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US federal court blocks second court martial against Army
war resister
By Naomi Spencer
15 November 2007
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On November 8, a federal judge blocked second Army court martial
proceedings against First Lieutenant Ehren Watada, the first commissioned
officer to openly refuse to deploy to Iraq. The decision is a
substantial blow to the prosecution, which has maintained that
civilian constitutional protections do not apply to military personnel.
Judge Benjamin Settle of the Western District court in Tacoma,
Washington, issued a preliminary injunction against the Army until
a military appeals court resolves whether a second court martial
constitutes double jeopardy, since the first was not completed.
Both the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and Article 44(a)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice protect individuals against
double jeopardy, or being tried for the same charges twice.
The ruling comes a month after Settle issued an emergency stay
on proceedings, when Watada requested relief from Army prosecution
as his appeals in the military court system were being exhausted.
The second court martial was scheduled to begin October 9.
Watada, who remains stationed at the Seattle, Washington-area,
Fort Lewis base, was court-martialed in February on one count
of missing movement stemming from his refusal to deploy
with his unit to Iraq in 2006, and on two counts of conduct unbecoming
an officer in connection with public statements explaining his
reasons for resisting the war.
Watadas refusal to deploy was based on evidence that
the war was illegal and unauthorized, and that therefore his participation
in it would make him a party to war crimes under the Nuremberg
Principles and the US Constitution.
Two unbecoming conduct charges had been dropped as part of
a January pre-trial agreement, after Watada agreed to sign a stipulation
of fact in which he admitted that he had refused to board the
plane to Iraq, and that he had given interviews in which he questioned
the legality of the war. Military judge John Head subsequently
threw out the stipulation and declared a mistrial just before
Watada was to testify in his defense, insisting that the agreement
amounted to a guilty plea. Both the defense and the government
prosecutors objected to the mistrial ruling.
Settle issued the injunction against a second prosecution on
three grounds. First, the court found that, with the second trial
imminent on charges carrying six years in prison, Watada would
suffer irreparable injury if relief is denied.
The military has insisted that because the first court martial
was not concluded, the second trial did not amount to double jeopardy.
Against this claim, Settle cited Arizona v. Washington,
a 1978 federal decision that clearly elaborated the law: Even
if the first trial is not completed, a second prosecution may
be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden
on the accused, prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized
by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even enhance
the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted. The danger
of such unfairness to the defendant exists whenever a trial is
aborted before it is completed. Consequently, as a general rule,
the prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to
require an accuse to stand trial.
Second, Settle concluded that Watadas double jeopardy
claim, currently pending in the US Circuit Court for the Armed
Forces, would likely succeed on its merits because it is
likely the military judge abused his discretion in rejecting the
stipulation midway through the trial on the same information upon
which he accepted it. Settle noted, there was no manifest
necessity for calling a mistrial, and...the record does not reflect
that reasonable alternatives to calling a mistrial were explored
or entertained.
Furthermore, Head likely abused his discretion in rejecting
the Stipulation of Fact after the Government had presented its
case and before [Watada] was allowed to present his. Neither
the prosecution nor the defense believed that there was any reason
to reject the stipulation, and, Settle wrote, both parties
agreed that they had a meeting of the minds as to the contents
of the stipulation and its use.
Shortly before Head declared mistrial, the judge asked Watada
to again explain his reasons for refusing to board the aircraft
bound for Iraq. Watada responded, Sir, my intent, as I stated
in public statements and as I stated to my chain of command numerous
times, was that the order to deploy to Iraq to support combat
operations in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] was to me, as I believed
in the facts and evidence that I saw, an illegal order.
He added, And that the war itself was illegal, and any participation
of mine would be contrary to my oath, and therefore I would have
no other choice but to refuse.
The defense never denied that Watada refused orders, but has
instead argued that the offenses for which the lieutenant is being
tried do not deserve punishment because the orders themselves
were illegal and military code necessitated their refusal.
The defense has held that Watadas public statements were
not unbecoming conduct as defined by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice: dishonesty, unfair dealing, indecency, indecorum,
lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Rather, the political
content of Watadas public statements makes them protected
speech under the Constitution.
In fact, Watada never stated anything contrary to military
code or American and international law. It is my conclusion
as an officer of the Armed Forces that the war in Iraq is not
only morally wrong but a horrible breach of American law,
he stated in June 2006, the first occasion the military characterized
as unbecoming conduct. As the order to take part in an illegal
act is ultimately unlawful as well, I must as an officer of honor
and integrity refuse that order.... The wholesale slaughter and
mistreatment of Iraqis is not only a terrible and moral injustice,
but its a contradiction to the Armys own law of land
warfare. My participation would make me party to war crimes.
From the outset of the proceedings against Watada, it was clear
that the military was less concerned with justice than with quashing
dissent in its ranks and setting a harsh example. For the military
and the Bush administration, declaring a mistrial and pursuing
unconstitutional prosecution against the officer is preferable
to allowing the Iraq wars legality to be challenged in court.
The military has consistently denied the relevance of Watadas
motive. However, the fact that the unbecoming conduct charges
leveled against Watada are the first such relating to statements
of political dissent in the ranks since the Vietnam War is in
itself revealing.
The war is deeply unpopular both within the military and among
the general population. Disciplinary proceedings against expressions
of this popular sentiment underscore the growing political divide
between the troops and the military brass.
According to Army figures, more than 10,000 soldiers have deserted
since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The rate of desertion has
increased every year; in 2006, just under 3,200 active-duty soldiers
deserted the Army, compared to 2,543 in 2005.
The majority of US soldiers stationed in Iraq, like the overwhelming
majority of Americans as a whole, want a complete withdrawal from
the country. An independent measure of troop sentiment is rare.
A Zogby poll conducted in February 2006 among active-duty soldiers
in Iraq found that 72 percent felt troops should be out within
a year. Of those, 29 percent said an immediate withdrawal was
in order.
See Also:
US Army to retry war resister
officer
[28 February 2007]
US Army court martial against
war resister lieutenant ends in mistrial
[9 February 2007]
US Army officer faces court
martial for refusing Iraq deployment order
[30 January 2007]
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