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The tsunami in Sri Lanka: A case study in US humanitarian
missions
By K. Ratnayake
14 May 2008
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Since the cyclone engulfed Burma on May 3, there has been an
incessant campaign in the international media to push for foreign
militaries, along with aid officials, to be allowed into the country.
Article after article contrasts the paranoia, incompetence and
callousness of the Burmese junta with the supposed willingness
of the US and other major powers to generously provide humanitarian
assistance.
The Burmese junta has clearly demonstrated once again its repressive
methods and callous disregard for human life. But the claim that
Washington and its allies are acting purely out of concern for
the Burmese people is simply a lie. As in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Bush administration is pursuing its strategic and economic
interestsin the case of Burma to undermine a regime that
is allied to China, which the US regards as a potentially dangerous
rising rival.
In making the case for an intervention in Burma, the media
commentary frequently raises the 2004 tsunami, claiming that the
international response, including the deployment of foreign militaries,
was a model of efficiency and benevolence. Completely ignored
is what actually took place in 2004, its political implications
and the fate of the tens of thousands of survivors who are still
struggling to survive in countries around the Bay of Bengal.
The case of Sri Lanka contains important lessons. After Indonesia,
Sri Lanka was the country hardest hit by tsunami. According to
official figures, at least 30,920 people died, 519,063 were displaced
and 103,836 houses destroyed. The devastation was horrendous.
Homes, schools, hospitals, road, rail lines, communications were
all swept away. Whole villages disappeared. The survivors were
left without shelter, food, clean water and medicine. Many, particularly
fishermen, lost their livelihoods.
Burma is not alone in having an incompetent, repressive administration.
For days the government of President Chandrika Kumaratunga did
nothing, particularly in the East and North where a tense ceasefire
was holding with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
It was above all ordinary working people, including those with
skills such as doctors and nurses, who streamed out of Colombo
and provided the first assistance to desperate survivors.
The reaction of the government was to deploy soldiers and troops
and place the entire aid operation under military control, including
the teams of volunteers. Their prime concern was not to help the
survivors, who faced appalling conditions in squalid improvised
refugee camps, but to suppress any opposition or protests at the
governments indifference and lack of aid. Above all, the
way in which ordinary Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims had come together
to assist each other, cut directly across the decades of anti-Tamil
communalism on which the Colombo political establishment has rested.
It was in this context that the Bush administration dispatched
the US military to Sri Lanka. Former Secretary of State Colin
Powell did not so much ask as demand that marines be allowed into
the south of the island. Even in ruling circles, eyebrows were
raised at allowing American troops into the country for the first
time. An editorial in the Daily Mirror openly questioned
whether the military intervention had ulterior motivesto
further US interests in Central Asia and the Middle East.
Kumaratunga quickly acquiesced, however. Three hundred marines
landed in the south of the island and were deployed there and
at Arugam Bay in the East. The aid operation was very limited.
The soldiers helped clear debris, handed out some relief supplies,
posed for the media and then pulled out several months later.
Undoubtedly some survivors received assistance, but the overriding
purpose of the US military presence was political.
The operation had a number of motives: to overcome decades
of deep hostility among the Sri Lankan masses towards US imperialism
and to set a precedent that is now being invoked in the case of
Burma. But as the Socialist Equality Party warned, above all Washington
was seeking to forge closer military ties, including with Sri
Lanka, to pursue its economic and strategic ambitions throughout
the broader region.
Sri Lankas strategic significance
That warning was confirmed. Sri Lankas main strategic
significance is its position astride the main sea-lanes of the
Indian Ocean, including the main route from the Middle East through
the Malacca Strait to the Pacific. In particular, the deep-water
port of Trincomalee on the eastern coast has been long been regarded
as an important prize. After the 2002 ceasefire was signed with
the LTTE, a high-level team from the US Pacific Command visited
Sri Lanka to make a detailed study of Trincomalee harbour and
assess the potential LTTE threats.
At that point, the Bush administration was still publicly supporting
the so-called international peace process as the means for ending
the islands bitter 20-year civil war. Washingtons
concern was not, however, with the devastation that the war had
brought to Sri Lankas population, but rather that the conflict
was a destabilising influence which threatened US interests in
the region, particularly in India.
By December 2004, however, the peace process was already at
the point of collapse. Peace negotiations had broken down in April
2003 and in early 2004 President Kumaratunga summarily dismissed
the United National Front (UNF) government for undermining
national security. In the background, the military and Sinhala
extremist parties, such as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)a
partner in Kumaratungas new government, were already pressing
for a renewed war.
The US and other major powers used the catastrophe created
by the tsunami to push for a joint mechanism between the government
and the LTTE to distribute international aid. The proposal was
regarded as the first step towards restarting peace negotiations.
Kumaratunga tentatively embraced the suggestion, in part because
of broad popular sentiment that the tsunami had demonstrated that
all Sri Lankans were in the same boat and that the fratricidal
war should be ended. However, the military high command and the
JVP regarded the temporary aid body as an impermissible concession
to the LTTE.
The tsunami was a convenient pretext for forging closer political
and military ties with Washington. Powell visited Colombo in early
January as part of his tour of affected countries. In April, Admiral
William J. Fallon, then head of the US Pacific Command, visited
Sri Lanka, met with government leaders and toured areas hit by
the tsunami, including Trincomalee. In the same month, Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca arrived in Sri
Lanka to discuss the joint aid mechanism.
The Bush administration was clearly pursuing a two-pronged
strategypublicly pushing for peace talks, while privately
holding top level discussions with the Sri Lankan military over
possible war plans. Discussions over a joint aid administration
dragged on for months. A conference of major aid donors on May
16-17 issued an ultimatum to Colombo to establish the body as
the condition for a $US3 billion aid package.
Kumaratunga reluctantly established the Post-Tsunami Operations
Management Structure (P-TOMS) with the LTTE, but it was a lame
duck from the outset. The JVP withdrew from the government and
successfully challenged the constitutionality of P-TOMS in the
Supreme Court. At presidential elections in November 2005, the
JVP backed the new candidate of Kumaratungas Sri Lanka Freedom
PartyMahinda Rajapakseon a platform that scrapped
P-TOMS completely and set the course for a renewed war.
Having narrowly won office, Rajapakse with the tacit backing
of Washington immediately adopted a highly provocative stance
towards the LTTE. In January 2006, the US ambassador in Colombo
Jeffrey Lunstead signalled Washingtons support for a renewed
war, demanding the LTTE accept the governments terms for
talks. If the LTTE chooses to abandon peace, Lunstead
warned, we want it to be clear, they will face a stronger,
more capable and more determined Sri Lankan military. We want
the cost of a return to war to be high.
A covert war of provocation and murders erupted into open conflict
in July 2006 when Rajapakse ordered the army to seize the LTTE-held
area of Mavilaru in open breach of the 2002 ceasefire. This open
act of aggression brought not a murmur of criticism from the US
or the other sponsors of the peace process. Today
the island is bogged down in a brutal civil warwith the
US providing political and military support.
According to a report by the Federation of American Scientists
(FAS), direct commercial sales of defence materials to Sri Lanka
increased from $US1.9 million in 2004, to $3.1 million in 2005
and $3.9 million in 2006. In return, the Rajapakse government
quietly supports the Bush administrations occupations of
Iraq and Afghanistan and last year signed an agreement to allow
the US military to use the island for logistical support.
As for the victims of the tsunami, they have been completely
forgotten. According to the governments Reconstruction and
Development Agency (RADA), 6,718 families or more than 25,000
people were still living in appalling conditions in refugee camps
in Marchthat is, more than three years after the tsunami.
Most of the families5,820are in the North and East
where the renewed fighting is taking place. Even in the district
surrounding the capital of Colombo, there are 803 families in
camps.
These official figures are undoubtedly an underestimate. Moreover,
many more of the survivors, including those who have been re-housed,
still face enormous economic difficulties. Many fishermen lost
their livelihoods and were resettled away from the coastline.
On the pretext of protecting the population, the government exploited
the opportunity to clear away fishing villages to pave the way
for luxury hotels and resorts.
The plight of these refugees speaks volumes. Hakeem from the
eastern rural town of Marathumunai told the WSWS this week: In
our village 186 families were affected by tsunami. Hundreds were
killed when the tsunami hit. He said that no one in his
village had a house. Many had no full time work and earned a little
money as casual labourers. The central school at Maruthumunai
has not been built.
The story is the same in the Western Province. An old abandoned
government building in the Colombo suburb of Katubedda is where
56 families are currently living. The building is dilapidated.
Each family has about 40 square metres partitioned off. Toilets
overflow with effluent. Electricity has been cut off because the
Disaster Management ministry has not paid the bill. None of the
adults have a proper job.
A 19-year-old girl told the WSWS: You ask about the situation
in Burma. As we cant watch television or have access to
any other media we dont know whats going on there.
I only know from you about the situation. It sounds somewhat similar.
Throughout the world we see how ordinary people are hit by natural
disasters and how the rulers treat them.
The US marines have long since moved on, international tsunami
aid to Sri Lanka has dried up and the government is diverting
money from basic services into its renewed war. The story will
undoubtedly be similar in Burma. The push to intervene in Burma
is motivated by the economic and strategic interests of the major
powers which are diametrically opposed to those of the majority
of Burmese and will inevitably produce to new tragedies.
See Also:
A socialist and internationalist
perspective to confront the Asian tsunami disaster
[9 February 2005]
Why the propaganda campaign for international
intervention in Burma?
[10 May 2008]
A new Asian disaster: Cyclone kills tens
of thousands in Burma
[7 May 2008]
Bush administration moves to exploit
Burma cyclone disaster
[7 May 2008]
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