|
WSWS : News
& Analysis : Australia
& South Pacific
Esso Australia convicted of safety breaches in fatal gas explosion
By Will Marshall
12 July 2001
Use
this version to print
| Send this
link by email | Email the
author
After a bitterly fought legal battle, a Supreme Court jury
in the Australian state of Victoria has found Esso Australia ,
a subsidiary of Exxon, guilty of breaching safety laws over the
September 1998 explosions at the companys Longford natural
gas plant. The blasts killed two workers, Peter Wilson and John
Lowerty, and injured another eight, as well as cutting gas supplies
to more than a million homes and businesses for two weeks.
Esso was convicted on all 11 counts under sections 21 and 22
of Victorias Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985.
These included failure to perform such basic procedures as identifying
hazards, assessing risks, monitoring dangerous conditions, and
providing crisis shutdown devices. The jury also concluded that
Esso had failed to provide emergency procedures, safe production
methods and adequate training for workers and supervisors.
Esso has now twice been found legally responsible for the explosion,
with a 1999 Royal Commission concluding that the disasters
major cause was the failure of Esso to equip its employees
with appropriate knowledge to deal with the events which occurred.
But neither verdict mentioned the underlying causes of the tragedygovernment
deregulation of safety inspection and corporate cost-cutting in
maintenance and safety.
For its part, the company has refused to apologise to its victims
or to the workers that it originally attempted to blame for the
explosion. Moreover, even if Justice Philip Cummins, who will
sentence Esso on July 23, hands down the maximum possible fines,
totalling $2.75 million, the amount will hardly trouble Esso,
which made a profit of almost $800 million in 1999-2000.
The company also faces class actions, worth up to $1 billion,
on behalf of companies and individuals affected by the gas shutdown.
The Supreme Court decision may have strengthened these claims,
but any legal action will be fought tooth and nail by Esso and
will drag on for years. The case has been in train since October
1998, and, according to one of the lawyers involved, may go to
court in the first half of next year.
In the recent Supreme Court trial, Esso abandoned its unsuccessful
efforts to blame workers, particularly plant operator James Ward,
for the disaster. Essos earlier tactics backfired in the
Royal Commission and its public image was further tarnished when
Ward was awarded a bravery medal for his actions during the explosion.
Essos legal counsel Malcom Titshall sought to appeal
to the jury by refusing to challenge any of the damning evidence
given by workers. Instead he argued that Esso was simply not aware
of the potential for catastrophic breakdown in Longfords
Gas Plant 1. Expert witnesses testified, however, that the company
knew the dangers involved and furthermore had not performed basic
hazard identification testing, which probably would have prevented
the disaster.
On the day of the explosion, 15 of the plants crew, including
some of its most experienced members, had gathered to attempt
to restart Gas Plant 1, but because of a lack of training they
had no inkling of the danger they confronted. Hot lean oil ruptured
the cold brittle metal of heat exchanger 905, causing an enormous
expulsion of hydrocarbons, which then ignited a second blast,
starting a fire that severely damaged Gas Plant 1.
Deregulation and cost-cutting
WorkCover Victoria chief executive Bill Mountford said the
jurys verdict should send a clear message to those
organisations who have not been supplying a safe environment for
their workers. Yet the current state Labor Party government
of Premier Steve Bracks has no intention of reversing the safety
de-regulation initiated by the former Kennett Liberal government.
Major companies like Esso operate as self regulators
under the Liberal governments 1995 changes to occupational
health and safety legislation. At the time of the explosion, Esso
was largely responsible for running its own safety checks, while
WorkCover Victoria, the government agency responsible for carrying
out safety audits, had been downsized to such an extent that risk
assessments were severely curtailed.
Shortly after the disaster, it was revealed that the number
of WorkCover visits to the Esso plant dropped after 1996 from
an annual average of 120 to only 18 a year. A leaked internal
WorkCover memo indicated that overall visiting time to sites fell
statewide to 55 percent of its target for December 1998.
WorkCover issued Esso a dangerous goods licence after two inspectors
visited the site in June and July 1998 for a total of about four
and a half hours. A thorough inspection of the complex 40-hectare
site, which contains numerous highly inflammable gas and liquid
gas storage and production facilities, would require weeks.
The Kennett government restricted the Royal Commissions
terms of reference to prevent any examination of this de-regulated
regime and the Bracks government has not reopened the issue.
The current government has promised to increase the fines for
company safety breaches and create an offence of industrial
manslaughter, with a maximum penalty of a $5 million fine.
These measures, yet to be proceeded with, would also leave untouched
the fundamental causes of the Esso disaster, which lie in cost-cutting.
Like its competitors, Esso outsourced much of its maintenance
work during the 1990s. It downsized its workforce by at least
16 percent, halving the number of jobs in maintenance. Ageing
and less profitable areas of the complex were given less priority.
Esso conducted Hazard Operability Studies on Gas Plants 2 and
3, but not Gas Plant 1its oldest plant.
During the Royal Commission, workers gave voluminous evidence
of how cutbacks in maintenance and supervisory jobs and increased
workloads undermined safety. Robert Elliott, a panel operator,
for example, said: Esso is tightening up on their budgets,
and in doing so they are trying to tighten up on the maintenance
budgets. In the process, they have to prioritise the work that
needs to be done in the plant.
The outcome was not simply the result of Essos corporate
greed. With intensifying global competition and the uninterrupted
introduction of new technology, transnational companies are continuously
restructuring their operations to maintain profit margins and
market shares. According to Business Review Weekly, labor-shedding
alone boosted the profitability of the top 1,000 Australian companies
by more than three percent in 1997-98.
Speaking for the union leadership, Victorian Trades Hall Council
secretary Leigh Hubbard claimed that the Esso verdict was a potent
warning to employers who tried to boost profits by sacrificing
workplace health and safety. The case confirmed, however,
that the unions had agreed to Essos restructuringa
point made by Esso in its own defence at the previous Royal Commission.
Crown prosecutor Robert Richter was obliged to argue in the
Supreme Court that, the circumstance that both employer
and employees agreed on a system of work does not ...[seem] to
be conclusive of the question of whether the system was safe.
This situation is not confined to Esso either. Enterprise bargaining
between the unions and major companies over the past decade or
more has involved repeated job-shedding and the imposition of
flexible conditions, inevitably undermining maintenance
and safety standards.
See Also:
Workers comment on
inquiry into Australian gas explosion
[9 July 1999]
Gas inquiry
designed to obscure Victoria's disaster
[11 November 1998]
Former Esso
plant worker speaks out: "It was only a matter of time before
this happened"
[1 October 1998]
Top of page
The WSWS invites your comments.
Copyright 1998-2008
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved |