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Australian High Court radically expands scope of military
power
Judges sanction control order on Jack Thomas
By Mike Head
13 August 2007
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Australias High Court on August 2 upheld the constitutional
validity of a control order imposed on a Melbourne
worker, Jack Thomas, sanctioning one of the central features of
the 2005 Anti-Terrorism Act.
The ruling in Thomas v Mowbray has serious implications
for fundamental legal and democratic rights. In effect, by a 5
to 2 majority, the court has legitimated the police-state measures,
including detention without trial, that the Howard government
and its state Labor counterparts have introduced since 2002 on
the pretext of protecting ordinary people from terrorism.
In doing so, Australias supreme court has for the first
time condoned the extension of the federal governments defence
power under the Constitution beyond war and external threats.
Members of the court said the power, which was used in World Wars
I and II to rule by executive decree and round up thousands of
people regarded as threats to the war effort, could be invoked
to combat not only terrorism but other internal disturbances.
Several state Labor governments intervened in the case to defend
their own identical control order provisions, which were introduced
as part of the 2005 federal-state package of anti-terrorism
laws. Their support for the Howard governments position
underscores the bipartisan nature of the assault on basic civil
liberties.
Thomas was subjected to the control order last August, just
a week after a three-member panel of the Victorian Court of Appeal
unanimously overturned his conviction on a charge of receiving
money from a terrorist group, on the grounds that he had been
tortured to obtain a confession. Without any notice, let alone
allowing Thomas the right to object, a federal magistrate granted
the interim 12-month order in a secret ex parte hearing
conducted on a Sunday.
Even though he has not been convicted of any offence, the order
deprived Thomas of the basic freedoms of movement and communication.
He must remain in his house from midnight to 5 a.m. every day,
and report to police three times a week. He cannot leave Australia,
use any telephone or email service not approved by the Australian
Federal Police, or communicate with specified individuals. A breach
of these conditions could mean imprisonment for five years.
The orderpersonally sought by Attorney-General Philip
Ruddockdemonstrates how the anti-terror powers
can and will be used for political purposes. In this case, the
Howard government has used them to reverse the humiliating setback
it suffered when the charges against Thomas were dismissed.
Control orders can be imposed without any evidence of terrorist
activity. The attorney-general only has to state that the order
would substantially assist in preventing an unspecified
terrorist act, or that the person received training
from an officially-declared terrorist organisation,
and the order is reasonably necessary to protect the
public from a terrorist act.
After hearing just the governments side of the case,
a magistrate decides on the balance of probabilities
to issue an interim control order. An appeal can be made to a
court, but only after the order has already commenced, and in
any such hearing the person under house arrest can be denied access
to the security material on which the governments
allegations are based.
In drafting the legislation, the federal and state governments
agreed to bypass Canberras lack of constitutional power
to make such laws, on the assumption that the defence power could
not support the measures on its own. To overcome the problem,
the states referred parts of their law enforcement and policing
powers to the federal parliament.
However, when Thomas v Mowbray was argued in the High
Court, the Howard governments top lawyer, Commonwealth Solicitor-General
David Bennett QC, declared anyone who opposed an almost unlimited
interpretation of the defence power was displaying September
10 thinking. He insisted that the High Court had to take
judicial notice of the September 11, 2001 attacks,
and the growth of fanatical ideological movements which
compass the destruction of Western civilisation.
The High Court majority essentially endorsed these assertions.
Two judges, Michael Kirby and Kenneth Hayne, dissented, but only
Kirby rejected the radical widening of the defence power. Led
by Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, the majority gave the federal
government a virtual carte blanche to use the power for the
military and naval defence of the Commonwealth for domestic
purposes.
Although the judges used varying formulations, their language
was sweeping. Justice Ian Callinan, who was the most vociferous
supporter of the terror laws, said the defence power could apply
whenever the Commonwealth or its people were at
risk of danger by the application of force in situations
where the Commonwealth military and naval forces could better
respond, than state police and agencies alone.
In a joint judgment, Justices William Gummow and Susan Crennan
spoke of the defence of the realm against threats posed
internally as well as by invasion from abroad by force of arms.
These propositions are broad enough to sanction the use of the
military to suppress political protests and civil unrest.
Gummow and Crennan cited a 1781 English case, where a judge,
Lord Mansfield, denounced a mass demonstration outside parliament
that had demanded the repeal of a statute. Mansfield and his fellow
judges decided unanimously that an attempt, by intimidation
and violence, to force the repeal of a law, was levying war against
the King; and high treason.
Gummow and Crennan also relied upon a 1532 Act, which declared
that the English people were bound to bear a natural and
humble obedience to the King, as well as God. Such trawling
back through the legal texts to the days of the absolute monarchy
highlights the deeply reactionary character of the High Court
decision. It represents a reversion to absolutist conceptions
of the state in relation to the war on terror.
During the hearings, Solicitor-General Bennett argued that
the war on terror justified executive powers to detain
not just individuals but thousands of people. Bennett said the
federal government could potentially round up and detain anyone
acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety of
the Commonwealth. None of the majority judges opposed that
proposition. Hayne said it need not be decided in
the case at hand.
Judges embrace war on terror
The majority judgments declared that the court was obliged
to accept as notorious facts that the Commonwealth
faced unparalleled dangers from terrorism. Ordinarily, courts
require evidence to substantiate the claims made by litigants,
including governments. In criminal cases, it is up to the prosecution
to prove its charges beyond a reasonable doubt and
in cases involving deprivation of liberty it has been accepted,
until now, that governments must prove their allegations.
