|
WSWS : News
& Analysis : Europe
: Britain
Britain: Inquiry reveals role of NHS cuts in deaths of child
heart patients in Bristol
By Julie Hyland
31 July 2001
Use
this version to print
| Send this
link by email | Email the
author
The findings of the Public Inquiry into the care of children
receiving complex cardiac surgical services at the Bristol Royal
Infirmary (BRI) between 1988 and 1995 makes devastating reading.
The largest ever investigation into medical standards of care
in Britains National Health Service (NHS) concluded with
the publication of a 600 page report the week before last. The
Inquiry, led by Professor Ian Kennedy, was conducted between October
1998 and July 2001. Thousands of pages of documents were submitted
from witnesses and parents, including the medical records of over
1,800 children. Oral evidence was also given, as were papers from
the NHS.
The Inquiry found that Bristol had a significantly higher mortality
rate for open-heart surgery on children under one than other centres
in England. Between 1988 and 1994 the mortality rate was roughly
double the national average in five out of seven years. The report
states that from 1991 to 1995, between 30 and 35 more children
under one years of age died after open-heart surgery in the Bristol
paediatric cardiac surgery (PCS) unit than might be expected had
the unit been typical of other PCS units in England. Two surgeons,
Wisheart and Dhasmana, operated on patients suffering from acquired
and congenital heart disease, both adults and children. Open-heart
operations were undertaken at the BRI, closed operations at the
Bristol Royal Hospital for Children (BRHSC), and were carried
out by both surgeons.
The report states that up to 35 children who underwent heart
surgery at BRI died unnecessarily as a result of sub-standard
care and that flaws in hospital procedure and management meant
around one third of all children who underwent open-heart surgery
received less than adequate care.
Most attention has focussed on the fact that whilst there was
enough information from the late 1980s onwards to cause questions
about mortality rates to be raised, no intervention was made.
The report highlights a club culture within the
PCS that refused to address concerns raised by a number of medical
professionals working within the department and from outside experts
as far back as 1986-1987. Further reports were published and circulated
throughout 1989/90 that showed a consistent pattern of poor outcome
at Bristol.
In 1992 the satirical journal Private Eye published
six articles criticising the PCS services at the BRI, but it took
the tragic death of 18 month old Joshua Loveday in January 1995
to finally bring a halt to the dangerous practices that prevailed
under the tutelage of Wisheart and Dhasmana.
In all the inquiry made 198 recommendations for improvements
in the NHSfocusing on changing the way doctors deal with
patients, better access to information about the performance of
hospitals and consultant teams, tighter leadership and nationally
agreed standards for quality and care. It also calls for the NHS
to set up an overarching Council for the Quality of Healthcare,
to coordinate different bodies regulating healthcare standards,
alongside a Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals
to oversee the work of the General Medical Council and other regulatory
bodies.
Whilst these may go some way to overcoming the type of bureaucratic
indifference and mis-management highlighted by the events in Bristol,
it is striking that no substantive recommendations are made on
NHS resources. Yet it is impossible to read the report without
drawing the conclusion that the lack of resourcesand the
struggle to acquire new ones in what, due to the introduction
of the market into health care, is a highly competitive environmentplayed
an essential role in events at Bristol. It certainly contributed
to the creation of a climate in which passing the buck
and fatally ignoring certain details could occur.
It is worth quoting that section of the report which deals
with the physical environment of the hospital in full. The Inquiry
team visited the BRI in July 1999, 14 years after initial concerns
were raised. The team stated that:
We were shocked by what we saw at the BRI. There was
a sense of dilapidation. The corridors were dirty, with an array
of discarded equipment and bric-a-brac pushed against walls and
in corners. The ICU was cramped and crowded. Large items of equipment
were stored in the middle of the room, making the
space even more crowded. The area previously allocated for children
was small and would have allowed little space for family members.
The room set aside for parents to await news was small, cramped
and windowless. The main lift used to transport children to and
from the operating theatre, two floors below, was cramped and
old. The space in the alternative lift was so limited that on
occasions staff who should have been accompanying a child had
to run up the two flights of stairs to meet it. Our overall, lasting
impression was that Wards 5A and 5B were cramped, overcrowded,
overheated, dirty and neglected. It was a tribute to the staff
that they were prepared to work there.
The report explains that due to national pressure to reduce
heart disease in adults, especially after the introduction of
the market into the NHS in 1990 to increase the income generated
by the numbers of adult patients, the care of child patients suffered.
The cardiac surgical service in Bristol was mainly an adult service,
with the PCS unit tacked on to it, rather than being a dedicated
service in its own right. The inquiry team found that the unit
had no dedicated paediatric intensive care beds, no full-time
paediatric cardiac surgeon and too few paediatrically trained
nurses. Children were only separated from the adults by using
two beds that were between a side wall and the nurses station.
Due to the pressure on beds, however, this was not always possible.
The supposed existence of a club culture within
the PCS does not explain why it was that other NHS bodies ignored
evidence of problems with the unit. Despite these reports, Sir
Terence English, then President of the Royal College of Surgeons,
recommended that the unit at Bristol should not only retain
designation but recommended they should be pressed to increase
the workload. Both the Department of Health (DOH) and the
Welsh Office were made aware of the situation at Bristol and also
took no action. But there existed a national shortage of paediatric
cardiologists, which was described by the British Medical Association
as unacceptable in 1988 and perilous in
1992. This shortage was particularly acute in the South West area,
due to there being few large hospitals in the area and none in
Wales. This may go some way to explaining why it is that no action
was taken regarding Bristols poor record.
The situation among nursing staff was no better. During the
late 1980s and early 1990s there were only two Registered Sick
Childrens Nurses (RSCN) at the BRI in Wards 5A and 5B. Nurses
were often asked to give conflicting advice to parents due to
the consultants doing their rounds at different times. Parents
were expected to be involved in the care of their children and
one mother even told of how she nursed another mothers boy,
as well as her own daughter.
By any criteria this is a hospital service in a state of collapse.
Yet the report states that what went wrong at Bristol could not
have been caused by a lack of resources, because other UK hospitals
are in a similar position and do not have the same bad record.
This is a truly astonishing submission to make and a devastating
indictment of the state of health care generally in the UK.
Professor Kennedy has stated that the scandal at Bristol could
be repeated elsewhere and could even be happening now. But having
acknowledged the enormous difficulties faced by the health service
nationally, his report dismisses this as a significant factor.
Despite the gravity of the situation revealed at Bristol, the
suffering of those involved and the time and energies of thousands
of people expended during the inquiry, the declaration that cuts
are no excuse will help to ensure that no fundamental changes
will be forthcoming and millions will be left dependent for their
lives on wholly inadequate NHS provision.
See Also:
Britain: Opposition grows to
Labours plans to sell off National Health Service
[8 June 2001]
Top of page
The WSWS invites your comments.
Copyright 1998-2008
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved |