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Australia: former leading intelligence official exposes government
lies
By Terry Cook
25 February 2005
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Like all regimes involved in criminal activity, systematic
lying is now the modus operandi of the Howard government. It is
a well-established fact that the government lied to parliament
about weapons of mass destruction to create the pretext
for Australian involvement in the criminal and illegal invasion
of Iraq, and lied when it claimed that before the release of the
horrific images of torture in Baghdads Abu Ghraib prison
it had no knowledge of the abuse of Iraqi detainees.
A damning interview with former Australian intelligence officer
Rod Barton on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation current
affairs program Four Corners has not only provided
further proof of the governments lies on the prisoner abuse
issue; it has blown to pieces the claim made last year by Defence
Minister Robert Hill that no Australian personnel were involved
in the interrogation of Iraqi detainees. The Four Corners
program, aired on February 15, was aptly entitled Secrets
and Lies.
Last June 16, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib revelations, Hill
told parliament that a thorough review by the Defence Department
had confirmed that Australia did not interrogate prisoners,
Australia was not involved in guarding prisoners at Abu Ghraib
prison, or any other prison. Prime Minister John Howard
supported and repeated the claims both in and outside parliament.
Even before Hills so-called review, Howard had declared
in a radio interview on May 28: We were not involved in
any interrogations. We did not witness interrogations.
However, Barton told Four Corners reporter
Liz Jackson that he had been involved in the interrogation
of Iraq prisoners at Camp Cropper. The detention facility, according
to Barton, held about 100 high value prisoners, including
senior officials of the former regime and Iraqi scientists. Barton
is a trained microbiologist who worked as a senior specialist
advisor for the US Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which was dispatched
to search for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in
Iraq. Before that, he had been seconded from the Australian Defence
Intelligence Organisation to work with the chief UN weapons inspector,
Hans Blix.
Barton said he had been annoyed by Hills
June 16 statement because when responding to the Defence Departments
review questionnaire he had confirmed that he had
been present at interrogations at Camp Cropper and had personally
been involved in interviewing a senior Iraqi detainee. When Barton
telephoned a high-ranking Defence Department official to object
to Hills statement, he was told: We regard that you
did interviews and not interrogations.
Barton told Four Corners that the departments
interpretationone that has since been seized on by Hill
in an attempt to extricate the government and himself from the
charge of misinforming parliamentwas misleading.
When someone was brought to me in an orange jumpsuit with
a guard with a gun standing behind him... I call that an interrogation,
he said. When former ISG chief David Kay, who quit the ISG just
before Bartons arrival in Iraq, was recently asked about
the supposed difference between interviews and interrogations,
he said: Look, its not a distinction I make. I assume...
that anyone in a room with a prisoner is engaged in an interrogation.
Barton confirmed in the Four Corners interview
that even before the Abu Ghraib revelations he had informed a
high-ranking Australian Defence Department official of his concerns
about prisoner abuse at Camp Cropper. I had certain indications
and certain evidence that this had occurred. His concerns
had led him to make a recommendation to the official, that
Australia should not be involved in the interview or interrogation
of any prisoners at Cropper.
Despite the seriousness of what Barton had raised, he claimed
that no Defence Department official had asked him any further
questions. I gathered later that nothing was done about
it. Nothing was followed up. Yet Bartons chilling
account in the Four Corners interview pointed to extreme
forms of prisoner abuse at Cropper. Barton confirmed that detainees
were kept in solitary confinement, basically in small
1.5- by 2-metre cells with no natural light. Before being committed
to the main facility, prisoners were kept for a couple of days
with hessian bags over their heads. He believed the practice was
part of this disorientation process, softening up, a sort
of purgatory before they actually finished up in prison...
Barton said he became gradually more aware of abuse during
briefings known as prisoner of the week where a profile
and photograph of a particular detainee were displayed. On two
occasions, the photographs showed prisoners with abrasions about
the face. Barton began to question the official explanation that
the injuries were inflicted when the person had resisted arrest
and to suspect that they were the result of a softening
up process and that this was deliberate.
The most horrific case of abuse suspected by Barton was in
relation to the death of senior Iraqi scientist Mohammed Hamdi
Azmirli in February 2004. Barton had been told his death was due
to a brain tumor. But later, when he returned to Australia, he
had read a press report of an autopsy done on Azmirli, showing
that he suffered brain damage due to a beating, had a fractured
skull and a broken jaw. Barton said: I had my suspicions
that this person had actually been beaten to death in the prison
and felt that it should be investigated. Defence told
him that someone would get back to him about his concerns,
but I am still waiting for the call.
