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WSWS : News
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Student protest exposes rift in Chinese regime
By John Chan
24 February 2003
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Details have surfaced this month of how a large but localised
protest by university students in the city of Hefei in early January
led to a bitter factional conflict in the upper echelons of the
Chinese bureaucracy over the handling of social discontent.
The demonstration by some 12,000 students from the Hefei Industrial
University was reported by the Hong Kong press at the time. The
students marched on the city government buildings on January 7
to protest against the police response to a traffic accident the
day before. Two female students were killed and another seriously
injured when they were hit by a truck.
While witnesses alleged the truck had run a red light, the
authorities claimed that the studentsnot the driverwere
responsible for the accident. They told the grieving friends of
the dead students there would be no charges and no investigation.
None of the reports indicated that the protest consisted of anything
more than a passionate denunciation of the callousness of officials.
The response from Beijing, however, was anything but ordinary.
While the typical attitude of the central government to protests
is to ignore them or order their suppression, Hu Jintao, the newly
installed secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
man slated to be elected Chinas president during the March
National Peoples Congress (NPC), voiced sympathy for the Hefei
students.
In a meeting on January 7 Hu moved for the publication of an
appeal in the central daily bulletin of the CCP Central Office,
urging the Anhui government to enter into dialogue with the students
and restore social order. He called for an investigation
of the accident and the prosecution of the truck driver according
to the law.
According to the February issue of Hong Kong-based magazine
Cheng Ming, Hus move immediately provoked opposition
from the retiring leader, President Jiang Zemin. The magazine
reported that Zemin attacked Hus actions at an expanded
meeting of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee on the evening
of January 8, saying it would encourage further protests and threaten
the regime with a repeat of the mass anti-government demonstrations
in Tiananmen Square in May-June 1989.
Jiang reportedly declared that some CCP leaders
had failed to assimilate both the positive and negative
experiences of the political events of students and youth in 1987
and 1989. He warned: No-one can guarantee that one
day, morning or night there wont be thousands or even millions
of students and teachers taking to the streets to protest and
storming provincial governments and even Zhongnanhai [the
regimes leadership buildings in Beijing] with other youth.
The government will be disabled and the society will fall into
chaos and turmoil.
Jiang went on to accuse the Young Communist League (YCL)a
major base of support of Hu Jintaoof bearing the major
responsibility for students taking to streets. To substantiate
his charge that the YCL was tolerating and encouraging discontent
against government officials, he declared there had been more
than 1,300 illegal protests and gatherings by student and YCL
organisations in 2002 and over 2,000 unauthorised political meetings
on campuses.
According to Cheng Ming, Jiang made an unsuccessful
attempt to convince the Standing Committee that the party should
denounce the illegal actions of the Hefei students
in an editorial in the main state organ, the Peoples Daily.
But Jiang failed to get the numbersin part because the protest
had already ended without incident.
The rift between Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin over the Hefei protest
is indicative of broader tensions within the Stalinist bureaucracy
in the face of widespread alienation and hostility, particularly
over the impact of its economic restructuring policies. The number
of demonstrations by workers, small farmers and others has escalated
dramatically in recent months.
Recognising the isolation of the regime, the bulk of the CCP
supported the change to the constitution at last years 16th
Congress to allow owners of businesses and property to join the
ruling party. Beijing is attempting both to legimitise a political
role for the emerging Chinese capitalist class and to create a
social base for the regime among sections of the middle class.
Hu wants to go further and is proposing political reforms which
Jiang Zemin and other members of the old guard fear
could lead to protests that rapidly get out of hand.
Tienanmen Square protests
In May 1989, then party secretary Zhao Ziyang sought to dissipate
the student protests by making concessions to their demands for
greater press freedom and a curb on state corruption. While Zhao
won support from the students, his actions encouraged hundreds
of thousands of Beijing workers and poor to join the protests
with their social demands. With the student occupation of Tiananmen
Square threatening to become the focus of a working class movement,
Deng Xiaoping, backed by Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, placed Zhao
under house arrest and ordered the military to crack down on the
protesters.
Throughout the 1990s, the leadership formed in 1989 under Jiang
and Li based its rule on the premise that any tolerance of discontent
could re-ignite a mass movement. Any organised opposition has
been met with systematic repression. Dissidents, who formed the
China Democracy Party in 1998, were subjected to arrests and draconian
prison sentences, while the semi-religious organisation Falun
Gong was suppressed for organising protests against media accusations
it was a cult.
While Jiang argues that any shift to a policy of concessions
will stimulate unrest, his factional opponents are arguing the
opposite: that the decade-long policy of intimidation and repression
has created such alienation the regimes very survival is
in question. According to the November issue of Trend magazine,
former Chinese defense minister Zhang Aiping appealed to Hu Jintao
to make reform the axis of the new leadership or the
CCP was headed for a death alley.
If correct, the Cheng Ming report is a further indication
that the push for political reform is currently gaining ground
in the Stalinist hierarchy. The factional tensions are likely
to intensify in the final weeks before the 2003 National Peoples
Congress on March 5, at which Jiang Zemin and Li Peng are both
slated to resign from their official government positions.
China in 2003 is not the same as 1989. The last decade has
seen a further erosion of political support for the CCP, combined
with a massive growth in the social weight of the working class.
Chinas cities have grown in population by over 150 million,
with large sections of the rural peasantry being transformed into
industrial workers in the coastal free trade zones. If and when
they erupt, the movement will dwarf the Tiananmen Square protests.
According to Wang Dan, a student leader in 1989 and now a dissident
commentator on Chinese politics, preparations are well advanced
to present the new leadership around Hu Jintao as a reformist
break with the Jiang-Li Peng years. In a column in the Taipei
Times in January, Wang wrote: Rumours have emanated
from Beijing political circles that a group of people who originally
followed Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang may gradually be allowed back
into the system... Everyone is talking loudly about theoretical
and systemic innovation, while debate about political reform is
also becoming gradually more vibrant.
The differences within the regime, however, are entirely tactical.
The rival factions share the common perspective of defending a
privileged and corrupt ruling elite. Both are committed to protecting
the interests of the major transnationals and the new Chinese
capitalist class who have profited from Chinas opening up
to foreign investment in 1990s and the transformation of tens
of millions of Chinese into super-exploited labour for the world
market.
While Hu Jintao is prepared to exploit the grievances of students
in Hefei to factionalise against his opponents, the so-called
reformers will have no hesitation about resorting
to repression when the position of the ruling strata is directly
threatened from below. The fact that a relatively minor protest
has become a point of debate within the top party leadership,
is an indication of just how nervous all factions are about the
potential for a social explosion.
See Also:
Social discontent escalates in China
[12 February 2003]
A profile of the new
leadership in Beijing
[2 December 2002]
Chinese Communist
Party to declare itself open to the capitalist elite
[13 November 2002]
Behind the delay in
the Chinese Communist Party Congress
[5 October 2002]
Factional conflict
as Beijing prepares for major leadership change
[3 May 2002]
Chinese think-tank
warns of growing unrest over social inequality
[15 June 2001]
Ten years since the
Tiananmen Square massacre
Political lessons for the working class
[4 June 1999]
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