|
WSWS : News
& Analysis : North
America
The Sago Mine disaster
Safety reports document deadly conditions at West Virginia
mine
By Jerry Isaacs
14 January 2006
Use
this version to print
| Send this
link by email | Email
the author
Newly released reports from state and federal safety inspections
of the Sago Mine prior to the January 2 explosion that killed
twelve West Virginia coal miners detail a rash of potentially
deadly safety violations and a pattern of negligence, if not criminal
disregard, by company officials.
In several cases inspectors reported that mine foremen performing
mandatory safety checks before each shift ignored obvious
hazards, including the buildup of explosive coal dust, the presence
of dangerous electrical equipment and unstable roof conditions.
Managers then entered reports in the logs concealing these hazards,
leading one inspector to charge a foreman with aggravated
conduct by his failure to record and take action on a known hazard.
On December 14, a little more than two weeks before the disaster,
an inspector from the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) found coal six to eight inches deep in piles along mine
walls and roadways, as well as an accumulation of highly explosive
coal dust on the mine roof and wall. In his report, the inspector
noted: The operator has shown a high degree of negligence
for the health and safety of the miners that work at this coal
mine by allowing the conditions to exist.
The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported that West Virginia
state inspectors, in particular, noted repeated roof collapses
and injuries in a section of the non-union mine that was subsequently
closed and sealed by the company. It is now believed that this
is the area where the January 2 explosion occurred, trapping the
twelve miners.
On July 22 of last year, inspectors pointed to the potential
dangers in this area, saying that Anker West Virginia Mining,
which at that time owned the Sago Mine, demonstrated higher
than normal neglect by allowing coal pillars in this area
to be cut to a dangerously thin width of ten feet. The inspectors
reported that miners will be exposed to the danger done
for several years to come. Inspector John Collins wrote
that it was impossible to measure for methane in this area because
of such hazards.
On August 16, a federal inspector noted the presence of loose-hanging
rocks up to four inches thick in the area, looking as if
they will fall without warning.
State mining officials said the operator closed the section,
at the time known as the Second Left Mains, on December 11 and
began cutting a new Second Left area to avoid frequent roof collapses
and injuries. Prior to the explosion, in 2004-2005, the areaabout
two miles from the entrance of the minewas the site of 31
roof collapses and several accidents.
Management was required to issue written reports on all injuries
and roof falls, but its reports were at best cursory. For example,
the report on an August 10 accident in which Ralph Mitchell, a
continuous mining machine operator, was struck by a rock from
the roof simply stated a rock struck Mr. Mitchell on the
right side of the head, middle and lower back, and right foot.
This rock had slick surfaces.
According to the Post Gazette, the safety inspector
described Mitchells injuries as serious, noting that the
miner had been taken by helicopter to a Morgantown hospital. In
his report, he checked off the box that suggested the severity
of the injury was permanently disabling.
One theory gaining strength is that a roof collapseand
the sparks caused by tons of falling rockignited methane
gas that had built up in the closed section. Other theories include
the possibility that a lightning strike hit this area or an adjacent
natural gas well.
The company was responsible for assuring that the area no longer
being mined was free of explosive gases and sealed so that an
explosion there would not endanger miners in areas still being
worked. Evidence suggests that neither precaution was taken in
a serious manner.
Rather than using concrete blocks or poured concrete, the company
installed a 40-inch-thick seal made of Omega Blocksa lightweight
material comparable to dense plastic foam. The blocks were coated
with a sealant. This material is known to be unreliable for containing
the pressure of an explosion and prone to being blown out.
When rescuers reached that part of the mine after the January
2 explosion, the New York Times reported, they found the
seals had been destroyed, apparently having been blown outward.
This indicated that the blast came from a closed-off area behind
the seals. This is the area where rescuers recovered the body
of 48-year-old Terry Helms, the fire boss who was apparently killed
by the initial blast.
It is likely that the concussion of this blast, rather than
being contained in the sealed-off area, knocked out the ventilation
and communication systems and spread debris, smoke and poisonous
carbon monoxide in the area where the twelve miners were working.
A hellhole
Details of hazardous conditions at the Sago Mine confirm reports
that the miners themselves felt each day at work might be their
last. Ted Tenney, 53, who worked briefly at the Sago Mine about
three years ago, described it as a hellhole.
A retired miner who worked for 33 years in both union and non-union
mines, Tenney told the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review that he
wasnt surprised by the disaster that claimed the lives of
men with whom he had worked. When I worked there, it was
a hellhole. On my first day there, it took me 20 minutes to know
that I screwed up by taking that job. It was suicide to walk in
that pit mouth. It was dangerous, and I knew that mine was not
going to make it.
Tenney said anyone who spoke out against the unsafe conditions
could be fired and banned from working at any nearby mine. They
cant hurt me, he said, but those working at the mine
could not speak out. These people will be fired and they
will be blackballed from any mine around. They need the money
and the work.
In a news conference Wednesday, Ben Hatfield, the chief executive
of the International Coal Group (ICG), the current owner of the
mine, said the company had improved safety conditions since taking
over the mines operations last November. In my opinion,
he said, the Sago Mine was a safe operation.
Efforts by ICG management to blame the unsafe conditions on
the mines former owner, Anker West Virginia Mining Company,
have been undermined by reports that ICGs billionaire owner
Wilbur Ross established a controlling interest over Anker at least
as early as 2001.
Referring to the new reports, Tony Oppegard, a former top official
with MSHA, said, I would say these are indicative of an
operator who wasnt going to let safety get in the way of
production. Oppegard, at one time a prosecutor of mine safety
violations in Kentucky, said the repeated failure to conduct proper
mine examinations showed that Sago officials should have been
prosecuted on felony charges.
Congress, he said, had singled out the falsification of reports,
such as pre-shift logs, as the only violation that could be prosecuted
as a felony crime. I cant emphasize how important
pre-shift examinations are. It is a key provision put in the [Mine]
Act to protect miners safety.
At the very least, Oppegard said, MSHA should have moved to
shut down the Sago Mine for having a pattern of pre-examination
violations.
During a conference call with reporters, Ray McKinney, acting
administrator for MSHA, said the mines violations did not
constitute a pattern of misconduct that would have warranted closing
the mine. The Bush administration official insisted that a pattern
of violations takes much longer that just a few weeks or
a few months to establish.
Oppegard called the MSHA officials statements ridiculous,
adding, The law doesnt say it has to go on for years.
Evidence is growing not only of the possible criminality of
the Sago Mines corporate owners, but also the federal and
state authorities who allowed this mine and many more like it
to continue operations. Years of budget cuts and kowtowing to
the profit interests of the coal companies by Democratic as well
as Republican administrations have severely undermined any government
oversight of the industry. Likewise, the ability to effectively
respond to disasters has been curtailed, with rescue operations
hamstrung by antiquated equipment and a lack of manpower. All
of these factors combined to condemn to death the twelve West
Virginia miners, who evidently survived for some ten hours before
succumbing to poisonous carbon monoxide gas.
The Bush administration and Democratic Party politicians such
as West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin are complicit in this tragedy.
That is why no confidence can be placed in any investigation conducted
by the two parties of big business.
Predictably, the bureaucracy of the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) issued a ringing endorsement of the investigations
and hearings announced by the Senate Appropriations Committee
and Governor Manchin.
Praising Robert Byrd (Democrat of West Virginia), Arlen Specter
(Republican of Pennsylvania) and Tom Harkin (Democrat of Iowa),
all members of the Senate committee, for their long term-commitment
to coal miners and their health and safety, UMWA President
Cecil Roberts declared, I have confidence that with them
taking the lead, we will get answers and we will begin the process
of working toward real, enforceable solutions.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
See Also:
Death toll continues to rise in US
coal mines
Kentucky miner crushed to death in roof collapse
[12 January 2006]
After the West Virginia mine disaster,
the official whitewash begins
[11 January 2006]
US media sheds crocodile tears for West
Virginia miners
[10 January 2006]
Top of page
The WSWS invites your comments.
Copyright 1998-2008
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved |