ON THE
WSWS
Donate
to
the WSWS!
News Feed
Contact
the
WSWS
Editorial
Board
New
Today
News
& Analysis
Workers
Struggles
Arts
Review
History
Science
Polemics
Philosophy
Correspondence
Archive
About
WSWS
About
the ICFI
Help
Books
Online
OTHER
LANGUAGES
German
French
Italian
Russian
Polish
Czech
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Portuguese
Turkish
Sinhala-
Tamil
Indonesian
LEAFLETS
Download
in
PDF format
|
|
WSWS : History
: Leon
Trotsky
Leon Trotsky and the post-Soviet school of historical falsification
A review of two Trotsky biographies by Geoffrey Swain and
Ian Thatcher
Part 3: The method of Ian Thatcher
By David North
11 May 2007
Use
this version to print
| Send this
link by email | Email
the author
Today we publish the first part of a four-part review of
two biographies of Trotsky written by Professors Geoffrey Swain
and Ian D. Thatcher. The first, second and
final parts can be accessed here. Click here
to download the entire review in PDF.
Trotsky, by Geoffrey Swain. 237 pages, Longman, 2006.
Trotsky, by Ian D. Thatcher. 240 pages, Routledge, 2003.
I have already made brief reference to the method of Ian Thatcher.
Let us return to this subject by reviewing three paragraphs that
appear in the introduction to Thatchers biography of Trotsky.
From Trotskys account of 1917 only he emerges with
honor. If in 1924 one accepted the arguments of Lessons
of October, then only one man could replace the now dead
Lenin, namely Leon Trotsky. It is perfectly understandable, then,
that having been accused of the sins of Menshevism in 1917, Trotskys
colleagues sought to refute his Lessons of October.
This they did in a series of speeches and articles, which were
then gathered together and published in Russian and in translation
in book form.
Leading Bolsheviks (including Kamenev, Stalin, Zinoviev
and Bukharin) and key representatives from the Communist International
(the Comintern) and the Communist Youth League (the Komsomol)
argued that Trotskys essay was not a genuine history of
the October Revolution. If one consulted the key documents of
the time and a growing supply of memoir literature, for example,
Trotskys detractors claimed one would discover how far his
memory had painted a distorted picture. Most notably, Trotsky
had minimized the roles played by Lenin and the Bolshevik Party
and had exaggerated his own contribution. It was, for example,
wrong to claim that in 1917 there was a long and sustained battle
between a Lenin seeking to rearm the party with Trotskys
theory of permanent revolution and a right-Menshevik faction within
Bolshevik ranks. In actual fact Lenins analysis of the events
of 1917 grew out of a long-held theory of the Russian Revolution.
Once Lenin had convinced colleagues of the correctness of his
developing strategy, neither Lenin nor the party was in any way
influenced by Trotsky or Trotskyism.
Indeed, the anti-Trotsky case continues, the whole history
of Leninism and Bolshevism before and after 1917 was one of opposition
to Trotskyism. Unfortunately, Trotsky had failed to realize that
he was only effective in 1917 because he acted under the guidance
of the Bolshevik Party. He had not made a full commitment to becoming
a Bolshevik. If he had, then he would have produced a very different
history. Trotsky would, for example, have admitted his past and
recent theoretical, as well as organizational, errors. Only in
this way would youth understand the proper relationship between
Leninism and Trotskyism, and how to avoid the sins of the latter.
Lessons of October was an attempt by Trotsky to replace
Leninism with Trotskyism. This, however, the Bolshevik Party would
not allow him to achieve. The leadership understood the dangers
of Trotskyism, revealed in Trotskys underestimation of the
peasantry, and in his mistaken policies during the peace negotiations
with Germany, in the debate over trade unions and on the issue
of currency reform.[50]
The significance of these paragraphs is that they exemplify
a highly-contrived stylistic technique repeatedly employed by
Thatcher in order to mask his falsification of history
that is, his construction of a seemingly objective historical
narrative out of the factional statements of Trotskys mortal
political enemies. Virtually everything written in the above-cited
three paragraphs is a lie. The criticisms of Trotsky
have been drawn together by Thatcher from a series of mendacious
attacks written by Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev in November and
December 1924 in order to discredit Trotskys brilliant analysis
of the political differences and struggles within the Bolshevik
Party during the critical year of the Revolution.
Trotskys Lessons of October explored events and
controversies that Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin whose right-wing
and conciliatory policies had placed them in opposition to Lenin
at various points in 1917 did not wish to have aired. Stalin
and Kamenev had allied themselves with the Mensheviks in March
1917, prior to Lenins return to Russia. In October 1917,
Kamenev and Zinoviev had opposed the insurrection. Furthermore,
the role of Trotsky in securing the victory of the Bolsheviks
in October 1917 was rivaled only by that played by Lenin himself.
The arguments presented in the above-cited paragraphs were fabricated
in order to deflect the impact of Trotskys criticisms in
Lessons of October as well as to destroy his reputation
as a revolutionary leader. As the historian Robert V. Daniels
has written, the charges made against Trotsky in response to Lessons
of October were either entirely fabricated or exaggerated
beyond all measure it was the man that the offended leaders
were bent on destroying, not doctrinal error.[51]
Thatcher, however, neither explains the context of the attack
on Trotsky nor challenges its factual validity. He adopts a pose
of studied even-handedness in his presentation of lies and fabrications.
The anti-Trotsky case Thatchers euphemism
for the bureaucracys gigantic slander campaign is
endowed with reasonableness, dignity and legitimacy. In effect,
Thatcher offers the pages of his biography as a dumping ground
for the political and historical falsifications upon which the
emerging Soviet bureaucracy built its struggle against Trotsky.
This insidious and dishonest technique, in which old lies are
repackaged as objective historical narrative, is employed repeatedly
by Thatcher.
The myth of 1905
Like Swain, Thatcher promises to expose key myths
about Trotskys life, such as his role in the 1905 Revolution.
Let us examine how Professor Thatcher goes about his work. Given
the fact that Trotskys crucial role in the 1905 Revolution
has been universally accepted by scholars throughout the world,
one would imagine that Thatcher would recognize that a challenge
to this scholarly consensus required a careful marshalling of
new facts and arguments. As it turns out, despite the attention
called to this very issue by the publishers introduction
(which is also cited on the back cover of the volume), Thatchers
demythologizing of Trotskys role in 1905 takes
up no more than one relatively brief paragraph.
He begins by writing that It is difficult to gauge the
exact influence that Trotsky had upon the course of the 1905 Revolution.
Yes, it may be difficult to determine the exact influence, but
there exists a substantial body of information that permits certain
informed judgments about the degree and scale of his influence.
Numerous memoirs from the period testify to his commanding political
presence. Trotsky became the chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet,
and edited two newspapers, Russkaya Gazeta and Nachalo,
which enjoyed large circulations. As if anticipating the latter
objection, Thatcher claims that We have no way of knowing
how many people were affected by his journalism.[52] Again, this is not true. In an article that
appeared under his by-line in History Review in September
2005, Thatcher himself acknowledges that the circulation of these
two newspapers may have been as high as 100,000, which was at
least 20,000 higher than those of their rivals.[53] Then, Thatcher abruptly introduces a new line
of argument, which is irrelevant to the issue of Trotskys
political influence in the 1905 Revolution. It is unlikely,
writes Thatcher, that his words reached many peasants. He
simply lacked connections with the villages, and there was not
a mass distribution of his appeals to the peasantry.[54]
This is really beside the point. The influence of Trotsky and
the Russian Social Democratic movement as a whole in 1905 arose
on the basis of the mass urban proletarian constituency. The St.
Petersburg Soviet was a political organ of the working class.
It arose on a wave of revolutionary working class activity that
included the mass general strike of October 1905. The peasantry
joined the unrest en masse only in 1906, in the aftermath of the
physical suppression of the socialist-led working class movement.
Thatcher continues: Even in the capital, his main stomping
ground, he did not create or found any specific institute or faction.
He was not, for example, the guiding force behind the emergence
of the Soviet of Workers Deputies, even though he may subsequently
have been, as one participant records, the unchallenged
leader of the Mensheviks in the Petersburg Soviet [emphasis
DN].[55] Like the
issue of the peasantry, the question of Trotskys factional
affiliations is tossed in by Thatcher for no other reason than
to try to build a case against the established historical record.
At that point in the history of the Russian Social-Democratic
movement, factional identities were far more fluid than they were
to become by 1917. Indeed, Trotskys political position was
actually strengthened by his relative independence from the main
political factions. Let us note Thatchers awkward formulation:
Trotsky may subsequently have been the unchallenged
leader of the Mensheviks in the Soviet. Only may have been?
Thatcher presents no evidence to the contrary, even though one
can safely assume he would have trumpeted it had he been able
to find it. However, he proceeds to make a novel argument. In
the memoirs of the prime minister of the day, Count Witte, Trotsky
does not merit a mention ... this only confirms the limited impression
Trotsky made at the time on the popular consciousness.[56]
This is the argument of a sly trickster, not of a conscientious
scholar. Count Witte, the tsars prime minister, failed to
mention Trotsky in his memoirs. This single detail is endowed
by Thatcher with extraordinary historical significance. From the
failure of Witte to mention Trotsky, Thatcher claims we can draw
far-ranging conclusions about Trotskys place in popular
consciousness in the autumn of 1905. One must ask, why has Thatcher
made no reference to other memoirs, written by individuals who
were more familiar than Count Witte, an aged aristocrat who was
most at home in palaces and vast leafy estates, with what was
happening in the workers districts of St. Petersburg? It
is characteristic of unscrupulous and bad scholarship to conceal
or disregard historical evidence that runs counter to ones
argument. But this is precisely what Thatcher has done. For example,
he should have brought to the attention of his student readers
the recollections of Anatoly Lunacharsky, who was a participant
in the 1905 Revolution as a member of the Bolshevik faction. In
his renowned Revolutionary Silhouettes, Lunacharsky provided
this estimate of Trotskys role in 1905:
His popularity among the Petersburg proletariat at the
time of his arrest was tremendous and increased still more as
a result of his picturesque and heroic behavior in court. I must
say that of all the social-democratic leaders of 1905-06 Trotsky
undoubtedly showed himself, despite his youth, to be the best
prepared. Less than any of them did he bear the stamp of a certain
kind of émigré narrowness of outlook which, as I
have said, even affected Lenin at that time. Trotsky understood
better than all the others what it meant to conduct the political
struggle on a broad, national scale. He emerged from the revolution
having acquired an enormous degree of popularity, whereas neither
Lenin nor Martov had effectively gained any at all. Plekhanov
had lost a great deal, thanks to his display of quasi-Kadet tendencies.
Trotsky stood then in the very front rank.[57]
Lunacharsky also recalled an incident during which Trotsky
was praised, in the presence of Lenin, as the strong man of the
St. Petersburg Soviet. This was a time of factional conflict between
Lenin and Trotsky, and so the former did not necessarily enjoy
hearing of his rivals political triumph. According to Lunacharsky,
Lenins face darkened for a moment, then he said: Well,
Trotsky has earned it by his brilliant and unflagging work.[58]
Thatcher also chose not to mention another contemporary memoir
that of the Menshevik leader Theodore Dan which
leaves no question about the immense political influence of Leon
Trotsky in 1905. The political perspective with which Trotsky
was now associated the recognition of the proletarian and
socialist character of the revolution captured the imagination
of substantial forces among both the Bolshevik and Menshevik tendencies.
Dan recalled that practically speaking both Mensheviks
and Bolsheviks were pushed toward Trotskyism. For
a short time Trotskyism (which at that time, to be
sure, still lacked a name), for the first and last time in the
history of Russian Social-Democracy, became its unifying platform.
Hence it was no accident also that after the arrest (in November)
of Khrustalyov, the chairman of the Petersburg Soviet of Workers
Deputies, it was precisely Trotsky ... who became his natural
heir, challenged by no one for the few short days the Soviet
itself still had to live.[59]
Thatchers failure to cite important eyewitness sources
that contradict and disprove his attempt to call into question
Trotskys role in the 1905 Revolution, discredits not only
his biography but places his integrity as a historian under a
shadow. I must stress that his improper handling of this particular
issue, i.e., Trotskys role in 1905, is not an isolated episode.
It is emblematic of the method he employs throughout his biography
to discredit Trotsky.
Thatchers falsification of the inner-party
struggle
Thatchers treatment of the political struggle that arose
within the Russian Communist Party in the early 1920s is a travesty
of scholarly writing. As in the introduction, Thatcher incorporates
the arguments of Trotskys factional opponents into what
he attempts to palm off as an objective presentation of historical
events. For example, in a crucial section of the biography that
deals with the eruption of the inner-party struggle in October
1923, Thatcher writes that Trotsky took up his anti-bureaucracy
program with his usual urgency and passion, believing that the
party was entering a new epoch through which only his methods
would ensure a safe passage [emphasis DN].[60]
Thatcher continues, His colleagues on the partys
leading bodies were, however, not convinced. They doubted whether
matters were really as bad as Trotsky depicted. Yes, there were
economic problems, but these were quite expected. In any case
there was no imminent danger of collapse. The party anticipated
several years of hard and steady work before it could claim to
have fully rectified the economy. Looking at the party, Trotskys
comrades claimed that they could congratulate themselves on educating
a new generation of cadres. The influx of this fresh blood would
no doubt expedite the resolution of important tasks. Having rejected
Trotskys analysis of imagined ills besetting the regime,
a majority of the old Bolsheviks wondered whether he could be
trusted to develop sound and sensible policies. If Trotsky was
prone to exaggeration of difficulties, he was, they argued, remarkably
vague in his solutions. For a majority of the Politburo, Trotsky
was part of a problem, not an answer. For example, if he was concerned
by an absence of systematic leadership why did he not attend important
meetings of the Council of Labour and Defense and of the Cabinet?
There was little evidence of conscientiousness in Trotskys
work habits. Furthermore, there was a marked absence of concrete
proposals from Trotsky. This was hardly surprising, since his
policy record was far from promising. In recent times Trotsky
had suffered a series of defeats as he opposed Lenin over, amongst
other matters, the Brest-Litovsk peace and the trade unions. For
his colleagues, Trotskys discontents were not rooted in
reality, but in a hurt sense of pride stemming from personal disappointments.
Thus, Trotsky could not have been pleased when, in April 1923,
the Twelfth Congress shelved his more militant approach to religious
affairs. In September 1923, Trotsky was certainly upset by personnel
changes to the Military-Revolutionary Committee. Finally, and
most annoying of all for Trotsky, came the Central Committees
refusal to grant him dictatorial powers. Trotsky was warned that
his unfounded criticisms were encouraging anti-party platforms,
sowing unnecessary disruption to important party work, and threatening
a war between older and younger generations.[61]
This passage, as written by Thatcher, creates the impression
that the majority on the Politburo euphemistically referred
to as Trotskys comrades was responding
to Trotskys criticism in a manner that was both restrained
and reasonable. It was confronted, in the person of Trotsky, with
something of a loose cannon, with whom it was hard, if not impossible,
to work. He pestered his colleagues with exaggerated
warnings and unreasonable demands, while failing to carry out
the assignments for which he was responsible. Moreover, Trotsky
had a poor grasp of reality and a history of stirring up trouble,
even with Lenin; was motivated by subjective bitterness, and,
worst of all, was demanding dictatorial powers. Thatchers
presentation clearly invites his students to form a negative opinion
of Trotsky and his political work.
What Thatcher has not communicated to his readers is that the
above-quoted passage is his own tendentious rephrasing of an unscrupulous
and dishonest factional document produced by Trotskys bitter
political opponents soporifically referred to by Thatcher
as comrades and colleagues on October
19, 1923, in response to Trotskys important letter of October
8, 1923 and the famous oppositional Letter of the 46 of October
15, 1923. There are no quotation marks and no footnotes. There
is no clear indication given by Thatcher that the arguments he
so benignly summarizes were, in fact, a pack of factionally-motivated
lies and half-truths.[62]
Nor does Thatcher inform his readers that Trotsky prepared
a withering response to this letter, dispatched on October 23,
1923, in which the accusations of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin
(who had formed an unprincipled anti-Trotsky faction known as
the Triumvirs) were refuted.
