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Policing the neighbourhoodAustralias
new para-military police
Part 2
By Mike Head
28 September 2007
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This is the conclusion of a two-part series on the Australian
Federal Police. Part 1 was posted
on September 27.
The AFP and the Honiara riots
The real face of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) as a para-military
arm of Canberras neo-colonial policy has nowhere been more
graphically demonstrated than in the Solomon Islands.
The New Matilda online magazine has published fresh
evidence about the AFPs role in the April 18-19, 2006 riots
in Honiara, the Solomons capital. These riots, which began
outside parliament house and culminated in the burning down of
the citys Chinatown and other commercial and tourism buildings,
provided the justification for the dispatch of more than 400 Australian,
New Zealand and other troops and police, bolstering the ongoing
security contingent of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands (RAMSI) to more than 1,000.
The WSWS has previously reported evidence that suggests that
Australian forces may have deliberately provoked the rioting to
create the conditions for the Howard government to reinforce the
RAMSI operation following a general election in which its favoured
candidate, Prime Minister Allen Kemakeza, was defeated.
After newly-elected MPs defied the thrust of the election outcome
by voting to install Snyder Rini, Kemakezas deputy, as prime
minister, Solomon Islanders reacted with outrage, generally believing
the parliamentary vote to have been rigged through corruption
and bribery. An angry crowd converged on parliament to demand
Rinis resignation.
Luke Johnston, an Australian NGO worker who was at parliament,
told New Matilda he had not spoken out before because of
fear of retribution from Australian authorities. He said the crowd
that gathered outside parliament to hear the announcement of the
new prime minister was agitated but not violent. The people were
willing to negotiateuntil the AFPs riot squad stepped
in.
These guys [the AFPs Operational Response Group]
came flying down the driveway at full speed, right towards the
crowd. There were two or possibly three Land-cruisers full with
all the kit: bullet-proof vests, big shields, lots of weapons.
The crowd just scattered. That was the first turning point. The
second one was when they cleared the driveway, they started manhandling
people. The first physical contact was made by the AFP officers.
They werent brutal, but they were shoving and pushing, and
thats when people got cranky, Johnston told the magazine.
Then they [the police] tried to bust the PM out. They
rushed him out to the car under guard of the riot squad, and thats
when the first stone came. The police began firing stuff, and
that really set the crowd abuzz, because it sounds and looks like
guns. They started freaking, shouting youre shooting
us. They went mad, just hysterical, and they trashed every
vehicle, and they ran down the hill and started burning things
down, he said.
The police then withdrew and seemed to allow the burning and
looting to proceed. So I had to stand on my verandah for
two nights with a crowbar with the whole town abandoned to these
mobs, which just grew and grew, and watch as [the police] dealt
with the situation from the air. They put the helicopter over
the house and they were firing tear gas out of the helicopter.
(For the New Matilda interview and series see:
http://www.newmatilda.com/home/articledetailmagazine.asp?ArticleID=2488
http://www.newmatilda.com/home/default.asp)
The New Matilda series also drew attention to a World
Vision submission to the current Senate inquiry into Australian
peacekeeping operations. The submission included claims
by serving AFP officers that International Deployment Group (IDG)
members of the ADF used non-approved munitions during the Honiara
riots, and were instructed to fire at peoples heads or shoot
them in the back as they fled. World Visions submission
welcomed the AFPs participation in RAMSI as a positive
development, while voicing concerns that these practices
could undermine support for the operation.
According to World Vision, the munitions included either
40 mm bean bag rounds or 40 mm foam rounds, 12 gauge bean bag
rounds, CS Gas and possibly Stinger grenades containing rubber
balls. We understand that these munitions were used by IDG members
on 18th April 2006 in Honiara, despite them not being approved
use of force options at the time under Commissioners Order
3 (CO3). We further understand that on 19th April, CO3 was retrospectively
amended for a 28-day period to permit the use of previously non-approved
munitions.
World Vision said its sources reported that an IDG Team Leader
had given chilling instructions to Australian and New Zealand
police officers in the Solomon Islands. He reportedly informed
participants that, from his experience in PNG [Papua New Guinea],
a persons neck was a good place to aim with a 12 gauge bean
bag round, since this would render the person unconscious, and
that shooting people in the back as they were fleeing was also
acceptable.
During a Senate committee public hearing in Melbourne, World
Vision representatives were admonished for attracting media attention
to specific grievances, and the committee refused
to pursue the claims. Justice Minister David Johnston said he
was satisfied that the claims had been investigated internally,
but a World Vision spokesman said no eye witnesses had been interviewed
in the internal probe, including the officers who spoke to the
organisation.
The Howard government and the AFP have insisted that the police
conduct during the Honiara riots constituted an exemplary display
of the AFPs new role. In the June 2006 edition of AFP
News, the agencys newsletter, AFP Commissioner Mick
Keelty said the response by AFP members would be remembered
as a very proud moment in the AFPs history. He described
the bravery and courage shown by police officers as
an inspiration to us all at the AFP. They did
an incredible job in extremely volatile circumstances, exercising
enormous restraint and putting their own safety at risk to protect
others.
As the WSWS has documented, the Howard government has sought
to block or derail the Solomon Islands governments own commission
of inquiry into the Honiara riots. Its campaign has included attempts
to arrest and extradite the countrys attorney-general, Julian
Moti, on trumped-up statutory rape charges (see Solomon
Islands government rebuts Canberras child sex allegations
against attorney-general).
The fresh evidence raises many further questions about the
IDGs part in the Honiara riots. Did AFP commanders provoke
the disturbances and then stand aside while Honiara burnt, in
order to give the Howard government a pretext to fly in more troops
to fortify the RAMSI intervention? Were orders given to use potentially
lethal force? Were those orders retrospectively authorised? Has
a high-level cover-up taken place?
A domestic gendarmerie
Commissioner Keelty has referred to the AFP becoming a pseudo-gendarmerie
of Australian foreign policy. The same could be said of its growing
para-military and political role domestically.
As the Howard government has turned to military and police
interventions in the Asia-Pacific regions, it has also dramatically
escalated the AFPs powers, resources and activity at home.
This was on display at the recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) summit in Sydney. According to official sources, some 450
AFP officers were deployed, alongside 2,500 state police and 1,500
military personnel, who included Special Air Services (SAS) commandos
on standby.
The AFP said its contingent included dog squads (canine
explosives teams), heavily-armed bodyguards (personal
protection officers), intelligence analysts and airport
security personnel. Commissioner Keelty described it as a
huge deployment, the biggest we have had.
Because many police personnel removed their name tags, it was
impossible to determine how many AFP officers were among the squads
of armoured riot police, equipped with pistols, mace spray, taser
guns, batons, shields, armoured vehicles, water cannon and helicopters,
that surrounded the 10,000 demonstrators protesting against the
Iraq war and the policies of the Howard government and the Bush
administration.
In the lead-up to the summit, police commandos joined SAS and
other military personnel in anti-terrorism exercises,
featuring helicopters whirring through the city, gunboats speeding
up Sydney Harbour and simulated live ammunition shootouts at railway
stations.
Over recent months, the AFP has also played a leading part,
as an adjunct to the military, in the Howard governments
takeover of Aboriginal townships and camps across the Northern
Territory. Police have been stationed in scores of communities
to enforce such measures as welfare cutoffs, medical checks on
children, crackdowns on truancy and the seizures of control over
houses and land.
The Howard government clearly regards the IDGs experiences
overseas as valuable for its internal operations. That was illustrated
by the initial appointment as Northern Territory taskforce commander
of Shane Castles, the former Australian police chief of the Solomon
Islands RAMSI operation. Castles subsequently declined the Northern
Territory post, and was replaced by an army officer, Major-General
David Chalmers.
The connection between the foreign and domestic work of the
AFP was discussed with rare candour in a June 27 Canberra ABC
radio interview with acting Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
police commissioner Andy Hughes, another AFP officer with neo-colonial
experience. He had been forced to leave Fiji, where he had been
installed as Police Commissioner, after last years military
takeover in Fiji.
ABC host Ross Solly asked Hughes whether AFP officers had the
special set of skills needed to go into indigenous
areas, following reports that local people feared and opposed
the intervention. Hughes replied: Look I dont think
anyone is doubting that it is a big job. No question of that.
But, ACT Policing members and indeed AFP have had considerable
experience in difficult environments including recently of course,
East Timor, Solomon Islands, and other UN missions over time.
Were in Afghanistan, Sudan, so you know, the track record
of AFP and Australian Policing generally in difficult circumstances
is very good.
The AFP was also centrally involved in the Howard governments
ultimately unsuccessful operation to frame-up Indian Muslim doctor,
Mohammed Haneef, on terrorism charges. Haneef was detained for
nearly two weeks without trial, and then stripped of his visa
to block his release. Amid lurid media claims of a doctors
jihad networkobviously fed by prejudicial police and
government leaksPrime Minister Howard and leading ministers
declared that his arrest was a wake-up call to Australians that
terrorists could strike on home soil.
Within three weeks the case collapsed. It emerged that prosecutors,
acting on AFP information, had wrongly told a court that Haneefs
former mobile phone SIM card was found in the jeep that rammed
into Glasgow airport in late June. Haneefs lawyers released
the transcripts of two AFP interviews with their client, providing
a devastating picture of the AFPs modus operandi: false,
unsubstantiated and highly damaging allegations had been levelled
against an innocent man and peddled to the media and the courts
(see Haneef police transcript exposes
Australian governments terrorist conspiracy
claims).
The entire witchhunt was aimed at drumming up new public fears
of terrorism in advance of the federal elections, due by the end
of this year. As well, its aim was to justify the battery of unprecedented
powers, such as detention and interrogation without trial, wide-ranging
definitions of terrorism, the executive banning of organisations,
semi-secret trials and the outlawing of urging support for resistance
to Australian military interventions, handed to the AFP and its
intelligence partner, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO), since 2002.
Taken together, the scope and scale of the AFPs new
paradigm of policing amounts to the erection of the scaffolding
of a police-state within Australia along with the para-military
enforcement of Australian strategic and corporate interests throughout
the region.
Concluded
See Also:
The Howard government, RAMSI,
and the April 2006 Solomon Islands riots
Part 1
[21 February 2007]
The Howard government, RAMSI,
and the April 2006 Solomon Islands riots
Part 2
[22 February 2007]
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