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Jordan: Elections provide a fig leaf for unpopular regime
By Jean Shaoul
25 June 2003
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The Jordanian parliamentary elections present any serious political
commentator with something of a dilemma. It is after all customary
when writing about the outcome of an election to explain the nature
of the parties seeking office, how the people voted, which party
won, who will form the next government and the policies that the
new government is likely to pursue.
But it is not really possible to do this when describing the
Jordanian elections. The significance of the election held on
June 17 in a country of some 5.5 million people lies in the fact
that it was held at all, rather than the outcome. Its aim was
to provide political cover for an absolutist regime at a time
when the United States is calling for the democratisation
of the region.
The tiny desert kingdom of Jordan was carved out of the former
Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I and given by the
British as a reward for services rendered to a local potentate,
whose heir still rules today.
The present king, Abdullah II, rules as an absolute monarch,
dependent upon his Bedouin army drawn from his own tribe. He is
a former military man who was a commander of Jordans special
forces specialising in counter-terrorism. Parliament is entirely
symbolic. It provides no fetters whatsoever on the kings
powers. Only the lower house is elected. The king can dissolve
parliament whenever he pleases and veto legislation that is not
to his liking. His secret police, the Muharabat, pervade every
aspect of Jordanian life.
Jordan, with few natural resources, is extremely poor and serves
as little more than a displaced persons camp for several million
former West Bank Palestinians who had been driven out by or fled
from the Israelis in 1948 and 1967.
The election was the first to be held for six years. It took
place almost two years after King Abdullah II dissolved parliament
at the end of its four-year term in July 2001. He repeatedly postponed
elections, citing regional circumstances as the reason.
He feared that the rising popular unrest fuelled by anger at the
brutal suppression by the Israelis of the Palestinians would undermine
the economic agenda dictated to him by the US and the international
financial institutions and sweep away his autocratic regime.
His plans to liberalise the economy, normalise relations with
Israel, secure Western aid and loans to shore up the bankrupt
economy, and support the US war against Iraq, were bitterly opposed.
As workers took to the streets in support of the Palestinians,
Abdullah outlawed public demonstrations and banned public meetings
to prevent opposition organisations, such as the Islamist parties
from gaining support.
Since 2001, his majesty has ruled by decree, issuing more than
160 temporary laws pending parliaments approval.
Despite unanimous public opposition to the war against Iraq, the
presence of US troops along the border with Iraq and Patriot antimissiles
near Amman meant that Abdullah could not deny that he was cooperating
with the US.
Anticipating unrest, the government cracked down on oppositionists
and rounded up suspected militants prior to the outbreak of the
war. In November 2002, ostensibly under the guise of arresting
a gang of outlaws who were terrorising the southern
city of Maan, one of the kings key areas of support,
security services conducted an operation using unprecedented force
and attracting international attention.
While in most countries parliamentary elections are at best
the opportunity to kick out one bunch of scoundrels to replace
them with another, in Jordan they do not have even that minimal
value.
The king is not obliged to appoint the prime minister or even
form the government from either the majority party or the parliament,
preferring to rely instead on his own loyal supporters and wealthy
Palestinian businessmen. In an interview with Financial Times
journalist Roula Khalaf, Abdullah made it quite clear that he
had no intention of breaking with tradition and choosing a government
based upon the outcome of the election. He said that ministers
would be picked according to qualifications rather than political
affiliation. He justified this with the remark that in the past
ministers who came from parliament spent their time ingratiating
themselves with their representatives so that they can get elected
next time round.
He described the elections as a transitional phase that
should lead to the creation of strong political blocs, rather
than set new policies for the country.
The king required that all candidates be independents
rather than party members. He increased the number of seats from
80 to 110, lowered the voting age to 18 and reserved six seats
for women in order to appear to be building democracy.
Of the 760 candidates competing for the 110 seats, almost all
were loyal supporters of the monarch.
Despite the king declaring the day of the election a public
holiday, voter turnout among the two million electorate was just
56 percent. It was low in Amman and Zarqa, the largest cities,
but higher in other parts of the country. This was no accident.
Gerrymandering was rife with the elections blatantly rigged in
favour of the small towns, villages and tribal areas where the
clans and East Bankers (original Jordanians) lived. The cities,
where the overwhelming majority of the population resides and
which are of predominantly Palestinian descent, had far fewer
candidates.
Loyalists won 93 seats, while the Islamist candidates affiliated
to the Muslim Brotherhoods political party, the Islamic
Action Front (IAF), which reversed its earlier position of not
participating in national elections, took 15 of the 30 seats they
contested. The Islamists success is widely believed to be
a gross underestimate of their actual support in the country.
Even this carefully controlled election, which the authorities
claimed were the cleanest in Jordans history, did not escape
claims of vote tampering. Such allegations were strengthened by
the kings ban on election monitors and the exclusion of
journalists from the voting stations.
Apart from the Islamists and a couple of independents assumed
to be of a similar political persuasion, all the candidates broadly
support Abdullahs agenda. The BBCs correspondent in
Amman, Heba Saleh, wrote, This parliament should not give
the king any headaches and then went on to add cynically,
the election of 15 Islamists will ensure a degree of debate
and perhaps some limited pressure on the government.
Since September 2002, the king and his crony government have
promoted a Jordan First campaign in an attempt to get Jordanians
to focus on domestic issues such as education, economic development,
equal opportunities and participation in national elections rather
than regional issues such as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and the US war on Iraq.
Planning Minister Bassem Awadallah explained that the new national
motto, Jordan First, was meant to encourage candidates and voters
to concentrate on practical platforms for domestic change
in the national interest.
In 2002, the US gave $250 million in economic aid to fund an
economic programme aimed at boosting education and in January
2003 tossed in a further $145 million for Abdullahs support
for the US war against Iraq.
Jordans desperate economic situation
The restructuring of the international economy in the 1980s
and the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987 led to a huge economic
crisis in 1989. Abdullahs father, King Hussein, found it
increasingly difficult to reward his traditional Transjordanian
supporters with public jobs and subsidies and protect his business
allies behind state regulation and government contracts.
Without loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Hussein
would have been forced to lay off thousands of workers, cut back
on social expenditure and eliminate subsidies on key commoditiesdestabilising
the social relations and patronage upon which his authoritarian
regime depended. The price of the bailout was the implementation
of its economic liberalisation agenda.
Hussein, ever the master of the political tightrope act, lifted
the ban on political parties imposed in 1957 and turned to national
elections as a means of appeasing dissatisfied Jordanians and
providing a few crumbs for the tribes, clans and businesses to
compete for cabinet posts and seats in parliament. He thereby
hoped to increase the scope for patronage, or wasta as
it is known, and deflect criticism onto parliament while at the
same time retaining the power to reward loyalists with cabinet
posts. His hopes were dashed when palace supporters won only 22
seats, while the Islamists won 34, leftists 13 and independents
11 of the 80 parliamentary seats in the 1989 elections, giving
the opposition parties a 59 percent majority.
The economic situation in Jordan deteriorated drastically following
Husseins backing for Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War.
Always dependent upon economic aid from and the remittances of
its citizens employed in the Gulf States, these sources dried
up as Jordan paid the penalty for opposing the US. It was this
lesson that led Hussein to support the US sponsored peace process
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reach and agreement with
Israel in 1994.
Immediately after the disastrous 1989 elections, he set about
fixing the electoral laws so that it was difficult for the Palestinians,
left wing and religious groups to win seats in national elections.
The 1993 and 1997 elections strengthened the palaces traditional
base among tribal and rural East Bankers and marginalised the
impoverished workers in the towns and cities, above all the former
Palestinian refugees living in abject poverty and squalor. The
overwhelming majority of Palestinians abstained and the election
served only to increase the social divisions and tensions within
the country.
While privatisation under the aegis of the IMF went ahead in
ways that benefited international capital, Hussein sought to mollify
his traditional supporters who had in the main administered the
public sector by offering them a stake in the new enterprises
as strategic investors. He set the terms and conditions
to ensure that only the palaces clients could bid and prevent
the wealthy Palestinian businessmen, who dominated the private
sector, from gaining control.
The IMF austerity measures have brought untold misery to the
Jordanian people: increased taxes, removal of subsidies, and loss
of jobs. Unemployment is 27 percent and many more live below the
poverty line. Prices have soared as the currency has declined
in value. Jordans debt at $8 billion is higher than its
GDP.
Husseins son, Abdullah, who succeeded him in 1999, has
continued these policies. Last weeks elections will mean
no change in either his political or economic direction. Totally
dependent upon the Bush administration, he supported the US rape
of Iraq, signed a free trade agreement with the US and is currently
hosting the summit of World Economic Forum leaders called to reorganise
the Middle East in big businesss interests.
See Also:
An atmosphere of
instability and crisis
World leaders gather at King Husseins funeral
[10 February 1999]
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