One has only to consult E. H. Carrs The Interregnum,
in which this material is reviewed (or at least that part of it
that had come to light by the early 1950s), to recognize the deliberately
misleading character of Thatchers approach. Carr cites passages
from Trotskys stinging retort to the Triumvirs,
and leaves no doubt as to where truth lay in this exchange.[63]
Trotskys speech at the 13th Congress
One of Deutschers great achievements as a biographer
was his portrayal of the heroism and pathos of Trotskys
struggle, under increasingly difficult circumstances, against
the immense and reactionary bureaucracy arrayed against him. Thatcher,
determined to erase the historical record, employs rhetorical
tricks, incompatible with serious scholarship, to belittle Trotskys
struggle and portray it in a demeaning and unflattering light.
Once again I must call attention to his deceptive use of citations.
Thatcher refers to Trotskys main speech at the Thirteenth
Party Congress in May 1924, and writes, It was, it has been
argued, the most inept speech of his career.[64]
Who, one wonders, was the original author of this damning judgment?
Was it written, perhaps, by a participant at the Congress, either
an opponent or supporter of Trotsky? As it turns out, the source
is to be found in a volume, published by the University of Toronto
Press in 1974, of Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. This volume includes a set of documents
from the Thirteenth Congress, which is briefly introduced by Professor
Richard Gregor, the volumes editor. Gregor writes that Trotsky
made what may well be the most inept speech of his career.[65] He offers no argument
in support of this appraisal, and the speech itself is not reproduced.
Furthermore, Gregor is hardly a historian to whom one turns for
a well-considered and unbiased judgment of Soviet politics.[66] Other than serving the
utilitarian purpose of belittling Trotsky, there is no compelling
reason why Gregors passing remark about the speech to the
Thirteenth Congress should have been cited as if it were an authoritative
judgment.
Let us further examine Thatchers use of Trotskys
Thirteenth Congress speech, which concluded with the well-known
and oft-cited phrase, Right or wrong this is my party, and
I will take responsibility for its decision to the end.
Thatcher himself quotes several sentences from Trotskys
speech, including the sentence cited above. He then writes, Trotsky
could thus have no grounds for complaint when the Thirteenth Congress
affirmed the anti-Trotsky resolution of the Thirteenth Conference.[67] It all seems rather straightforward.
Trotsky said, my party right or wrong, so how could he object
when it passes a resolution directed against him? But Thatcher
has withheld from his readers those passages that show Trotskys
speech to be far more subtle and combative than the citation,
as provided in Thatchers text, indicates. Trotsky states
emphatically his disagreement with the resolution, and asserts
his responsibility to argue against those policies he considers
incorrect.[68] By presenting
a bowdlerized citation, Thatcher misrepresents Trotskys
position and legitimizes the actions taken against him by his
opponents.
Thatcher falsifies the Lenin-Trotsky relationship
Thatcher asserts that Lenins relationship with
Trotsky was highly problematic. He contends that in Lenins
political Testament of December 1922 Trotsky was not given
a recommendation higher than any other comrade. This is
not true. While expressing reservations over Trotskys excessive
self-assurance and excessive preoccupation with the
purely administrative side of work, Lenin said he was distinguished
by his outstanding ability and personally perhaps
the most capable man in the present C.C. [Central Committee]...[69] The same Testament warned
against Stalins accumulation of unlimited authority
concentrated in his hands...[70]
Lenins famous addendum to his Testament, which Thatcher
fails to mention, urged the Central Committee to remove Stalin
from the position of general secretary.[71] Thatcher then writes: Lenin was unlikely
to have given his seal of approval to Trotsky for the post of
leader because, even in 1922-23 when he relied upon the Commissar
of War to present some of his views, he remained suspicious of
him. Lenins biographer has emphasized that he would have
dropped Trotsky at the next available opportunity [emphasis
DN].[72]
This is a deliberately misleading and false presentation. Numerous
historical studies have established, based on a well-documented
record, that the last months of Lenins life were dominated
by his growing suspicion of and hostility to Stalin. Lenins
increasing distrust of Stalin was expressed in several documents
that he wrote in the months and weeks before his career-ending
stroke in March 1923. During the same period, Lenin drew ever
closer to Trotsky, whom he viewed as his most important ally in
the developing struggle against Stalin. But let us concede that
the political developments in the critical period between December
1922 and March 1923 allow for varied interpretations. That still
leaves us with Thatchers reference to the alleged finding
of Lenins biographer that Lenin, had he lived,
would have dropped Trotsky at the next available opportunity.
The biographer cited in the relevant footnote is Robert Service,
author of a three-volume study of Lenin. This is not the place
for an evaluation of the qualities of Mr. Services biography,
of which I do not have a high opinion. But the issue here concerns
Thatchers use of citations. Turning to page 273-74 of the
Service biography (as indicated in the footnote), there is no
reference to a plan by Lenin to get rid of Trotsky. In fact, Service
offers an entirely different assessment of Lenins plans.
While in the past, according to Service, Lenin had used Stalin
to control Trotsky, the disputes with Stalin over policies
on foreign trade and other matters reversed the situation: Trotsky
was needed in order to control the ever more rampant Stalin.
Despite his past conflicts with Trotsky, The October Revolution
and the Civil War had brought them together, and Lenin was inviting
Trotsky to resume close collaboration.[73] A few pages later, Service comments further
on Lenins view of Trotsky and Stalin: Of the two men,
he had come to prefer Trotsky despite his reservations. This was
obvious in Lenins recent letters seeking an alliance with
him on questions of the day where Stalin stood in his way. In
late December [1922], too, Lenin asked Krupskaya to confide the
message to Trotsky that his feelings towards him since Trotsky
had escaped from Siberia to London in 1902 had not changed and
would not change until death itself.[74] Once again, we see that Thatcher, in the interest
of his own campaign to discredit Trotsky, has attributed to another
historian a statement he has not made.
Historians, like everyone else, are fallible. They make mistakes.
Not every incorrect citation is proof of professional incompetence,
let alone of a secret plan to distort and falsify. When one comes
across such errors it is necessary to maintain a sense of proportion.
But the problem that presents itself in the Thatcher biography
is not a series of isolated mistakes but a system of distortion
and falsification. Thatchers presentation is designed to
create among readers especially students not only
a false image of Trotsky, but also a disoriented and distorted
conception of an entire historical epoch.
What finds expression in the biographies written by Thatcher
and Swain is a process that may be legitimately described as the
erosion of historical truth. The historical image of Trotsky as
a great revolutionary fighter and thinker that emerged out of
the exposure of Stalins lies and crimes that is,
out of the discrediting of the pervasive anti-Trotsky demonology
that was pumped out of the Soviet Union (and, for that matter,
all of Eastern Europe and China) and sustained by countless academics
affiliated with Stalinist parties all over the world is
once again under attack. A sort of anti-historical intellectual
counter-revolution is in progress, to which Thatcher and Swain
are making their own disreputable contributions. Only in this
way can we understand their zeal in attempting to belittle Trotsky,
in even making him appear ridiculous.
Problems of Everyday Life
Let us, for example, examine Thatchers treatment of Trotskys
remarkable essays published under the title Problems of Everyday
Life. Thatcher strains to present Trotsky as an effete snob,
who was far from impressed with the general mores of Russian
society. He viewed the mass of Russians as uncultured. He described
them as illiterate, inefficient, dirty, unpunctual, prone to swearing
and abusive language, and under the sway of superstition.[75] Presented in this way,
the reader is clearly encouraged to view Trotsky as an elitist,
distant and remote from the great mass of the Russian people.
This intended image is reinforced by Thatchers sarcastic
remark that one cannot help thinking that his ideal human
type consisted of his own habits writ large. His advice is littered
with its own brand of simplification.[76]
Thatchers summary is a spiteful and dishonest caricature
of Trotskys writings on Problems of Everyday Life.
What is portrayed by Thatcher as an example of Trotskys
self-aggrandizing conceit, an immodest tribute to his own special
qualities, is, when properly and knowledgeably viewed in the context
of the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, one of the
finest and most deeply felt elucidations of the relationship between
culture, the development of proletarian class consciousness and
the struggle for socialism. Presented by Thatcher as an irritating
laundry list of Trotskys personal objections to the Russian
workers, the characteristics that are cited illiterate,
inefficient, prone to swearing, etc. were all manifestations
of the terrible oppression suffered by the masses in Tsarist Russia.
