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WSWS : News & Analysis : Europe : Spain

Catalan coalition seeks greater independence from Spain

By Paul Bond
31 January 2004

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The coalition government that took power in Catalonia after last November’s elections is set to pursue an agenda increasingly dictated by the nationalists.

Seeking to benefit from the region’s relative wealth compared to the rest of Spain, the coalition is seeking greater direct financial control and the opportunity to negotiate with transnational corporations independently of Madrid.

The changes within the Catalan government are symptomatic of the wider changes in Spain and across Europe. For the 23 years since the end of the military dictatorship of General Franco, the moderate nationalist party Convergencia I Unió (Convergence and Union—CiU), under Jordi Pujol, had controlled the regional government. When it lost its absolute control in 1999, the CiU did a deal with the national ruling Partido Popular (PP—Popular Party). In return for the PP’s support in the regional government (the Generalitat), the CiU agreed not to pursue any reform of regional statutes that might tend towards an independence movement.

Although the CiU finished first in the polls in November, it lost its pre-eminent position. The Parti Socialist de Catalunya (Catalan Socialist Party—PSC), sister party of the social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers Party—PSOE), also lost seats and did not win an overall majority.

The PP made some limited gains, but it was the pro-independence Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC—Catalan Republican Left) that emerged as the key to any future coalition. Effectively cut out of the Generalitat in 1999 by the CiU’s accord with the PP, the ERC now became the party to court in order to win power. The party’s leader, Josep Lluis Carod-Rovira, warned the other parties not to take the ERC’s support for granted.

Pujol (who headed the Catalan government for the whole period since the transition from Franco’s rule) had announced before the election his intention of retiring. When the results were announced, Pujol came under pressure from the PP nationally. The PP’s leader, Mariano Rajoy, warned the CiU against becoming “radical in their attempt to form a government” (i.e., doing a deal with the ERC) and encouraged it to reach agreement with the PSC.

The negotiations that took place, though, should give some idea of how pervasive the nationalists’ agenda had already become in the region, and of the extent to which the PSC has gone along with it. When Pujol attempted to broker a deal with the PSOE’s headquarters in Madrid, the PSC’s first secretary Jose Montilla commented, “The Catalan Socialists have their headquarters in Barcelona....”

The PSOE’s national leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero has recently talked of a “plural and diverse Spain,” and the party’s position nationally is for an extension of regional autonomy within the framework of the Spanish state (although this is not its position on the Basque region). However, even while the PSC was waiting for national approval from the PSOE for a deal with the ERC, one senior PSC official said, “They have to realise that we’re not the same party; the PSC is federated with the PSOE.”

A similar situation arose within the ERC. Early in the negotiations, one ERC leader said, “Preventing a divided Catalonia, into nationalists and non-nationalists, is the key for us.”

The CiU’s previous record of isolating the ERC was not forgotten though, and Carod-Rovira was able to utilise the CiU’s support for the PP against it.

What finally clinched the deal was explained succinctly by Carod-Rovira to Montilla: “As you know, financing and self-rule are the two key issues.”

There was no fundamental difference on financial questions between the two parties, and they entered protracted discussions on the matter of a new regional statute. The ERC threatened to call a referendum if the national government attempted to block the draft of any such new statute.

Under the PP’s recent Penal Code reform (which the PSOE’s Zapatero opposed), political leaders can be imprisoned for calling a referendum that is not sanctioned by Madrid. Designed to stop Basque nationalists by legislative repression, the reforms could also have an impact in Catalonia, which shared its extended autonomous rights. The PSC and the ERC, in their negotiations for a coalition, agreed to hold a “general consultation” should Madrid reject their draft statute. This, they argue, would not breach the new legislation as it could be interpreted as an opinion survey.

In the meantime, Carod-Rovira was doing his best to satisfy regional business leaders that the ERC posed no threat to their interests. Earlier in the negotiations, Prime Minister José Maria Aznar warned the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce against ERC participation in the regional government. Scarcely a week later, Carod-Rovira was being introduced to members of the Spanish Confederation of Business Executives. He was introduced by Isidre Faine, head of the La Caixa Bank. Faine, along with his fellow directors of La Caixa, also held breakfast meetings with other senior members of the ERC.

With the ERC satisfied that it was dictating the agenda on regional autonomy, and business leaders satisfied that the ERC had their interests at heart, the coalition was established. Pasqual Maragall of the PSC became regional president. Carod-Rovira became chief cabinet minister. Immediately after the results were announced, his calls for a “government of national unity” were translated into the following statement as he took his post as second-in-command in the Generalitat: “Catalonia is not one party, it is all of us.” Carod-Rovira made clear the class nature of this agreement when he said that the coalition “will have the greatest consideration, respect for and collaboration with, the forces that will be situated...in the opposition.”

Even together, the PSC and ERC could not fill the 68 seats required to hold power. They needed a third element, which was provided by Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verdas/Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (ICV-EUiA—Initiative for Catalonia-Greens/United and Alternative Left), a coalition of left groups, Greens and Stalinists. When the ICV-EUiA’s results were announced, its supporters argued that this disparate group would have to fight to put its Green and radical policies on the agenda. The ICV-EUiA’s Joan Saura, on taking his position as the third member of the ruling troika, made it clear that this was little more than a pipe dream as he declared himself “very comfortable” with the agreement that had been reached. “During these 23 years,” he said, “there has been a great deal of progress, but the electorate has said that it wants new horizons for Catalonia.”

This “new horizon” involves the redrafting of regional autonomy. The primary objective of these proposals is to bring financial control of the region to Barcelona. The main proposal, agreed by the PSC and ERC as the basis for their coalition, is that Catalonia would take control of its own tax collection, creating a regional tax office independent of Madrid. This would allow the Generalitat to cease paying “tributes” to the central government, as well as free up control of the finances.

This agenda is motivated by entirely selfish considerations. Catalonia is the wealthiest of Spain’s 17 autonomous regions. It provides around 20 percent of the national gross domestic product. Under the inter-regional solidarity fund, nationwide tax revenues are distributed to regions according to need. Catalonia and Madrid between them provide 80 percent of the solidarity fund. In 2002, the Catalan province of Girona had a gross household income almost double that of the province of Jaen in Andalusia in the impoverished south. Catalonia’s revenue showed a profit of €10.862 billion; Andalusia was in the red to the tune of €4.412 billion.

Sections of the regional bourgeoisie are keen to end this subsidisation of the poorer Spanish regions. Carod-Rovira has been explicit on this point. Instead, they are looking to create a smaller regional economy more directly in contact with international corporations. This would allow them to control the exploitation of the Catalan working population and enrich themselves in the process. Proposed changes to taxation would provide immediate revenue, while the extension of regional autonomy is necessary to prevent any loss of funds. It would also provide the basis for an independent infrastructure.

This is what lies behind such proposals as making the Catalan High Court of Justice the highest court in the region, side-stepping the Madrid legal system. Proposals are also afoot for direct representation to the European Union as well as to other international bodies like UNESCO and the World Tourism Organisation.

Most significantly, the coalition has also put forward plans to create a so-called “Euro-region.” This would combine the Catalan-speaking areas of Catalonia, Aragon, the Balearic Islands and Valencia in Spain, and Roussillon in France, into a single economic unit. Because it is currently proposed as a loose economic unit, the plan has met with little opposition. It is quite clear, though, that the coalition intends this as a new form of economic structure. It is seeking to extend the Generalitat’s already-stated ambition to improve transport and communication links as a means of creating a regional trading unit outside of existing state borders. The Generalitat’s Investment Promotion Agency had already won some support for this from businesses in French Catalan-speaking areas, which are keen to exploit the poorer wages and conditions they see across the state border.

To this end, the coalition has proposed an ambitious programme of installing a publicly funded broadband telecommunications grid in the region—to reach every home and office—within four years.

The coalition has put forward a raft of social measures that, on first sight, appear to be liberal—to increase funding of education, cut hospital waiting lists, and raise the minimum pension to within 80 per cent of the minimum wage, for example. But they are essentially aimed at bringing all financial control within the remit of the Generalitat. Madrid has fought off all attempts to devolve pensions, for example, and is likely to do so again.

At a point when global corporations are shifting investment eastwards (for example Samsung, which recently moved mobile phone production from Catalonia to China, and computer monitor production from Britain to Slovakia), the Generalitat faces the challenge of making Spain’s most affluent region a viable, attractive investment prospect. This is what is driving the ever-more vigorous assertion of the Catalan language as a unifying regional factor. Before the election, the Generalitat had already started the so-called CAT campaign under which immigrants to Catalonia were offered free Catalan lessons, although they had to pay for Spanish lessons. Businesses participating in the campaign were being instructed only to speak Catalan to customers.

This has now been extended further. In a proposal aimed at increasing the “social use” of Catalan, the Generalitat is to change its criteria for purchasing goods and supplies. Henceforth, the Generalitat—the main purchaser in the region—will take into consideration whether products are labelled in Catalan. It is intended that goods sold in the region be labelled exclusively in Catalan.

The Generalitat is also seeking to extend the use of Catalan through the education system, as well as increasing its presence in films and new media. It intends to have Catalan recognised as an official language within EU institutions, which would create a further powerful lever for the establishment of a Catalan trade zone.

The use of Catalan is still an emotional issue. Prohibited under Franco, attempts to broaden its base meet with an ambivalent response. Such a bureaucratic method of extending the language is not aimed at defending a democratic right to speak Catalan, but at furthering the separatist agenda of a section of the bourgeoisie who want the right to preside over the exploitation of the region’s working class.

See Also:
Spain: Ex-Army official claims responsibility for killing leading Basque separatist
[15 January 2004]
Spain marks 25th anniversary of democratic transition
[20 December 2003]
Spain: Catalan election threatens further instability
[12 December 2003]

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