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Britain: Book alleges US sent MI5 detailed file on London
bomber Khan
By Rick Kelly
22 June 2006
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On June 19, the Times of London published excerpts from
a new book that raise further questions regarding the role of
the British intelligence agencies in last years terrorist
bombings in London. According to American journalist Ron Suskinds
book The One Percent Doctrine, one of the suicide bombers,
Mohammad Sidique Khan, was refused entry into the United States
on security grounds two years before the London attacks. US authorities
allegedly sent Britains MI5 a detailed file on the
suspected terrorist following the incident.
These claims contradict the official account of the London
bombings as presented in the parliamentary Intelligence and Security
Committees (ISC) report released last month. The report
concluded that while Khan was known to British intelligence agencies,
it was understandable that he was not a priority for
MI5 because he was considered to be a peripheral figure and not
a serious threat to Britain. Eliza Manningham-Buller, the director-general
of MI5, testified that Khan had never before been listed as a
terrorist threat.
A very different picture of the events leading up to the London
bombings is presented in Suskinds book. The One Percent
Doctrine, subtitled Deep inside Americas pursuit
of its enemies since 9/11, is based on Suskinds interviews
with sources in Washington and the American intelligence establishment.
Suskind was a Wall Street Journal reporter from 1993 to
2000, and in 2004 wrote The Price of Loyalty, which detailed
former Treasury Secretary Paul ONeills exposures of
the Bush administration.
According to Suskind, Mohammad Sidique Khan became known to
American authorities by 2003, after the National Security Agency
(NSA) intercepted e-mails and telephone calls between Khan and
another suspected terrorist living in the US, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali.
The e-mails reportedly included discussions about blowing up synagogues
in the US. Ali has since been sentenced to 30 years imprisonment
for plotting to assassinate President George W. Bush.
When it became known that Khan was going to enter the US, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pressed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to organise an extensive surveillance operation
while he was in the country. After what Suskind describes as tense
exchanges that went all the way to top bosses in Washington,
the FBI decided that the threat of Khan evading their surveillance
and launching an attack in the US was too great. He was then placed
on a no-fly list and refused entry on board a flight
from Heathrow airport to New York in March 2003.
This is a very dangerous character, senior FBI
agent Dan Coleman reportedly told colleagues. We and the
Brits should be all over this guy. But we have to do it right.
Unless we have some coordinated effort between us and the CIA
to handle himarrest him on some charges thatll stick
or work close, coordinated surveillance on him and the people
hes in contact with over when he comeswe just cant
take the risk.
British intelligence was certainly told about Khan in
March and April 2003, Suskind told the Times. This
was a significant set of contacts that Khan had, and ones of much
less importance were exchanged on a daily basis between the CIA
and MI5. British authorities were sent a very detailed file.
Officials in London immediately denied Suskinds entire
report. The day after the Times published the excerpt from
The One Percent Doctrine, intelligence officials provided
a rebuttal to the Guardian. According to these unnamed
officials, Suskind has confused Mohammad Sidique Khan with Mohammad
Ajmal Khan, who has been jailed for nine years for assisting Lashkar-i-Toiba,
a Kashmir-based Islamist organisation.
The Guardian reported that Mohammad Ajmal Khan fits
the profile of the man described in Suskinds book. His communications
to the US were intercepted by the NSA, he has been linked to Ahmed
Omar Abu Ali in a terrorist trial in the US, and he discussed
attacking synagogues while visiting the US. The newspaper also
claimed that there is no evidence that Mohammad Sidique Khan had
previously been to America, or that he was known to the FBI or
CIA.
Suskind has adamantly defended the accuracy of his report.
In my investigation and in my book and in my conversations
with people in the US government, there was no mistake or doubt
that we are talking about Mohammed Sidique Khan, not Mohammed
Ajmal Khan, he told the Telegraph. Suskind suggested
that British officials were trying to divert attention away from
their role in the affair. There has been no misidentification,
he insisted.
Given the absence of any additional information, it is not
possible at this stage to determine the veracity of Suskinds
report. But there is every reason to question the British authorities
denial that they were forewarned of Khans intentions by
the CIA.
There has still been no attempt to disprove an earlier report
that British officials were provided with a specific and detailed
warning of a pending terrorist attack months before the July bombings.
In August of last year, the Observer revealed that in early
2005 Saudi intelligence had advised British officials that four
Islamic militants, including at least some British citizens, were
planning to bomb the London Underground within the next six months.
The newspaper quoted high-level Saudi officials, including security
officials and the Saudi ambassador to Britain. The Observer
published another story last February that cited senior US National
Security Council counterterrorism agents confirming the report.
The Intelligence and Security Committees report into
the London bombings merely denied that any foreign intelligence
agency had issued a prior warning of the attack. The ISC dismissed
the Saudi tip-off as irrelevant, saying that it presented a different
scenario from that which took place on July 7, but provided no
further details on the intelligence.
Nor did the ISC even mention other reports that suggested that
the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad had also warned London
of a pending attack. On July 7, 2005, the Stratfor web site, which
has contacts within the US intelligence agencies, reported that
unconfirmed rumours in intelligence circles indicate that
the Israeli government actually warned London of the attacks a
couple of days previous to the bombings.
The ISC also provided no satisfactory explanation for the decision
to downgrade the national security alert in March 2005 despite
the pending G8 summit in Scotland, which saw a massive security
mobilisation.
If Suskinds account of events is accurate, there was
at best an intelligence failure that amounts
to gross negligence on the part of the British authorities. This
would also then have been followed by a cover-up to protect the
guilty parties.
Given the American journalists presentation, however,
another scenario and explanation for a possible coverup is possible,
namely that elements within the security apparatus permitted the
terrorist attacks to take place. If the FBI and CIA had produced
a detailed file on Khan and his international connections and
had refused him entry into the US out of fear that he would perpetrate
a terror attack on American soil, how can one explain MI5s
failure to monitor the suspected terrorist for more than two years
before the London bombings?
The British police and intelligence agencies have long track
records of provocations and dirty tricks. Moreover, the London
bombings were seized upon by the Blair government to further its
agenda. The terrorist attacks were used to pass further repressive
and anti-democratic anti-terror laws and to justify
Britains participation in the US-led occupations of Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Despite the explosive character of Suskinds allegations,
Tony Blairs Labour government has again refused to consider
a public inquiry into the events leading up to the London bombings.
The [Intelligence and Security] Committees conclusion
is that there was not an intelligence failure, a spokesman
for the prime minister insisted. The government maintains that
another inquiry would be a diversion from the war
on terror.
On the same day as the Times published the excerpts
from Suskinds book, it ran an editorial, Better intelligence:
fostering public trust is the answer to conspiracy theories,
notable for its concern over public scepticism regarding the official
war on terror.
The Times bemoaned the growing, and regrettable,
tendency to reject all official explanations of horrific, headline-making
events and see instead plots, conspiracies and cover-ups.
The newspaper conceded that a swift, independent assessment
of the London bombings may be necessary, but demanded that people
accept the official version of events as presented by the government.
Inevitably there is much that will remain confidential and
that we have to take on trust. We are paying people to be secretive,
and so secretive they will inevitably be.
On the contrary, the character of the British government and
intelligence agencies response to the London bombings as
well as the unanswered questions surrounding the events leading
up to the terrorist attacks demands that not a single aspect of
the official explanation should be taken on trust.
See Also:
Britain: More official lies
and evasions on London bombings
[13 May 2006]
Britain: More evidence suggests
July 7 bombings were preventable
[27 March 2006]
Saudi Arabia alerted Britain
of terror attack prior to London bombings
[8 February 2006]
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