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The Hamdan dissents: US Supreme Court justices argue
for presidential dictatorship
By John Burton
6 July 2006
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John Burton is the Socialist Equality Party candidate for
United States Congress from the 29th District of California
Three US Supreme Court justices filed dissenting opinions in
last weeks 5-3 ruling in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
which rejected President Bushs military commissions at the
Guantánamo Bay prison camp.
All three dissentersClarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia and
Samuel Alitosupported the administrations claim to
virtually unlimited presidential powers. A fourth, Chief Justice
John Roberts, recused himself from the high court proceedings
because, in his previous capacity as a federal appeals court judge,
he had already supported the administrations position in
the Hamdan case.
The Hamdan cases significance is not so much in
its expressed holdingsthat any war crimes trial of Guantánamo
Bay detainee Salim Ahmed Hamdan, allegedly a driver for Osama
bin Laden in Afghanistan, must meet the due process standards
of a military court martialbut in its implicit repudiation
by the majority on the court of the claimed legal justification
for much of the Bush administrations exercise of unbridled
executive power in the name of waging an indefinite war
on terror.
Relying on the Constitutions Article II designation of
the president as the commander in chief of the Army and
Navya provision intended to subordinate the military
to civilian authorityand the supposed open-ended war
on terror, the Bush administration claims unchecked military
power to seize individuals of any nationality, including American
citizens, anywhere in the world, including within the United States
itself, and imprison them indefinitely, under the most brutal
and inhumane conditions, where they are subjected to torture and
other forms of abuse and degradation, without any constraint by
domestic or international law.
From any legitimate legal perspective, the war on terror
is not a real wara state of belligerency between
sovereign nationsbut a metaphorical war, like the war
on drugs, for example, and does not constitutionally trigger
the executives war powers. Moreover, its object is only
a vague reference to a tactic, terror, rather than
an identifiable organization or movement.
So-called anti-terror measures such as the military commissions
in Hamdan can be easily turned from the reactionary Islamic
fundamentalists of Al Qaeda to other targets, most importantly
the growing domestic and international political opposition to
US militarism, attacks on democratic rights, and the destruction
of jobs, living standards and social programs.
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens majority opinion
rejected the Bush administrations arguments that the Supreme
Court cannot challenge the presidents claimed wartime
powers, and mandated that any war crimes trials conform at least
to the Uniform Code of Miliary Justice (UCMJ), that it be based
on a charge recognized by international law, and, most importantly,
that it conform to the Geneva Conventions which, by virtue of
Common Article 3, protect all persons captured by a signatory
nation such as the United States. (See Supreme
Court rules against Bush administrations military commissions)
The principle dissent was written by Associate Justice Clarence
Thomas, joined by Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel
Alito. (Alito recently replaced retired Associate Justice Sandra
Day OConnor.)
To underscore the vehemence of his opposition to the majority
ruling, Thomas took the unusual step of reading his dissent from
the bench.
What is most notable is the brazen fashion in which Thomas
sets out a blueprint for military dictatorship, a system of laws
where the president determines the scope of his own war powers
and then is free to use them to establish military commissions,
setting whatever procedures he chooses, and subject whomever he
chooses to rigged trials for whatever he claims to be a war crime,
with sentences up to the death penalty.
Ignoring the role of the Supreme Court as a check on presidential
power, Thomas chastises Stevens for flout[ing] our well-established
duty to respect the Executives judgment in matters of military
operations and foreign affairs. Underlying this purported
obligation to defer to presidential decisions are, Thomas argues,
the structural advantages attendant to the Executive Branchnamely,
the decisiveness, activity, secrecy, and dispatch that flow from
the Executives unity.
Here, in a nutshell, is the nub of the deeply anti-democratic
argument. The Hamdan dissenters reflect sentiments widely
held by right-wing elements in the US ruling elite: to confront
the growing domestic and international opposition to the consequences
of its policies, the US government must free itself from the baggage
of the legislative and judicial branches. It must act in secrecy,
with decisiveness and unity of purpose,
unencumbered by opposing viewpoints voiced in other branches of
government, much less those expressed within the population as
a whole.
The use of military commissions, such as those proposed by
the Bush administration, which deny the accused independent judges,
access to evidence, and even the right to attend the trial, flies
in the face of the Fifth Amendment guarantee that No person
shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.
Because there is no constitutional provision or act of Congress
which authorizes the president to establish military commissions,
Thomas adopts his doctrine from what he calls the common
law of war, which, in turn, he claims is derived from
the experience of our wars and our wartime tribunals, as
well as the laws and usages of war as understood and practiced
by the civilized nations of the world.
Setting aside the oxymoron of war practiced by the civilized
nations of the world, Thomas here sets out a doctrine that
allows the executive branch to ignore both domestic and international
law, instead cherry picking its rules from the
experience of our wars and our wartime tribunals.
Moreover, consistency with those historical precedents is not
even required. According to Thomas, the common law of war
is marked by two important features. First, as with the common
law generally, it is flexible and evolutionary in nature, building
upon the experience of the past and taking account of the exigencies
of the present.
In other words, past experience can be ignored whenever convenient
to do so, leaving the executive free to make the law up as it
goes along.
Second, Thomas continues, the common law
of war affords a measure of respect for the judgment of military
commanders... In recognition of these principles, Congress has
generally left it to the President, and the military commanders
representing him, to employ the commission, as occasion may require,
for the investigation and punishment of violations of the law
of war.
Here Thomas is asserting that the life and liberty of everyone
on earth is within the discretion of the US president and his
military command staff, subject only to their interpretations
of the common law of war.
Who can be subjected to these military commissions? Thomas
cites four factors from William Winthrops 1920 treatise
Military Law and Precedent: the (1) time and (2)
place of the offense, (3) the status of the offender, and (4)
the nature of the offense charged, and then concludes that
the president has unreviewable authority to deem each factor established,
thus making the reach of military commissions unlimited.
As for time and place, Thomas refers to Hamdans
charging document, where the Executive has determined
that the theater of the present conflict includes Afghanistan,
Pakistan and other countries... and that the duration of that
conflict dates back (at least) to Usama bin Ladens August
1996 Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans.
These judgments pertaining to the scope of the theater
and duration of the present conflict are committed solely to the
President in the exercise of his commander-in-chief authority,
Thomas writes, condemning Stevens opinion for its willingness
to second-guess the Executives judgments in this context.
Persons triable before a commission, the third factor, include,
according to Thomas, individuals of the enemys army
who have been guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offences
in violation of the laws of war, as well as irregular
armed bodies or persons not forming part of the organized forces
of a belligerent who would not be likely to respect the laws of
war.
Here Thomas ignores the most fundamental notion of due process,
that a person is presumed innocent, and that guilt can be established
only after a fair hearing. According to Thomas, those already
deemed guilty of illegitimate warfare, presumably
at the direction of the president and his military commanders,
can then be subjected to military commissions. Even if the accused
has not actually done anything, he can still be hauled
before a commission if he would not be likely to respect
the laws of war.
There are no legal limits restricting what the president can
do to such people, Thomas claims in a particularly bloodthirsty
passage, because, according to Winthrop, such persons are
not within the protection of the laws of war
and therefore are liable to be shot, imprisoned, or
banished, either summarily where their guilt was clear or upon
trial and conviction by military commission. This consideration
is easily satisfied here, as Hamdan is an unlawful combatant charged
with joining and conspiring with a terrorist network dedicated
to flouting the laws of war.
Why is Hamdan an unlawful combatant subject to
military commission or worse? Because the executive branch has
so charged. There is an unmistakable Alice-in-Wonderland
quality to Thomas circular argument. Perhaps, Thomas insinuates,
Hamdan should be thanking his lucky stars he has not already been
lined up against a wall and shot.
Finally, Thomas turns to the fourth factor, the nature of the
offense charged, condemning Stevens for imposing a requirement
that precedents establishing war crimes be plain and unambiguous,
labeling it a pure contrivance, and a bad one at that.
(Stevens opinion rejected the stand-alone conspiracy
charge against Hamdan on the basis that it does not appear
in either the Geneva Conventions or the Hague Conventionsthe
major treatises on the laws of war.)
Calling the rule that war crimes must be clearly established
by law, treaty or precedent inconsistent with the nature
of warfare, which also evolves and changes over time, and for
which a flexible, evolutionary common-law system is uniquely appropriate,
Thomas limits the Supreme Courts role to whether an
unlawful combatant has been charged with an offense against the
law of war with an understanding that the common law of war is
flexible, responsive to the exigencies of the present conflict,
and deferential to the judgment of military commanders.
After reviewing the four factors, Thomas opens the doors wide
open for war crime tribunals by deliberately conflating the September
11 terrorist attacks with the indigenous resistance to US imperialisms
invasion and occupation of Iraq.
We are not engaged in a traditional battle with a nation-state,
but with a worldwide, hydra-headed enemy, Thomas writes,
who lurks in the shadows conspiring to reproduce the atrocities
of September 11, 2001, and who has boasted of sending suicide
bombers into civilian gatherings, has proudly distributed videotapes
of beheadings of civilian workers, and has tortured and dismembered
captured American soldiers.
Thomas then turns from the jurisdiction of military commissions
to their procedures. He condemns the Supreme Court majority for
finding that an act of Congress, the UCMJ, provides the rules.
Instead, according to Thomas, the president as Commander
in Chief... may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the...
procedure of military commissions. In other words, after
defining who goes to trial on what charges, the president can
then set rules to make sure that the outcome will meet his political
agenda.
What about the protections of international treaties such as
the Geneva Conventions? That too is solely a matter of presidential
discretion, according to Thomas. Rejecting Stevens conclusion
that, at minimum, Common Article 3 protects captives who do not
fall within the definition of prisoners of war under
the Third Geneva Convention, Thomas writes, Pursuant to
[his] authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive of the
United States, President Bush accepted the legal conclusion
of the Department of Justice that common Article 3 of Geneva does
not apply to Al Qaeda detainees. It is the high courts
duty to defer to the Presidents understanding of Common
Article 3, Thomas concludes.
The provision of Common Article 3 which, according to Thomas,
Bush can ignore prohibits the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
That four Supreme Court justices openly endorse unchecked presidential
power to capture, imprison, prosecute and execute for alleged
war crimes anyone, anywhere, without regards to the Constitution,
laws of Congress or international treaties such as the Geneva
Conventions, is a telling commentary on the state of democracy
in the US.
See Also:
After the Supreme Court ruling: Congressional
Democrats join with Republicans to maintain military commissions
at Guantánamo
[1 July 2006]
Supreme Court rules against
Bush administrations military commissions
[30 June 2006]
US Supreme Court hearing on
Guantánamo tribunals bares attacks on basic rights
[1 April 2006]
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