They were part of what generations of the best elements in the
democratic and socialist intelligentsia often described as our
terrible Russian reality. Their struggle against the shameful
expressions of human degradation eventually found a profound response
in the working class.[77]
When these writings are read as contributions to the development
of class consciousness and kulturnost, it is possible
to appreciate the broader dimensions and ramifications of the
issues raised by Trotsky in his Problems of Everyday Life,
and of the significance of his essays such as The Struggle
for Cultured Speech and Civility and politeness as
a necessary lubricant in daily relations. Interestingly,
as Professor S. A. Smith points out, the struggle for cultured
speech faded from the political agenda in the late 1920s,
after Stalin secured his grip on power.[78] It is only necessary to add that much of what
Trotsky writes in these articles is not only of historical interest,
let alone merely relevant to a Russian audience. As we today confront
our own terrible reality, where culture is under relentless attack
and every form of social backwardness spawned and encouraged,
Problems of Everyday Life remains a book for our times.
At certain points in his biography, Thatcher descends to levels
that can only be described as utterly absurd. He declares that
One can even claim that Trotsky was as dismissive of his
female compatriots as any other egocentric male.[79] He offers as proof a passage from a librarians
memoir, which recalled that Trotskys wife apparently went
to borrow a journal on his behalf. And so, writes Thatcher, we
discover Trotsky using his wife as a (unpaid?) secretary...[80] Thatcher also berates
Trotsky for failing, as he had advised in one of his essays, to
view reality through a womans eyes very seriously.
What evidence does Thatcher present to support this reprimand?
Certainly he did not advocate a female candidate to replace
Lenin; nor did he produce the promised fuller account of what
he thought a womans perspective on the world might be.[81] How does one begin to
reply to such criticisms?[82]
Endnotes:
[50] Thatcher, pp.
7-8. [return]
[51] The Conscience of
the Revolution, p. 244. Another excellent source for an objective
presentation of the controversy sparked by Lessons of October
is E. H. Carrs Socialism in One Country, Volume 2
(Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin, 1970), pp. 11-44. [return]
[52] Thatcher, p. 35. [return]
[53] Thatcher, predictably,
tries to downplay the significance of the circulation figures
by suggesting that the press run may have been greater than the
actual readership. That is, of course, possible. But it is also
possible that the readership, when copies that were passed around
are considered, may have been greater than the press run. [return]
[54] Thatcher, p. 35. [return]
[55] Ibid, p. 35. [return]
[56] Ibid, p. 35. [return]
[57] London, 1967, pp. 60-61.
[return]
[58] Ibid, p. 60. [return]
[59] The Origins of Bolshevism,
New York, 1970, p. 345. [return]
[60] Thatcher, p. 125. In
reality, Trotsky never made such subjective claims of personal
infallibility. And Thatcher does not produce a single citation
in which Trotsky argued that only his methods would
work. [return]
[61] Ibid, pp. 125-26. [return]
[62] The October 19, 1923
letter is included in the collection of documents published in
The Struggle for Power: Russia in 1923, edited and
translated by Valentina Vilkova. Although Thatcher frequently
cites Vilkova, he does not list her work as a source for the October
19 letter, nor does he refer to her assessment of this document.
Vilkova writes that the October 19 letter is a vivid illustration
of the methods used by the majority when carrying out the discussion.
Most probably the document has been written by Stalin, since the
argumentation and the style of presentation coincided with that
of the speech of the General Secretary at the October Plenary
Meeting of the Central Committee. The letter contained seriously
strained interpretations, sheer lies, and the falsification of
both the historical facts and the appraisal of the situation in
the Party and in the country as a whole (New York: Prometheus
Press, 1996) p. 28. [return]
[63] London, 1969, p. 307.
[return]
[64] Thatcher, p. 127. [return]
[65] Gregor, p. 221. [return]
[66] In his general introduction
to the entire volume, Gregor bitterly denounces Lenin in terms
redolent of Cold War anti-communist ideologues. He argues that
Stalinism was the logical outcome of Lenins personal intolerance
and political doctrine.
Lenin was the mentor and Stalin the pupil who carried his
masters legacy to its logical conclusion. The pages of history
are full of accounts of atrocities committed in the name of high
principle. The two bolshevik leaders were no exception. As difficult
as it may be, to accept it, both, in their own ways, wished to
serve what they regarded as the most worthy cause; and there lies
one of the ironies of history, for there are no men more dangerous
and ruthless than those who know how to save mankind
(p. 38). [return]
[67] Thatcher, p. 128. [return]
[68] In a relevant passage,
Trotsky stated, The English have a proverb: My country right
or wrong. We can say with much greater historical justification:
Whether it is right or wrong at any particular moment, this is
my party. And although some comrades may think I was wrong in
raising this or that point; although some comrades may think I
have incorrectly described this or that danger; I for my part
believe that I am only fulfilling my duty as a party member who
warns his party about what he considers to be a danger.
