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WSWS : News
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Castro on Caribbean tour seeks to build pressure against US
embargo
By Bill Vann
6 August 1998
Fidel Castro's six-day swing through the Caribbean has been
widely interpreted as a sign that Cuba is breaking out of the
diplomatic and economic isolation that US policy has attempted
to impose on the island nation for nearly 40 years. Certainly
Castro's trip had its share of ironic inroads into what had appeared
to be irreversible victories for Washington's policy in the region.
The Cuban leader was welcomed to Jamaica by none other than
former prime minister Edward Seaga, leader of the right-wing Jamaican
Labour Party, who was brought to power in 1980 in elections dominated
by a CIA destabilization campaign that claimed more than 350 lives.
Having driven out the left-nationalist regime of Michael Manley,
Seaga proceeded to break relations with Havana and promote US
policy in the Caribbean. The old anti-communist Seaga embraced
Castro and declared that every dispute had to come to an end.
Grenada will soon mark the 15th anniversary of the US invasion
and occupation that changed forever that island's political life,
relegating the left-nationalist and pro-Cuban New Jewel Movement
of the late Maurice Bishop to a pariah status. Yet the island's
Prime Minister Keith Mitchell greeted Castro as an old friend.
Havana's assistance in building Grenada's airport, denounced
by Washington in the run-up to the invasion as Cuban military
expansionism, was gratefully acknowledged and Castro was even
allowed to dedicate a monument to Cuban construction workers who
died in the unequal battle with U.S. troops.
In Jamaica, Grenada and Barbados, Castro followed a set pattern,
meeting with government officials, holding rallies before enthusiastic
audiences and finally attending closed-door sessions with businessmen
interested in capital investment in Cuba. For Castro, the Caribbean
tour was in continuity with Cuban foreign policy as it has developed
in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. Havana has directed
all its efforts to winning allies, of whatever political stripe,
in its campaign to pressure Washington into lifting the economic
embargo that it has enforced against the island since the early
1960s.
At the beginning of this year, the Castro regime gave an elaborate
welcome to Pope John Paul II. In an unmistakable gesture of accommodation
to imperialism, Castro organized huge state-sponsored masses,
at which the Pope declared the blockade "immoral."
The Pope is hardly alone in expressing qualms about US trade
policy toward Cuba. The National Association of Manufacturers
in the US and the corporate directors of virtually every major
American-based multinational have also publicly opposed a ban
on investment and commercial ties with Cuba, on the grounds that
European and Canadian capital are being given a free hand in a
potentially highly profitable market.
Castro's three-nation tour of the Caribbean has a similar purpose
to the Pope's visit to Cuba. Despite the rhetoric about anti-colonialism
and regional solidarity in his speeches to crowds in Kingston,
Bridgetown and St. George, Castro's main objective is to use the
former British West Indies and its international links as a back
door to forging closer ties with international capital.
If the tour expresses a long-standing Cuban drive to bury the
hatchet with Western imperialism, it also indicates a developing
shift within the regimes in the rest of the Caribbean. None of
them any longer perceive Cuba as posing any revolutionary threat
to their stability. They do, however, see a certain advantage
in forging closer ties with Castro.
Grenada's Prime Minister Mitchell summed up the motives of
the Caribbean bourgeoisie in its rapprochement with the Castro
regime: "Cuba, because of its long-standing dispute with
the United States, has a special place in the world. Therefore,
any relationship with Cuba brings instant international recognition."
Why do the Caribbean regimes desire "recognition?"
Clearly, they feel that they have gotten the short end of the
stick as far as their relations with Washington are concerned.
US foreign aid to the region has been slashed by 25 percent in
the last five years, from nearly $200 million in 1993 to just
$137 million in 1997. Aid totals for this year are expected to
show another $3 million drop.
There has not been a compensating increase in US-Caribbean
trade. The Caribbean Basin Initiative, promoted by the Reagan
and Bush administrations, has become a dead letter due to Washington's
concentration on the NAFTA treaty with Mexico and Canada and its
possible extension to the more developed economies of Latin America.
Washington, moreover, has pursued an aggressive case against the
Caribbean banana industry, a vital component in the region's trade,
winning a World Trade Organization ruling that the European Union's
preferences for Caribbean bananas violated free trade rules.
While the Caribbean regimes may see ties with Cuba as a useful
means of attracting attention from Washington and the EU (and
no doubt see no harm to their standing at home in identifying
themselves with the vaguely left and nationalist rhetoric of Fidel)
none of them appear overly anxious to cement closer economic bonds
with the Castro government. CARICOM, the region's 15-member Caribbean
Community free trade association, has been discussing a proposal
to admit Cuba for more than two years, continuously putting off
a decision. Another study on the issue is to be discussed at a
CARICOM-Cuba joint commission meeting set for December in Havana.
The former British colonies of the West Indies that dominate
CARICOM see little advantage to Cuban membership. The largest
Caribbean nation, Cuba has a population of more than 11 million,
compared with 20 million for all the CARICOM countries combined
(Haiti and the Dominican Republic, neither of which are full members,
account for two-thirds of that total). The weight of Cuba would
be felt in CARICOM, but it is widely believed that the island's
economy is in no condition to increase its imports from the rest
of the region. Cuba's aim is to use any Caribbean pact to accelerate
its creation of free trade zones and the expansion of foreign
capitalist investment.
While the Caribbean bourgeoisie, like capitalists all over
the world, recognize the potential for profit in Cuba, they have
little confidence that a further opening of the Cuban economy
to foreign capital will benefit them or lead to greater regional
integration. They see Cuba's most likely path to be a resumption
of its economic orbit around the US economy, with investments
by American and expatriate Cuban capital in the island's tourist
and other industries spelling only stiffer competition for the
impoverished economies of the West Indies.
As a right-wing columnist writing in Jamaica's Daily Gleaner
put it, while "Cuba under Castroism constitutes no particular
addition to CARICOM...a redeemed Cuba could pose a serious threat
to our national economy."
See Also:
WSWS mobilizing opposition to arrests
by LTTE authorities
New information indicates lives of Tamil
socialists in grave peril
[6 August 1998]
Castroism and the
Politics of Petty-Bourgeois Nationalism
[A lecture by Bill Vann]
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