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: News &
Analysis : Middle
East : Iraq
The formation of Iraqs interim government and the missing
billions
By James Cogan
22 July 2005
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Over the past year, a number of US government audits have documented
the mismanagement, lack of accounting, corruption and likely theft
of billions of dollars during the 13 months that the US-controlled
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) governed Iraq. Legal actions
have been initiated against US contracting companies such as Haliburton
and calls for further investigations were made in June in the
US House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform.
However, one aspect of the audit findings that raises many
issues has received little media coverage. In the eight weeks
before the June 28, 2004 handover of sovereignty to the so-called
Iraqi interim government, the CPA ordered $5 billion to be shipped
to Iraq in $100 notes and other US currency bills. The large sums
of cash that were disbursed to Iraqi government ministries, provincial
governors and American military field commanders in the final
months of the CPAs existence are simply unaccounted for.
After a $1 billion shipment in May 2004, two more cash shipments
in June 2004 were by far the largest the Federal Reserve has ever
carried out in its history. A Fed official commented in an email
on June 11: Just when you think youve seen it all...
the CPA is ordering $2,401,600,000 in currency to be shipped out
on Friday, June 18. On June 22, 2004, C-130 cargo planes
arrived in Baghdad containing the $2.4 billion in $100 notes.
Three days later, on June 25, another shipment of $1.6 billion
touched down.
The cash that flooded into Iraq in the lead-up to the formation
of the interim government leaves questions about the manner in
which the regime was assembled. At the time, the WSWS characterised
the process leading to the formation of the puppet regime as a
carefully contrived political balancing act aimed at paying off
the various rival ethnic and political organisations that backed
the US invasion (see Washington
installs new puppet regime in Baghdad).
The findings of the audits give grounds to suspect that the
paying off involved far more than just the allocation
of ministerial positions and political posts. The willingness
of various Iraqi factions to participate may well have been facilitated
by a share in the large amounts of US dollars.
Plane-loads of $100 bills arrived in Iraq amid a severe military
and political crisis facing US-led forces. In April 2004, the
resentment and discontent among the Iraqi people against the occupation
erupted. Thousands of young working class Shiites took up arms
in Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala and numerous other southern Iraqi cities
after the US military attempted to suppress the anti-occupation
movement led by cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. After the killing of four
mercenaries in Fallujah, the citizens of the Sunni city defied
ultimatums that they allow American troops to enter and withstood
a three-week assault by marines.
As well as shoring up pro-US political figures in the face
of a popular uprising against the occupation, a portion of the
unaccounted-for cash is likely to have been used to pay for what
can only be described as Iraqi mercenaries.
In late April 2004, the marine commanders directing the assault
on Fallujah recruited former Baathist generals to form a 5,000-strong
brigade made up of former Iraqi military personnel and convince
the local fighters to allow it to enter the city. While the so-called
Fallujah Brigade collapsed shortly after, its creation
enabled the US military to make a tactical retreat and re-deploy
forces to crush Sadrs rebellion in the south.
During June and July 2004, it is also known that the US military
and the US-installed interim prime minister Iyad Allawi recruited
large numbers of Saddam Husseins secret police and elite
security forces. In particular, ex-Baathist generals and thousands
of former Iraqi Republican Guard enlisted with the occupation
to form the interior ministry special police commandosthe
main local force that has since fought alongside the US military
against the insurgency.
The impact of the orgy of CPA outlays in May and June 2004
was that the incoming interim government inherited a vastly depleted
treasury and was left dependent upon financial injections from
Washington. All of the funds spent by the CPA were Iraqi assets
that had been handed over to or confiscated by the US occupation
forces. Between May 2003 and July 2004, the CPA took possession
of over $23.3 billion of Iraqi funds and spent or contractually
obligated some $19.6 billion. Just $3.7 billion was left when
sovereignty was transferred.
Iraqi money
The Iraqi assets handed over to and liquidated by the CPA came
from three sources: $1.9 billion from assets frozen in US banks
since the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; $926 million in US currency
that the occupation forces seized from Iraqi banks; and $20.7
billion from the so-called Development Fund for Iraq
(DFI).
The DFI was established in May 2003 by UN Security Council
Resolution 1483, which recognised the US-led occupation as the
sovereign authority in Iraq. The first money deposited in the
fund consisted of $8.1 billion from the UN-run Oil-for-Food program,
which had taken in the revenues from official Iraq oil sales since
1991. It was added to by Iraqi assets frozen in banks outside
the US, and, over the following months, the proceeds of Iraqi
oil sales. Haliburton alone was paid $1.6 billion from the DFI
for various CPA contracts.
Of the $19.6 billion in Iraqi funds that was spent or obligated
by the CPA, an incredible $12.7 billion was disbursed in the form
of US currency. During its existence, the CPA converted close
to $12 billion of Iraqi assets into US currency and ordered it
to be shipped to Iraq by the Federal Reserve. In all, 281 million
US currency bills, including 107 million $100 notes, were sent
to the occupied country from the US during the existence of the
CPA. It was shipped in by cargo planes on 484 pallets weighing
a total of 363 tonnes.
Where the money went is shrouded in mystery. A June 2005 report
prepared for Democrat congressman Henry A. Waxman of the House
of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, which brought
together the findings of various audits, stated the following
in its executive summary:
The report has three principal findings: (1) unprecedented
sums of cash were withdrawn from Iraqi accounts at the Federal
Reserve Bank in New York and transferred to US officials at the
CPA; (2) CPA officials used virtually no financial controls to
account for these enormous cash withdrawals once they arrived
in Iraq; and (3) there is evidence of substantial waste, fraud
and abuse in the actual spending and disbursement of the Iraqi
funds(see Rebuilding
Iraq: US Mismanagement of Iraqi Funds, June 2005).
Iraqi provincial governments were given close to $1 billion
by the CPAmost of it in cash. An audit into these payments
noted that numerous disbursements to and from the provincial
treasuries and their divisions were not recorded or incorrectly
recorded by either party.
The CPA handed over more than $637 million in cash to US military
commanders and civilian officials under the Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP) and the Rapid Regional Response Program
(RRRP). The Special Inspector General found that there was
no assurance that fraud, waste and abuse did not occur in the
management and administration of cash assets.
The CPA was unable to account for 80 percent of the $119.9
million in cash spent in the south-central region of Iraq. According
to one audit, a US official responsible for disbursements in Iraqs
south-central region was given $6.75 million in cash on June 21,
2004 and instructions to liquidate it before the handover of power.
The most questions surround the transfer of some $10.9 billion
by the CPA to the Iraqi ministries it had set up. At least $8.8
billion was handed over to these bodies in the form of US currency.
As far more than half the cash sent to Iraq by the Federal Reserveover
$7.3 billionarrived between February 2004 and June 28, 2004,
the largest disbursements must have taken place in the months
and weeks before the formation of the interim government.
The Special Inspector General reported that the CPA did
not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial and
contractual controls to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent
manner by Iraqi ministries and disbursed funds without
assurance the monies were properly used or accounted for.
The audit found, for example, that approximately $1.5
billion in cash allocations were made to Iraqi banks between January
and April 2004 for ministry operating expenses, yet spending plans
supported only approximately $498 million in operating expenses.
At one Iraqi ministry, 8,206 security guards were on the payroll
but auditors could only validate the employment of 602.
A former CPA official, Frank Willis, told researchers for Waxman
that there was leakage of assets all over the place.
What the audit did not stress, however, is that the Iraqi ministries
operated completely under the control of hundreds of US officials
who were installed by the Bush administration. They could easily
have functioned as a convenient conduit for the appropriation
of Iraqi assets for any number of purposesfrom bribery to
covert operations to outright theft.
The evidence of corruption and the unanswered questions that
surround the CPAs spending of Iraqi assets serves to underscore
the criminality of the entire US invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Behind the propaganda of bringing liberation and democracy,
the real agenda of the US ruling class in Iraq was and remains
the looting of its assets and its energy resources, at the expense
of the Iraqi masses.
See Also:
As Congress approves $82
billion more
Wholesale corruption exposed in Iraqi contracts
[5 May 2005]
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