In Thomas v Mowbray, however, the judges broadened the
concept of constitutional facts to simply accept,
as a matter of judicial notice, all the assertions
made by the federal and state governments and their security and
spy agencies, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO).
Callinan was the most vehement, declaring it was blindingly
obvious that groups of zealots forming part of, or
associated with Al Qaida were making common
cause of hatred against communities posing no threat to them
and planned to undertake violent, literally suicidal attacks
upon even the institutions and persons of those communities.
Callinan acknowledged that the evidence was hearsaynot
normally admissible in a court of law.
The judge also claimed it was a matter of public record that
in Australia there have been persons convicted or charged
of conspiring or planning to undertake terrorist activities in
this country. As a matter of fact, only one person currently
stands convicted of a terrorist offence in Australia, Sydney architect
Faheem Khalid Lodhi, and he has appealed.
The High Court majority embraced the war on terror
in another way as well. Five judges said there was no objection
to courts carrying out the sort of functions assigned to them
by the control order law. Thomas had argued that the proceduressecret
ex parte hearings, without the person affected being
present or even told of the hearinginvolved the courts in
exercising executive functions that were incompatible with the
independence of the judiciary and hence violated the Constitutions
separation of powers.
Chief Justice Gleeson gave Thomass arguments short shrift.
Gleeson relied on a so-called chameleon principle,
which asserts that some governmental powers can be exercised administratively,
judicially or legislatively. This line of reasoning seriously
erodes the separation of powers principle, by which the courts
are meant to act as a check on the executive.
The decision has torn asunder the half century-old proposition,
adopted by the High Court in the Communist Party case of 1951,
that the defence power cannot be used for domestic political purposes.
In that case, the court rejected the attempt of the Menzies government
to ban the Communist Party during the Korean War. That stand was
vindicated when Menzies called a referendum to override the decision
and was defeated, despite his efforts to whip up a red-baiting
campaign in the context of the Cold War. None of todays
judges mentioned the referendum, which gave a clear public verdict
against the unfettered use of the defence power.
Dissenting opinions
Justice Kirby condemned his fellow judges, saying: I
did not expect, during my service, I would see the Communist Party
Case sidelined, minimised, doubted and even criticised and denigrated
in this Court. He said the majority view was further
evidence of the unfortunate surrender of the present court to
demands for more and more governmental powers, federal and state,
that exceed or offend the constitutional text and its abiding
values.
On the defence power, Kirbys specific concerns were two-fold.
Firstly, he expressed reservations about the potential expansion
of military power. Not since Cromwell has our constitutional
tradition seen the military taking a leading role part in civilian
affairs, he commented. Secondly, he objected that the defence
power could become a vehicle for Canberra to acquire general power
over all aspects of society, overriding the states. This second
objection was in line with his concerns about the extinguishment
of states rights, raised in last years WorkChoices
industrial relations case.
Kirby also voiced concern that the reputational capital
of the courts as independent and impartial would be squandered
if the courts were seen as no more than pliant agents
of the executive. Similar sentiments were expressed by Justice
Hayne, who agreed with the extension of the defence power but
joined Kirby in dissenting on the issue of the courts. To
the extent that the courts are left with no practical choice except
to act upon a view proffered by the executive, the appearance
of institutional impartiality and the maintenance of public confidence
in the courts are both damaged, he warned.
Far-reaching implications
By the majoritys logic, all the 40 pieces of federal
terrorism legislation introduced since 2002 are valid. These include
at least four forms of detention without trial, executive powers
to ban organisations, semi-secret trials, revamped sedition laws
and a definition of terrorism so broad that it covers many forms
of political and industrial protest.
Attorney-General Philip Ruddock immediately hailed the ruling,
claiming it vindicated the governments stance on terrorism.
He told ABC radio: What it does is put beyond doubt the
counter-terrorism laws that we have implemented.
Further draconian measures are now being brought forward, including
a Bill rushed though parliament this week to give the federal
authorities expanded sneak and peek powers to secretly
enter and bug homes without notifying the occupants, powers to
intercept telecommunications without warrants and powers to conduct
undercover controlled operationswhich involve
using agents provocateurs to entrap peoplewithout warrants.
The courts decision also clears the way constitutionally
for wartime-style executive detention. In a series of 2004 decisions,
the court overturned previous cases to sanction the detention
of asylum seekers indefinitely, even for life. Given that the
war on terror is indefinite, according to both the
Howard government and the Bush administration, detentions without
trial claimed to be necessary to prevent terrorism could also
last for life.
Finally, the ruling removes possible legal objections to the
military call-out powers adopted in 2000 and expanded in 2006.
Under this legislation, the prime minister or the chief of the
Australian Defence Forces (ADF) can order troops onto the streets
to deal with domestic violence. ADF personnel called-out
will have extraordinary powers, including to issue orders to civilians,
interrogate people and shoot to kill, all covered by superior
orders defence and legal immunities.
In summary, Thomas v Mowbray marks a major shift in
the constitutional framework, toward unrestricted executive power
and unprecedented military powers. With the Labor Party extending
unconditional support for the terror laws, there now exists substantial
consensus within the political establishment on exercising these
powers.
See Also:
Australian government rams bills through
parliament to take over Aboriginal communities
[8 August 2007]
Australian government issues new "terrorist"
smears against Haneef
[1 August 2007]
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