Barton also further exposed the lies told on WMD. He detailed
the sexing up of an interim ISG report. He revealed
that he had come under pressure from the incoming ISG chief, Charles
Duelfer, in mid-February 2004 to produce a report on his investigation
in Iraq that had no conclusions. Bartonwho by
that time had become convinced that there were no WMD or weapons
programs, told Duelfer: I believe its dishonest.
If we know certain things, and were asked to provide a report,
we should say what we have found and what we havent found.
After all, if we had found positive results, we would report that.
According to Barton, the interim ISG report left the
impression that maybe there were WMDs out there: maybe there were
programs still to find and all our future work might
discover this. This allowed Duelfer to report to the US
Congress that while ISG had not found evidence of stocks of weapons,
we continue to receive reports all the time that there are
hidden weapons, so its something which we have to pursue.
Shortly afterward, in March 2004, Barton resigned in protest,
as did another senior Australian and a British colleague.
Barton returned to Iraq in September to again work with ISG
at Duelfers invitation to produce the final report. He was
assured that no one influences him (Duelfer) and they
would do an honest report. Barton said the final report
concluded: [T]here were no weapons of mass destruction since
1991, and there were no programs to produce weapons.
Barton voiced his concern that despite the findings, Iraq scientists
and military officers who were earlier involved in weapons production
were still being held in Camp Cropper without charges after more
than 18 months. The final ISG report demonstrated that they
(the detainees) havent done anything wrong, at least internationally.
Barton explained: While they may have been involved in the
production of biological or chemical weapons in the past, under
international law, as long as they werent involved in the
use of these weapons, that is not illegal.
Government in damage control
Coming in the wake of the shocking allegations of torture recently
released by Australian Guantanamo Bay detainee Mamdouh Habib,
who detailed how he was interrogated in the presence an Australian
official, Bartons Four Corners interview is
a body blow to the Howard government. To buy time for Hill to
concoct a story to counter Bartons claims, Howard last week
point-blank refused to answer questions in parliament on the issues
raised, declaring that they should be directed to Hill in the
Senate. The Senate was not in session at the time.
At a Senate estimates hearing that began on February 16, Hills
clumsy attempts to rationalise the governments statements
last year only further fueled the already broadly held perception
that Howard and his cohorts are a gang of habitual liars.
Assisted by leading defence officials, including Brigadier
Steve Meekin and Lieutenant-General Peter Leahy, Hill told the
Senate committee that he had since been informed that a
small number of military personnel had been employed in
Iraq as debriefers but did not conduct interrogations.
Meekin admitted that up to eight Australians had been involved
in so-called debriefing sessions.
Hill made the preposterous claim that debriefs are not
interrogationsthe major difference being the matter of consent.
According to Hill, a detainee in a debriefing session had the
right to break off the interview at any time and cannot
be compelled to answer questions. He claimed that debriefs
at Camp Cropper in which Australians were involved, all involved
detainees that were compliant, and were willing participants in
the debrief.
This claim is ludicrous given that the people being questioned
were detainees who had been incarcerated in a maximum-security
prison for months without access to lawyers or the outside world
and who were completely at the mercy of their captors. What process
had they been put through to make them so compliant?
No doubt the softening up techniques observed by Barton
would have played their part, and Azmirlis death is evidence
enough that some of the detainees at Cropper were subjected to
far worse.
Attempting to back up Hill, Meekin revealed more than he meant
to when he insisted that Australian ISG members had been instructed
that they were not to take part in forced interrogations
and indeed they were to withdraw from that situation if
it was an interrogation and it appeared to them to be an interrogation.
The question is: how would the Australians judge that an interview
had suddenly turned into an interrogation? The definition of an
interrogation given by Lieutenant-General Leahy to the Senate
gives a clue. As opposed to a mere debriefing, Leahy
explained an interrogation was a hostile, aggressive and
systematic method of information-gathering where various techniques
are utilised to elicit information and weaken the
subjects will to resist...
In other words, when detainees were being beaten up or, as
the Abu Ghraib images show, subjected to humiliation and torture,
Australians were merely to withdraw. Note, Meekin
did not say they were instructed to object, or intervene to stop
abuse or even to report it; they were only to withdraw.
This can mean nothing else than Australian personnel were instructed
to turn a blind eye and walk away when prisoners were being abused.
One can now begin to understand why Bartons concerns
over prisoner abuse were treated with complete indifference by
ranking officials in the Defence Department. This was no accident
or the result of departmental laziness. It was completely in line
with government and departmental policy that tolerates and supports
the most brutal methods to achieve political endsincluding
torture.
See Also:
Former top Australian
officials denounce Howard for deception over Iraq war
[13 August 2004]
Australian government
faces new charges of manipulating intelligence
[28 April 2004]
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