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WSWS : News
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Australian airline ignores critical maintenance checks
By Terry Cook
12 January 2001
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The circumstances surrounding the grounding of six Boeing 767-200
wide-bodied aircraft on December 22 in Australia raise serious
questions about the existing air safety system and the role of
the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the government's so-called
aviation watchdog.
The six Ansett Airline aircraft used on domestic air routes
were taken out of service after it was discovered that they had
not undergone a scheduled maintenance check required by Boeing
when the 767-200s have completed 25,000 take-offs and landings,
or cycles. All of the grounded aircraft had reached
this figure. At least one had exceeded 30,000 cycles.
The special high-cycle inspections are essential
for safe performance. They involve checks that cannot be made
visually and include detailed ultrasonic inspection of the aircraft
body panels to detect minute stress cracks caused by repeated
pressurisation and depressurisation. The inspection cannot be
carried out without removing parts. It requires at least four
days, or even longer if faults are detected.
Ansett baldly claimed that its failure to carry out the crucial
inspections was an oversight. Boeing simply said that
it had not noticed that the checks were overdue. While these explanations
in themselves are cause for concern, what followed was even more
alarming.
After a two-day meeting with Ansett and Boeing representatives,
supposedly called to question them on the oversight,
CASA cleared the six jets for service and gave the airline 90
days grace to perform the detailed checks. Within 48 hours of
being grounded over a serious safety breach, the planes were allowed
to operate, permitting Ansett to move thousands of passengers
over the peak Christmas holiday season.
Defending the extraordinary decision, CASA spokesman Peter
Gibson said he was satisfied they [the aircraft] are perfectly
safe. A representative for the airline said: Ansett
is totally satisfied with the safety and integrity of our operations.
But neither spokesman attempted to explain how it was possible
to give such definitive assurances when the necessary inspections
had not been carried out and in some cases were long overdue.
To make matters worse CASA agreed to allow the airline to conduct
its own internal investigation of the incident. Even before the
in-house investigation began, CASA announced that legal action
against Ansett was unlikely because there is
no evidence that the inspections were deliberately missed.
Gibson claimed: Where people make mistakes the emphasis
is always on identifying the problem, and then to look more broadly
at whether there are any systems that need to be in place to prevent
this sort of thing happening again. Allowing the airline
to investigate its own negligence only increases the
likelihood that the underlying causes will never be identified
and nothing will change.
These events highlight the serious compromising of air safety
standards that has taken place since 1990 when the Labor government
deregulated the airline industry. As part of the deregulation,
the previous government-supervised system of safety standards
was replaced with self regulation by the airlines
themselves.
CASA, which used to have engineers on site at the major airlines
to constantly monitor every aspect of maintenance and safety,
was reduced to auditing the maintenance schedules
and agreements to be carried out by the companies. What has been
revealed, however, is that these minimal requirements have not
been carried out and, even under the public spotlight, CASA is
more concerned with the operating requirements of the airlines
than with safety. Self-regulation by the airlines
turns out to be a recipe for non-regulation.
CASA has now acknowledged that Ansett failed to act promptly
on many of the maintenance notices issued by Boeing and admitted
it only ordered the airline to treat every maintenance directive
as mandatory after the December 22 incident.
Other deficiencies have also come to light:
* An article in the Australian newspaper on January
4 pointed out that in 1999 CASA became aware that Qantas had incrementally
altered its pilot training and performance review over several
years in breach of agreed procedures. CASA, however, did not investigate
the impact of these changes on safety.
At least one of the changes has led to a number of serious
landing incidents. In 1999, a Qantas plane carrying 410 passengers
overran the runway at Bangkok airport. The pilots told investigators
that they relied solely on the braking system and did not use
full reverse thrust on the wet runway because of a management
decision to change standard operating procedures, presumably to
save on fuel. Qantas only changed its directive last September
because of an increased number of weather related runway
overruns.
* On January 8, CASA finally ordered Ansett and Qantas to undertake
urgent checks of all their aircraft with General Electric CF6
engines. In mid-December, the US National Transport Safety Board
(NTSB) had issued an urgent alert warning that there was potential
for a catastrophic accident after a US Airways jet
blew apart during a ground running test at Philadelphia airport.
A disc in the high-pressure turbine exploded, blasting shards
of metal into the aircraft engine, body and the nearby river.
CASA claimed to have passed on the information
to the Australian airlines, but it did not treat the warning as
urgent. It admitted later to having known about the danger since
September after the NTSB began investigating an incident involving
the CF6 engine. The checks were only ordered after CASA received
notification from its British counterpart that inspections had
been undertaken in the UK.
Again the reason appears to be costs. An article in the Wall
Street Journal commented that the inspections mandated by
the US Federal Aviation Administration, designed to detect cracks
caused by metal fatigue in titanium spools in the CF6 engines,
have become so time consuming they threaten to force planes
out of regular service and seriously disrupt airline
schedules.
There is considerable pressure on all the airlines to cut costs
in maintenance and other areas. A report last November showed
that Ansett was operating at a loss and that its share of the
domestic market had fallen from more than 50 percent to 41.5 percent
due to aggressive competition from Qantas and the emergence of
two new competitors, Virgin Blue and Impulse Airlines.
Over the past decade airlines internationally have been forced
to restructure their operations to cut costs, downsize their workforces
and increase workloads. Over this period maintenance jobs at Australian
airlines have been cut back through sackings and attrition, seriously
affecting the availability of skilled engineers and tradesmen.
John Wood, former chairman of CASA's pilot training council, commented
recently that the damage from years of cutting back the
hands-on experience of flying and engineering staff has now taken
their toll.
In the early 1990s, Qantas sacked more than 300 of its national
maintenance workforce of 5,000 and has subsequently reduced numbers
even further through voluntary redundancies. In 1997 the company
ended its apprentice training scheme and refused to employ about
40 apprentices who had just completed their time.
On January 5, the Amalgamated Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU)
revealed that more job losses could be in the pipeline. A union
bulletin stated that Qantas had refused the AMWU access to a new
business plan that involved further cost cutting and increased
outsourcing of maintenance functions that would sharply impact
on engineering jobs.
The recent takeover of Ansett by Air New Zealand will result
in another round of job cuts as the newly merged entity restructures
its operations to eliminate duplication, particularly
in maintenance and administration. According to airline unions,
the changes could result in the loss of up to 3,000 jobs.
The deterioration of airline maintenance was highlighted in
a survey of 1,400 aviation maintenance engineers conducted by
the Australian Transport Bureau in 1998 that showed widespread
maintenance deficiencies. Just under a third of the engineers
said they had, on occasions, taken shortcuts and omitted
a functional check because of lack of time.
When asked why safety breaches occurred, more that 20 percent
of those interviewed said it was because of stress associated
with the heavy workload and staff shortages. Other reasons cited
were fatigue, tiredness, lack of training, poor supervision, inadequate
equipment and dated work manuals.
Despite the recent events the federal government has made clear
it has no intention of abandoning the present system of self-regulation.
Transport Minister John Anderson has ordered a review' of
the present system that could lead to a shakeup of the internal
management of both airlines. This week the Australian Transport
Safety Bureau announced that it would conduct its own investigations
of the airlines and the increasingly discredited CASA.
However, Anderson's office has also stated that there would
be no return to the more stringent hands-on monitoring of
the past. The government's reaction and that of CASA in the face
of growing evidence that the ingredients are present for a major
air disaster, confirms a terrifying truth. No matter what the
human cost, the profits of the airlines will continue to take
precedence over the safety of passengers and crew.
See Also:
Contaminated aviation
fuel grounds 5,000 planes in Australia
[25 January 2000]
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