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The BSE crisis
British officials fall out over the "Beef is Safe"
campaign
By Paul Mitchell
5 November 1998
"British beef is safe" was the constant message of
the previous Conservative government, its top officials and the
meat and farming industries as the crisis resulting from Bovine
Spongiform Encepalopathy (BSE), or "Mad Cow Disease",
unfolded.
This apparent unity has started to collapse as each of the
protagonists has tried to justify their own actions and pass the
blame to others for a public scandal that has seen 29 people die
from the human form of BSE, and has cost billions of pounds in
compensation paid to the beef industry.
The unsavoury spectacle of senior public health officials and
industry spokesman exchanging claim and counter-claim in an attempt
to pass the buck could be witnessed during the Labour government's
public inquiry into the BSE crisis. The official terms of reference
of the "BSE Inquiry", set up earlier this year, are:
"To establish and review the history of the emergence and
identification of BSE and new variant CJD in the United Kingdom,
and of the action taken in response to it up to the 20 March 1996;
to reach conclusions on the adequacy of that response, taking
account of the state of knowledge at the time; and to report on
these matters." The 1996 date corresponds to the announcement
in parliament by the then Tory Secretary of State for Health Stephen
Dorrell that a link between BSE in cattle and new variant Creutzfeld-Jakob
Disease (nvCJD) in humans had been confirmed.
Three officials, in particular, dominated the nation's TV screens
and newspapers during this period. Sir Donald Acheson was the
Chief Medical Officer at the Department of Health from 1983 to
1991. His successor was Sir Kenneth Calman. Keith Meldrum was
Chief Veterinary Officer between 1988 and 1997 at the Ministry
of Agriculture (MAFF).
All made repeated statements that "beef is safe".
Since the cattle organs considered most dangerous, such as the
brain, spinal cord and other offal, were banned for human consumption
in 1989, it was said that eating beef muscle did not cause CJD.
Sir Donald Acheson told the inquiry there was "tension"
between his department and MAFF and that he was pressurised to
say beef was safe. "It was several years after the events
that I became aware that for some people the word 'safe', without
qualification, means zero risk," he said. Asked about his
reassuring statement to the media after a Siamese cat died of
BSE in 1990, he said, "I find it impossible to reconstruct
the considerations that led to the wording of my own contribution,
in particular, why I chose to follow MAFF in the word 'safely'
rather than 'with confidence'."
His successor Sir Kenneth Calman was aware there was a chance
BSE might infect humans even before he became Chief Medical Officer.
After the Siamese cat died, he said it "strengthened my view",
but he still endorsed Acheson's statement that beef was safe.
He explained that safe meant "negligible" and not "zero"
risk.
Calman claimed he was first formally told there were serious
breaches in the offal ban by Keith Meldrum in October 1995. He
claims Meldrum expressed disappointment at the breaches, but "understated
the importance of this information." Calman also said he
was astonished at the "careless attitude" of farmers
and slaughterhouse owners. "For me it was important the public
were given all the information. This included the important new
information that offal could have entered the human food chain.
MAFF clearly found that a step too far for them and wanted to
change that." He said MAFF were more worried about the costs
to farmers and reassuring the public. However, Calman himself
agreed to advertisements by the Meat and Livestock Commission
two months later reassuring the public regarding the safety of
eating beef.
The former Chief Veterinary Officer replied to Calman's accusations,
saying, "I should be judged by my actions and not by my words."
Meldrum said, "It is unfortunate that those who are following
the inquiry are not able to see the totality of the picture and
therefore the comments from Sir Kenneth Calman are not being seen
against the comments from my old department [MAFF]." He said
he had kept Acheson and Calman informed of any new findings, however
unimportant. When he talked to the media he said he was simply
following the line taken by successive Chief Medical Officers,
particularly on the safety of beef.
However, his statement to the BSE Inquiry shows he was aware
of problems with the offal ban from the start. In August 1992
he received reports from contacts in the meat industry about failures
to separate out the banned offal. In May 1994 the rendering company
Prosper de Mulder repeated the same information.
Meldrum also reported that Ministers and officials had discussed
destroying all British cattle in 1990 but admitted that no contingency
plans had been drawn up for the eventuality the disease might
spread to humans. "It would have been the equivalent of planning
for a disaster," he added.
Andrew Fleetwood, a MAFF vet, said he was told unscrupulous
abattoirs had cheated the offal ban and it was treated "little
better than a joke in certain quarters" of the meat industry.
Meat Inspectors "were often quite junior and easily browbeaten
by the slaughterhouse managers," who were probably aware
of any inspections in advance, he claimed.
Peter Carrigan, whose company disposes of abattoir waste, complained
of Meldrum and "the clowns whose total inaptitude brought
this once prosperous industry to its knees." He said he was
"more likely to meet a Martian than a MAFF vet within an
abattoir."
After seven months of hearings, the BSE Inquiry finally took
evidence from a number of relatives who had lost their loved ones
to nvCJD. Although the beef industry was paid billions of pounds
in state handouts for its losses, the relatives of those struck
down by this terrible disease have yet to receive a single penny
in compensation. Indeed, it has been left to the families to draw
up proposals for the provision and costing of care for nvCJD patients.
Many suffered appalling problems trying to care for and bury their
relatives.
Dot Churchill explained that a wheelchair only arrived for
her son Stephen three days after he had died in 1995. She said
she was in contact with a family who had made 42 calls to different
medical professionals about their son, who was showing the symptoms
of nvCJD. Nobody would listen until he was arrested by the police.
She said, "I think that is a very sad reflection that three
and a half years on this is still happening." The people
who told us beef was safe in the past are still giving the same
reassurances today, she added.
More information is yet to come out. Meldrum has so far refused
to release tapes in which he voices his opinions of other officials
and ministers. MAFF, the government department implicated in the
whole crisis, would not provide the BSE Inquiry with a report
in its possession, believed to contain a history of the BSE crisis,
listing MAFF's mistakes and potential legal liabilities.
The first phase of the BSE Inquiry concludes this year with
evidence from former government Ministers. Phase two will take
further evidence clarifying submissions, dealing with conflicts
and potential criticisms. It will conclude with final submissions
from the counsel to the inquiry. The inquiry report, expected
in July 1999, will first be presented to government ministers.
The official web site of the Public Inquiry set up to establish
and review the history into the emergence and identification of
BSE and new variant CJD in the United Kingdom can be accessed
at: http://www.bse.org.uk/
See Also:
Human BSE/CJD: Anatomy
of a Health Disaster
New book on BSE widely praised
[27 March 1998]
WSWS coverage
of the BSE crisis
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