For the full text of Trotskys speech, see The Challenge
of the Left Opposition 1923-25 (New York, 1975), pp.
161-80. The citation presented here appears on page 179. [return]
[69] Lenin Collected Works,
Volume 36 (Moscow, 1966), p. 595. [return]
[70] Ibid, pp. 594-95. [return]
[71] Ibid, p. 596. [return]
[72] Thatcher, p. 131. [return]
[73] Lenin: A Political
Life, Volume 3 (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995), pp. 273-74.
[return]
[74] Ibid, p. 285. [return]
[75] Thatcher, p. 135. [return]
[76] Ibid, pp. 135-37. [return]
[77] As explained very well
by Professor S.A. Smith of the University of Essex, From
the 1880s a stratum of conscious workers emerged,
who rebelled against the poverty and degradation which surrounded
them and who struggled to advance themselves through education.
Modelling themselves on the radical intelligentsia, they identified
themselves with the ideal of kulturnost which
the intelligentsia represented. This concept of culturedness
connected ideas of growth of the individual to reflections on
the evolution of society at large. On the one hand, it denoted
inner cultivation, in the sense of intellectual development, refinement
of manners and moral development: in short, the forging of a self
worthy of mans innate dignity and capable of commanding
respect in others. On the other hand, kulturnost
was a sociological category used to evaluate the level of civilization
achieved by a particular society along an evolutionary spectrum.
In this respect, Russia was characterized precisely by its lack
of kulturnost, perceived as lying closer to
Asiatic barbarism than to western-European
civilization.
Smith continues, For conscious workers, a crucial
element in the acquisition of kulturnost was
the repudiation of swearing. Like the intelligentsia, these workers
saw the ubiquity of swearing as a symptom of the lack of culture
that enslaved Russian society. At the individual level, swearing
was a sign of the underdevelopment of lichnost, that
inner sense of personal dignity and worth as a human being, and
a sign of lack of respect for others. And learning to regulate
speech (and emotions) was seen as vital to achieving the intellectual
and moral self-activity that was at the heart of kulturnost.
By extension, the capacity to control speech indicated an individuals
potential to exercise control over wider aspects of working life
and, ultimately, over society as a whole. At the social level,
the widespread use of mat [swearing] among workers was,
for the conscious minority, a depressing reminder of the political
backwardness of the working class (The Social Meanings of
Swearing: Workers and Bad Language in Late Imperial and Early
Soviet Russia, Past and Present, No. 160. (August
1998), pp. 177-79. [return]
[78] Professor Smith writes
that during the Stalin era, it became acceptable for the
new breed of official to use mat. (Ibid, p. 200)
[return]
[79] Thatcher, p. 137. [return]
[80] Ibid, p. 137. [return]
[81] Ibid, p. 138. [return]
[82] Thatcher fails to indicate
who that female candidate might have been. So as not to permit
even this point to go entirely unanswered, I will cite a brief
passage from The Autobiography of a Sexually Emancipated Woman,
by Alexandra Kollontai, a leading female member of the Bolshevik
Party. After the revolution she assumed the leadership of the
Coordinating Office for Work Among Women. In relation to this
assignment, Kollontai wrote, The law liberalizing abortion
was put through and a number of regulations of benefit to women
were introduced by our Coordinating Office and legally confirmed.
... Our work received the wholehearted support from Lenin. And
Trotsky, although he was overburdened with military tasks, unfailingly
and gladly appeared at our conferences (New York, 1971),
p. 42. This comment was written in 1926. By that time, it was
no longer politic to praise Trotsky. This fact invests Kollontais
words with probative value. [return]
See Also:
Leon Trotsky and the post-Soviet school
of historical falsification
A review of two Trotsky biographies by Geoffrey Swain and Ian
Thatcher
Part 4: The relevance of Trotsky
[12 May 2007]
Top of page
The WSWS invites your comments.
Copyright 1998-2008
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved |