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Chinese leadership plans to honour ousted party reformer
By John Chan
26 September 2005
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The General Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central
Committee issued a plan last month to officially mark the 90th
anniversary of the birth of former party secretary Hu Yaobang
on November 20.
The announcement is significant, as Hu has been deliberately
kept out of the spotlight for more than a decade and half. The
fact that Hu is now going to be feted as an honoured party leader
is connected to the continuing political predicament confronting
the current Stalinist bureaucracy in Beijing over the massacre
of students and workers in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989.
Hu was the CCP general secretary from 1981 to 1987 and an advocate
of limited political liberalisation. His death in April 1989 was
one of the initial reasons why students gathered in Tiananmen
Square. To justify the bloody crackdown that followed, the CCP
bureaucrats still officially describe the protests for democratic
rights as counterrevolution riots or political
turmoil.
As in 1989, the CCP leadership rests on a very narrow social
base and, under President Hu Jintao, is seeking to broaden its
appeal to layers of the middle class. To do so, however, it has
to lay to rest the resentment, hostility and anger generated by
the events in Tiananmen Square. The move to pay respect to the
memory of Hu Yaobang is a tentative step in that direction.
Ceremonies will be held in Beijing at the Great Hall of People
as well as in Hus hometown in Henan province and in Jiangxi
province, where he is buried. An official biography and his collected
works will also be published. Hu Dezi, the late leaders
nephew, has confirmed that the local authorities in Hunan province
have received instructions from Beijing to build a memorial park
for Hu Yaobang, including a statue, a public square and an exhibition
hall.
An unnamed Communist Party official told the Washington
Post that the leadership was not prepared to renounce its
position on the events in 1989, but Hus rehabilitation was
a sign of change. If the party can change its position on
Hu Yaobang, it can change its position on June 4 and on political
reform, he said. The CCP is not about to admit its crimes,
but it is trying to soften its image.
Hu Yaobang was a protégé of the late paramount
leader Deng Xiaoping and played a key role in bringing Deng to
power after Mao Zedongs death in 1976. By organising a campaign
to criticise Maos devastating Cultural Revolution
in 1960s and 1970s, Hu paved the way for the rehabilitation of
Deng, the turn to market reform and an open door policy
to foreign capital.
In the early 1980s, Hu went further. He encouraged criticism
of the partys autocratic rule, and won support among a layer
of middle class intellectuals who wanted a greater political role.
Hu was purged by Deng in 1987 when this policy led to a wave of
student protests that questioned the partys ruling legitimacy.
Deng was concerned that the regime could face a challenge from
below if political control was loosened. His policies had already
led to the dismantling of collectivised agriculture and the deregulation
of state-run industries had produced growing unemployment. These
processes led to deepening social polarisation as the families
of Chinese leaders began profiteering and generated widespread
resentment.
Hus death in April 1989 confirmed Dengs fear. Beijing
students mourned Hus death and organised a rally that was
initially pro-government and limited to protests against official
corruption. These demands began to broaden to include calls for
democratic rights. Hus successor as party secretary, Zhao
Ziyang, attempted to end the growing demonstration in Tiananmen
Square with proposals for limited political reforms aimed primarily
at reducing the role of the state bureaucracy, encouraging private
enterprise and enlisting the support of layers of the middle class.
As the protest continued, hundreds of thousands of workers
in Beijing and other cities joined and raised their own demands
against rampant inflation, growing unemployment and social inequality.
Terrified by the prospect of a working class revolt, Deng ordered
troops to move into Beijing and suppress the protests, killing
hundreds if not thousands of people.
Zhao Ziyang was purged and placed under house arrest for encouraging
the political turmoil. Party elders and army generals
installed Jiang Zemin in place of Zhao. Throughout 1990s, Jiang
made no concessions on democratic rights and responded to any
sign of unrest, particularly by workers, with ruthless repression.
Anyone who questioned the official version of events in June 1989
was immediately under suspicion and faced police measures.
Every year the Chinese leadership has responded to the June
4 anniversary with great nervousness. The state-controlled media
censor any reference to the massacre, the security forces are
mobilised and known political dissidents placed under police surveillance.
This year Chinese authorities again flooded Tiananmen Square with
police and plainclothes agents to ensure no protests took place.
The death of Zhao Ziyang earlier this year triggered a considerable
political crisis in Beijing. The Chinese authorities feared that
any public commemoration for Zhao could become the focus for a
renewed outpouring of mass discontent (see Beijing
on heightened alert after the death of Zhao Ziyang).
A flood of international capital
In 1989, Western leaders and media denounced the Tiananmen
massacre as a crime of communism against democracy,
while Beijing maintained it had been forced to act to defend the
socialist system. Today, these cynical claims are
transparently absurd.
Before their crocodile tears were even dry, international investors
began pouring billions of dollars into China, recognising that
Beijing was prepared to take the most extreme measures to suppress
any political opposition, particularly by workers. The Stalinist
bureaucracy responded by accelerating its agenda of free market
reform, on a scale not witnessed in the 1980s.
The OECDs first economic survey of China released on
September 16 enthusiastically hailed Chinas big results
in market restructuring. It pointed out that the private sector
now generates 57 to 65 percent of Chinas non-agricultural
GDP. Between 1998 and 2003, the output of private companies increased
five-fold and of foreign enterprises three-fold. By contrast,
between 1995 and 2005, some 150,000 state-controlled enterprises,
or half of the total, were shut down or privatised. Since 1998,
16 million workers have been turned out of work.
Behind Chinas so-called miracle, tens of
millions of Chinese workers labour in atrocious conditions for
subsistence wages. The size of the working class is being continuously
augmented by millions of peasants who are compelled to migrate
to cities by heavy taxation, poverty or landlessness to look for
work. Poverty, unemployment and anger over the corrupt and repressive
bureaucracy fuel a growing number of protests, which, while isolated,
can involve tens of thousands of people.
A study by Chinas Ministry of Labour and Social Security
warned last month that if no effective measures were taken to
curb the disparity between rich and poor and between urban and
rural areas, social tensions could reach a red light
level in 2010 and threaten political stability. While Beijing
would not hesitate to use political repression, the new leadership
under President Hu Jintao is seeking to establish new political
mechanisms to prop up its rule.
Sections of the Beijing bureaucracy are seeking to revive the
program of political reform promoted by Hu Yaobang
and Zhao Ziyang in 1980s. The aim is not to provide genuine democratic
rights but to enlist the support of the better-off layers of Chinas
new middle classes to offset the opposition of the working class
and urban and rural poor.
Political dissidents have long warned of the dangers if such
a strategy is not implemented. A comment in the September issue
of Cheng Ming, a Hong Kong-based journal for the overseas
democracy movement, urged Beijing to transform class
conflict into parliamentary struggles. Only such a
reform can eliminate large-scale turmoil and violence, and
avoid revolution and civil war, it warned.
Before he came to power in 2002, Hu Jintao endorsed discussions
among the intelligentsia on subjects related to democratic
reform. At a news conference on September 5, Premier Wen Jiabao
promised that elections, now confined to the village-level, should
expand to townships in the next several years. The plan to rehabilitate
Hu Yaobang is another tentative step in the same directionto
try to bury the issue of the Tiananmen Square massacre and implement
cosmetic political reforms in an effort to head off future social
explosions.
See Also:
Chinese government preparing for greater
social unrest
[6 September 2005]
Chinese president preaches
the need for "a harmonious society"
[12 March 2005]
Behind the military
leadership changeover in China
[25 October 2005]
Ten years since the
Tiananmen Square massacre
Political lessons for the working class
[4 June 1999]
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