by independent
lawyers, as well as the results of a preliminary magisterial inquiry
and an interim report issued by the government-appointed Human
Rights Commission (HRC).
Contrary to the picture being presented by the media and government
spokesmen, all the evidence points to the conclusion that the
massacre of young Tamil detainees at the Bindunewewa Rehabilitation
camp on the morning of October 25 was pre-planned and carried
out by a Sinhala racist mob with the active involvement of the
police and other security forces.
Even the interim report issued by the Human Rights Commission
on November 1 was forced to conclude that the assault on the camp
was not an unpremeditated eruption of mob violence caused
by the provocation of the inmates. It is more consistent with
a premeditated and planned attack.
Bindunewewa lies in the central hill district of Sri Lanka,
near Bandarawela, 210 kilometres east of Colombo. The camp had
been a training centre for rural development officers and then
for home guards (a police auxiliary force). In the late 1980s,
it was used to house Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) suspects
during the United National Party government's reign of terror
against Sinhalese youth in the late 1980s.
The camp is one of a number of detention centres and prisons
across the country where mostly young Tamils are held for prolonged
periods. The Bindunuwewa camp was meant to be for the rehabilitation
of LTTE suspects or LTTE members who had surrendered
to the army, but many of the inmates had no connection with the
LTTE.
The centre was run by the government's National Youth Council,
supervised by a Presidential Task Force and coordinated by the
Human Rights Commission. The officer-in-charge, Captain Y.P. Abeyratna,
and his assistant, Lieutenant A. Abeyratna, were both from the
army's volunteer force. The staff was small a reserve police
constable, two home guards, two security assistants and four civilian
staffand security was relatively low key. But the security
officials were armed with T-56 automatic rifles and a shot gun.
Detainees were allowed at times to leave the camp. Two of those
who escaped death were working at a local shop and hotel at the
time. They had been released but were forced to remain
at the camp because the government provided no means for them
to return to their villages. We spoke to a number of villagers,
a former detainee and one of the injured. All of them described
relations with the local Sinhalese as cordial and even friendly.
They dismissed malicious gossip, circulated in the Colombo media,
that the tensions had arisen because detainees had harassed local
girls.
Most of the inmates were from the north and east of the country
where the army is continuing its 17-year war against the separatist
LTTE. Two were Tamils from the towns of Maskeliya and Kotagala
in the tea plantation district of Nuwara Eliya. The detainees
were as young as 11 and had been kept in the camp for up to 15
months.
There are significant discrepancies over the number of detainees
in the camp, which show, at best, a callous indifference to their
lives and, at worst, an attempt to cover up the true death toll.
The police report filed in the courts stated that the number of
inmates at the time of the attack was 4125 dead and 16 injured.
The HRC found from its own records, however, that the figure should
have been 46 and noted in its interim report that the matter was
being further investigated.
When we contacted the regional HRC coordinator Senaka Dissanayake
on November 7, he said: There are still some doubts about
the number of detainees at the Bindunuwewa rehabilitation center
at that moment. According to him, the camp official Abeyratne
put the number of detainees at 40 and the local police chief at
41. But when HRC members visited the camp on October 27, two days
after the massacre, they found another bodylifting the total
to 42.
According to our reports there should have been 46 detainees
at that time. If anyone was to be released it should have been
reported to my office in advance. They seem to be hiding a lot
of things. We are still investigating these matters. We will see,
the HRC co-ordinator told us.
No riot in the centre
Prior to the attack, the detainees had begun a campaign over
their continued detention and the conditions in the camp. The
main demand was that minors and elderly inmates should be released
immediately and the release of the others expedited. The inmates
wanted their letters posted and to be allowed to receive mail
and phone calls from relatives. In some cases, detainees had found
their letters in dustbins. They also wanted soap.
These demands had been made repeatedly before and not acted
upon. When Captain Abeyratna said he could provide no solutions,
the inmates demanded to speak with higher officials. On October
24 at the regular evening meeting at 6pm they asked Abeyratna
again, argued with him and some stood around him. A police officer
fired his gun into the air, provoking an angry response from the
detainees. According to the HRC interim report, several fluorescent
lights and the police post were damaged.
The police claim that the detainees turned violent, entered
the store room and armed themselves with iron rods then proceeded
to damage buildings, furniture and the police post, and set fire
to documents. The media in turn seized on the police reports to
claim the officer in charge had been taken hostage and to paint
a picture of a riot in which the detainees took control of the
camp.
These versions are deliberate fabrications aimed at justifying
what subsequently took place and covering up for the actions of
the police and camp officials. The HRC interim report pointed
out: In the account given by the police officers there was
no suggestion that inmates had taken any of the officers on duty
at the centre as hostage and were holding them.
As to the police claims, the report stated: The store
did not show any signs of forced entry; the doors were intact
and did not have any visible signs of damage. The glass panes
of some windows in the office and officers' quarters had been
broken. There were a few charred pieces of paper and a small quantity
of ash in the office that indicated that a few papers had been
burned. At the same time we noted that articles such as the television,
radio, refrigerator had not been damaged by the inmates.
The HRC concluded that what they had seen did not lend
credence to the claims that inmates had gone round
smashing up buildings and causing extensive damage. A further
claim by a police constable that the inmates had attacked and
injured Lieutenant A. Abeyratna could not be verifiedboth
the officer in charge and his assistant are in police custody
in Colombo.
When we spoke to one of the injured detainees, he explained
that, far from threatening the camp guards and officials, it was
the detainees themselves who felt in danger: On the 24th
we telephoned the ICRC [International Red Cross] office in Batticaloa
and told them the situation was becoming dangerous and there was
a threat to our lives. We told them that they were responsible
if anything happened to us, he said.
When we told him about press reports claiming that the inmates
had rioted and tried to escape, he said: If we wanted to
escape it was easy as there was no proper security system.
After the confrontation at the meeting, the camp officials
rang the Bandarawela police. A police party comprising 30 officers
armed with T-56 guns arrived at about 8pm. Later they were joined
by another 39 police officers sent from other stations. A group
of soldiers arrived from the Diyatalawa army base about 10km away.
Perhaps the most telling sign of what was going on inside the
camp was the response of Captain Abeyratna. According to the police,
he told them that he could look after the camp and asked them
not to allow outsiders to come in. In response to the telephone
call from the detainees, the ICRC had rung the local police who
had told them: The situation is under control.
A mob gathers
A survivor told us that the detainees did not want armed police
in the camp but had later agreed that Head Quarters Inspector
(HQI) [the local police chief] could enter unarmed. They protested
to him about the way in which the police officer had fired his
weapon during the meeting. Outside, a crowd of about 200 or 300
gathered at the side of the ground of the nearby Education Faculty
and pelted stones at the inmates. No action was taken either by
the police or army, other than to persuade the crowd to withdraw.
When the situation looked quiet we went to sleep,
the survivor said. The army withdrew its contingent at about 1am
and, according to police, some armed police remained outside the
camp.
Others, however, were very active. Villagers told us that a
petition had been circulated in the area a few weeks before the
massacre calling on authorities to remove the camp from the area.
During the night of October 24, a group of Sinhala extremists
seized on the incident at the centre to organise a mob. They put
up posters in Bandarawela and Bindunuwewa inciting locals to Chase
out the Tigers [LTTE] who have destroyed the country and
Close down the LTTE rehabilitation camp. Certainly
the police knew about the posters as some were put up under their
noses right next to the camp.
A mob began to gather early in the morning. Some may have come
from nearby villages. But locals told us that most people were
brought in from outside by vehicle. Press reports claimed a crowd
of 2,000 to 3,000 had gathered but the HRC stated that there was
no evidence of such a sizeable mob and the figure was exaggerated.
The HQI told the HRC that he received a message at 6.45am from
the police inspector on duty at the camp that a crowd was gathering.
Neither the police nor the army did anything. The HQI received
another message at 8.15am from the same inspector that people
were entering the camp, and it was now on fire.
A gang of thugs armed with iron rods, knives, axes and clubs
entered the camp and set about hacking the Tamil inmates to death.
Some detainees had their heads smashed in. The mob set fire to
the buildings. Survivors told us they saw some inmates thrown
onto the fire. Captain Abeyratna did nothing to stop the thugs,
leaving as soon as they entered.
Detainees shot by police
The role of the police is clear. No reinforcements were sent
after the first warning and no attempt was made to halt the thugs
from entering the camp. A lawyer pointed out that there was no
sign of forcible entry into the camp. The barbed wire fence was
intact. When some of the inmates tried to escape from the thugs
by running out of the camp, police shot at them.
One survivor we spoke to was in hospital with gunshot wounds.
About 50 of the police shot at us, he said. They
did not try to shoot at the mob. The mob was with the police.
The police shot at my leg. I ran to a policeman and pleaded with
him [to save me]. He threw me into a truck. My right leg was wounded.
The bullet was removed at the national hospital. Another
of the detainees lost two fingers due to the police shooting.
When the detainees tried to hide in the police trucks to save
their lives, the mob attacked them in front of the police. The
police, instead of protecting the helpless victims, assisted in
the murders. No one knows how many detainees were killed by police
bullets, as not all the bodies have been properly examined and
some were burnt. Ten of the injured were hospitalised at Diyatalawa
army hospital and two at the National Hospital in Colombo. When
we saw them, they were chained to their hospital beds like criminals.
The police, and later the army, took no action to arrest any
of the thugs. Army Captain Charitha Dematampitiya arrived on the
scene in the aftermath of the massacre. He told the magisterial
inquiry that he saw a large crowd outside the camp along the road
and a few injured on the road. Inside the centre, there were people
armed with assorted weapons. At the request of the police HQI,
the captain called on the crowd to disperse, which it did.
Asked whether he had attempted to arrest any of the culprits,
Dematampitiya claimed he had no powers to arrest civilians. He
also said that the police had not tried to arrest anyone. It should
be pointed out that the army routinely detains people and hands
them over to the police. After the event, police officers rounded
up several hundred local villagers, including women and children,
for questioning. Far from seeking to probe the murders,
the police called for 50 volunteers to confess in
order to sweep the massacre under the carpet and whitewash their
own role.
No organisation has claimed responsibility for the massacre,
but several Sinhala extremist organisations have been active in
the area. Sinhala Veera Vidahana (Sinhala Heroes Forum), one of
the organisations that formed the chauvinist Sihala Urumaya Party
(SUP), began agitation last year. The SUP contested the district
in the country's parliamentary elections last month and some of
its candidates live in the villages adjoining the Bindunuwewa
camp.
The SUP denies organising the murders but there is no doubt
that their anti-Tamil chauvinism during the election campaign
helped create the climate for the attack to be carried out. Organisations
such as the SUP have close links with the security forces, which
are themselves deeply imbued with Sinhala chauvinism. When we
asked Lalith Hettiarachchi, the SUP candidate for the Badulla
district, point blank whether he had been involved, he responded,
I did not participate in it. But the job was done well.
Who exactly organised the massacre remains unknown. But it
was clearly aimed at further inflaming racialist sentiment just
two weeks after the parliamentary elections and in the midst of
a highly unstable political situation. Sinhala thugs from the
area, actively assisted by police on the spot, carried the murders
out. Some of the police, two camp officials and a few locals have
been detained and may even eventually be charged.
But many questions remain about the role of those further up
the police and army chain of command. Which higher authorities
did the local police chief tell about the incidents the night
before the massacre? Why were troops and police withdrawn from
the camp that night even though there had been a menacing crowd?
Why did the local police chief do nothing when he heard that a
mob was gathering outside the centre in the morning?
It is highly unlikely that any of the official inquiries will
provide answers.
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